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This dissertation is an exploration of the dynamics of Iranian-Saudi relations from
the earliest days of their encounter in the 1920s through 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.
This is a period in the relations of the two states that has rarely been the subject of
intellectual inquiry in the existing literature. This present research provides an analytical
historiography of Iranian-Saudi relations with an aim to examine the elements
constituting the dynamics of their relations. This is attained by contextualizing the
milestones of Iranian-Saudi relations, triangulating historical accounts to identify the
narrative among alternatives that best fits the meaningful causal processes explaining
continuity and change, and weighing the impacts of factors playing a role in any given
period of the Iranian-Saudi relations.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
A characteristic of the contemporary global politics is its “regional flavor.”1 Two
waves of regionalism are historically identifiable. The first wave began in the 1950s and
continued into the 1970s. The still-ongoing second wave which is referred to as “new
regionalism”2 started in the mid-1980s.3 Some scholars contend that “significant periods
of economic regionalism” occurred in the interwar period and then only in the 1980s,4
while Acharya and Johnston maintain that “regionalism has been a consistent feature of the
global security and economic architecture since World War II.”5
Security studies at the regional level is profoundly indebted to the various phases
of decolonization specifically in the 1960s and the end of the Cold War.6 Decolonization
put an end to European imperialism and ushered in national states and sovereign equality.
Such rough equality replaced inequalities characteristic of the colonial era. This

Mark Beeson, M. “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical
Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, 12.6 (2005): 969-985.
1

2

Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political
Change (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Wilfred J. Ethier, “The New Regionalism,” The Economic
Journal, 108, 449 (1998): 1149-1161.; Bjorn Hettne, “Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second
Great Transformation.” Globalism and the New Regionalism, 1(1999): 1-24.
3

Jagdish Bhagwati, "Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview," New Dimensions in Regional
Integration 22 (1993).
4

Michael Kitson, & Jonathan Michie. Trade and Growth, a Historical Perspective: From Managing the
Global Economy (Oxford University Press. 1995).
5

Amitav Acharya & Alistair Ian Johnston, Crafting cooperation: Regional International Institutions in
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18.
Peter J. Katzenstein, “Re-examining Norms of Interstate Relations in the New Millennium,” Kuala
Lumpur: Paper for the 14th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 2000); Patrick Morgan, “Regional Security
Complexes and Regional Orders,” in David Lake and Patrick Morgan, ed. Regional Orders: Building
Security in a New World (Penn State University Press, 1997), 6-7.
6
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transformative shift had important ramifications for politics and security studies.
Regionalism was revived once the grand ideological rivalry between the two
superpowers declined in the closing years of the Cold War.7 While some scholars doubt
this thesis,8 the pervasive belief holds that regionalism is highly indebted to the end of the
Cold War. The end of the Cold War ensued by weakening of global security arrangements,
reduced the penetrative capacity and appetite of the superpowers considerably. The loss of
power and appetite on the part of superpowers to actively engage in different world regions
provided regional actors with more room to maneuver, exercise their sovereignty and quest
for regional domination.9 In the absence of the great power influence, the new environment
provided a fertile ground for a new international system wherein regional arrangements
could assume greater importance.10 With the end of an era when the exigencies of
superpower politics would condition regional affairs, states realized that they could
conduct their regional security affairs and international alignments with greater liberty.

Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism.” International
Affairs, 80.3 (2004) 429-446.
7

See Arthur Stein, and Steven E. Lobell, “Geostructuralism and international politics: the end of the Cold
War and the regionalization of international security” in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional
Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)
101-122; Michael Mastanduno, “A realist view: Three images of the coming international order.”
International Order and the Future of World Politics, 1990, 19-40.; William C. Wohlforth, "The stability
of a unipolar world." International security, 24, no. 1 (1999): 5-41.
8

9

Barry Buzan, People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era
(Ecpr Press, 2008); Richard Rosecrance, "Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era." International
Journal 46, no. 3 (1991): 373-393; Andrew Hurrell, & Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism and international
order?” in Andrew Hurrell, & Louise Fawcett, eds. Regionalism in world politics: Regional organization
and international order (Oxford University Press, 1995); Edmond J. Keller, "Rethinking African Regional
Security." Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (1997): 296-317.; Barry Buzan, and Gerald
Segal. ‘The rise of "lite" powers: a strategy for the postmodern state." World Policy Journal 13, no. 3
(1996): 1-10.; Stein & Lobell, “Geostructuralism”; David J. Pervin, "Building Order in Arab-Israeli
Relations: From Balance to Concert." Regional orders: Building security in a new world (1997): 271-95.
10

Buzan, People, states & fear.
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Whether regions’ rise in importance after the Cold War occurred due to an insideout thrust in the absence of the grand ideological struggle or, as Katzenstien maintains, as
the result of the encouragement by the United Stated perceiving regions as foundational
pieces to the global security puzzle under the aegis of “American imperium,”11 the
unequivocal fact is that regions matter both in policy and academic debates.
Among all the regions of the world, the Middle East is perhaps the most volatile.
The Persian Gulf as a sub-region of the Middle East stands further out due to its political,
economic, strategic, and geopolitical complexities. The geostrategic significance of the
region, the fact that it hosts unresolved historical multi-dimensional disputes among its
littoral states, the existence of serious human security issues with upward pressure on the
states’ capacity to control, the weakness of regional governance institutions, the uncertainty
caused by non-state actors and social dynamics; and the long-lasting presence of outside
powers in it encourage intellectual probe into the security dynamics of this fascinating
setting.
This research is an analytical historiography of Iranian-Saudi security dynamics
from 1920s through 1979. This research begins with the 1920s because the earliest
encounters between Persia and Saudi Arabia — which was in the making — dates back to
these years. Also, the 1979 Islamic Revolution has been decided to offer a logical cut-off
point for the scope and purpose of this research. The post-revolutionary Iran underwent a
massive overhaul in its foreign policy concerns and practices, discouraging any
juxtaposition of these two essentially distinct eras in one enterprise as large as a

11

Peter J. Katzenstein, A world of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Cornell University
Press, 2005). Katzenstein argues that the United States made “regionalism a central feature of world
politics” so that it would serve its imperial interests across the globe.

3

dissertation. The present research is informed by the pursuit of five themes/inquiries. First,
this research problematizes mutual/dialectic construction of security perceptions, practices
and policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia whenever such interconnectedness was
historically demonstrable. Second, in this analytical historiography of Iranian-Saudi
security relations, the notion of “agency” is traced and examined. An assessment of the
degree to which players can manifest agential capacity, will and power within the rigidity
of regional configurations is important in regional security studies. This research aims to
challenge the notion that regional players simply lacked any meaningful agency prior and
during the Cold War. This research contends that beyond British hegemony in the Persian
Gulf region prior its withdrawal, and the Cold War grand superpower ideological rivalry,
the Iranian-Saudi relations reflect considerable agential qualities. These qualities are
typically overlooked in the literature that accentuates the role of the great powers in
determining the course of events in the regions, and discounts regional conflicts outside
the Cold War grand rivalry as simple microcosms of the overarching ideological struggle.
The present research analyzes the role of super/great powers in the region in terms of
regional players’ response to their presence or quest for having a presence in the region.
This approach will provide a better insight on the impact of outside forces on the regional
security dynamics.

12

Third, this research provides a fresh assessment of Iranian-Saudi

security relations in the Western orbit during various phases of the Cold War. This theme
is predicated on the notion that superpower clientele is not monolithic, rather there are

12

Following Andrew Hurrell, this research bears that regions are not self-contained spaces and immune from
outside pressures. According to Hurrell, indirect hegemonic influences are worth the inquiry in this regard.
Some of empirical scholarship with this perspective are Ojendal 2004; Jones and Smith 2007; Ravenhill
2009. Acharya’s quite comprehensive perspective about the role of outside powers in regional systems is
perhaps the closest to what serves as the compass in this research.
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various degrees and types of clientelism, determining the extent to which regional players
were willing to give up their autonomy in decision-making to their superpower patrons.
During the interwar period and then the Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia represented two
distinct approaches to the great/superpowers, causing, at times, a divergence in their
policies toward the region and beyond. Fourth, this research investigates how the IranianSaudi relations in this period were influenced by the domestic vulnerabilities of either side.
Domestic vulnerabilities can render a neighbor with the potential of posing a threat
corresponding to those vulnerabilities as a structural threat. The role such vulnerabilities
— caused by the maladies of state-society relations in either country — played in
determining the direction of Iranian-Saudi relations constitutes another major
problematique in this research. Fifth, this study provides the historical context of some
faultlines to which the complexity of Iranian-Saudi relations are conveniently, yet
erroneously reduced. It is important to identify the context and mechanism through which
the Shiite-Sunni or Persian-Arab divide informs the relations between the two states among
other factors, and avoid essentializing these relations by reducing them to the operation of
these cleavages.

Literature Review
Due to a long-lasting tradition within the discipline that biased toward great power
politics, the literature that examine the security dynamics among non-great powers within
the bounds of regions is tenuous. The discipline of International Relations was developed
after the WWII and within the context of the Cold War. In this environment, the primary
concern of academics was the analysis of great power politics which led to massacres of

5

the two world wars and/or the ideological rivalry of the two superpowers on the global
scale. Academics in concert with politicians viewed regions of the world as stages for the
colonial rule of the old European powers or the ideological/military maneuvers of the Cold
War superpowers. In spite of that bias, regional level is where most of the action takes
place for most of the states. While only few great powers have such massive capabilities
which enable them to pursue their wide-range security interests over the whole planet or a
substantial portion of it, almost all other states with limited capabilities largely confine
their security interests and practices to their near neighbors.13
Several themes guide academic literature on the Iranian-Saudi relations either
directly or within the broader inquiry on the Middle Eastern politics. These themes are
atheoretical survey of Iranian-Saudi relations in the context of great power politics (Halabi
2009; Chubin & Zabih 1974; Maoz 2013; Mirhosseini 2011; Keynoush 2016; Legrenzi
2013; Kraig 2006; Mangold 2013; Cooper 1997; Sciolino 1991; Neuman 1996); IranianSaudi relations as influenced by the geopolitics of the region or the regional order
(Mojtahedzadeh 1998, 2013; Legrenzi 2013; Herrmann & Ayres 1997; Graz 1990; Chubin
and Tripp 2014; Potter 2002; Fox et. al. 2006) Iranian-Saudi relations as defined by the
problematique of oil (Golub 1985; Glaser & Kelanic 2016; Cooper 2012; Hurewitz 1975;
Quandt 1981; Crystal 1995; Herrmann & Ayres 1997); atheoretical account of historical
relations and/or analytical account of mutual awareness (Cleveland 2012; Entessar 1984;
Abrahamian 1982; Badeeb 1993; Kawtharni & Haseeb 1998; Anthony 2015; Amir Ahmadi
& Entessar 1993; Al-Saud 2003; Ahmadi 2007; Weller 1993; Ehteshami 2003; Chubin and

13

Barry Buzan, & Ole Weaver. Regions and powers: The structure of international security. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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Tripp 2014; Afary 1996; Afkhami 2009; Ansari 2003; Mostyn 1991; Wilson 2011);
Iranian-Saudi relations in light of the Persian Gulf conflicts, wars and militarization (Orgill
1995; Mughissudin 1977; Graz 1990; Gordon and Trainor 1995; Freedman and Karsh
1993; Cordesman and Gold 2014; Kennedy 1975; Gordon 1981; Mccuen 1987; Tripp and
Chubin 1988; Pelletiere 1992; O’Neill 1992; Frank 1992; Rajaee 1993; Askari et. al 2010);
Iranian-Saudi relations as influenced by the presence of foreign powers and/or their
diplomatic/military strategy in the region (DeNovo 1963; Bromley 1991; Hudson 1996;
Hunter 2010; Hurewitz 1972; Baram 1978; Adelson 1995; Nakhleh 1982; Kupchan 1987;
Gause 1985; Dunnigan and Macedonia 1993; Miller 1980; Mangold 2013; Koury &
Nakhleh 1979; Joshua & Gibbert 1969; Sick 1983; Acharya 1989; Kraig 2006; Cole 2003);
Iranian-Saudi relations in light of their distinctive foreign policy making (Goldberg 1986;
Fraser 1997; Brzegar 2008; Afrasiabi 1994; Ramazani 1972; Mirhosseini, S. M., & Sandhu
2013; Barzegar 2008; Taheri 1975; Afrasiabi 1994; Boroujerdi 1996; Marschall 2003;
Chubin and Litwak 2003); the role of Islamic intra-faith divisions in defining the IranianSaudi relations (Louer 2008; Buchan 2015; Dawisha 1983; Piscatori 1983; James 1984;
Nasr 2004; Nakash 2003; Jones 2006; Kramer 1987; Bill 1984; Cole and Keddie 1986);
and the Iranian-Saudi relations as a subset to the international relations of the Persian Gulf/
Middle East (Hinnebusch 2010; Dunnigan & Macedonia 1993; Byman 2003; Moshaver
2012; Burrell 1972; Anthony 1981; Amirsadeghi 1981; Moshaver 2012; Kamrava 2011;
Hurewitz 1956, 1972; Hunter 2010; Gause 2009; Halliday 2005; Lawson 2006; AdibMoghaddam 2006; Bayman and Wise 2003).
While there are overlapping between the scope of this research and some of the
themes appearing in the literature on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, this research is

7

distinguished by its assessment of the Iranian-Saudi security dynamics with an approach
that captures “a complex interplay of local, regional, and global forces, simultaneously
involving states as well as non-state, market, and societal actors.”14

Method
Process Tracing is the method that informs this study. Process Tracing is a distinct
method in qualitative research that has recognition and widespread use among political
scientists. Process Tracing involves research where, “the cause-effect link that connects
independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the
investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.”15 With this method, one can “peer
into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural
cause and its purported effect.”16
Process Tracing enables an investigator to narrow the list of potential causes for an
outcome down to one or few causal paths and put aside alternative, yet less consistent,
explanations. Methodologically, Process Tracing traces the causal process in a very
specific, theoretically informed way; although some variations of the method tend to be
less theoretical or atheoretical altogether. In more theoretically informed variant of the

Samuel S. Kim, “Northeast Asia in the local-regional-global nexus: Multiple challenges and contending
explanations.” The International Relations of Northeast Asia, 41 (2004) 11.
14

15

Stephen Van Evera, Guide to methods for students of political science. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
1997); Andrew Bennett, ‘the mother of all “isms”: Organizing political science around causal mechanisms.’
in Ruth Groff, Revitalizing Causality: Realism about Causality in Philosophy and Social Science
(Routledge, 2008) 205-219; Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process tracing." In D. Prakash, & A. Klotz, Qualitative
methods in international relations, (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008) pp. 114-127; Jeffrey T. Checkel,
"Tracing causal mechanisms." International Studies Review 8, no. 2 (2006) 362-370; Alexander L. George,
and Andrew Bennett. Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. (MIT Press, 2005).
16

John Gerring, "Single-outcome studies: A methodological primer." International Sociology 21, no. 5
(2006): 707-734.

8

method, the researcher looks for a series of theoretically predicted intermediate steps to
establish the verity or falsity of an alleged path of causality. This method overwhelmingly
uses qualitative data that are usually garnered from various resources including but not
limited to historical memoirs, expert surveys, interviews, press accounts, and documents.17
Process Tracing equips the researcher with a diagnostic perspective. With such
outlook, the research can differentiate between those pieces of evidence that may constitute
a major step on the causality chain and those with unsubstantial contribution to the
correlation between the dependent and independent variables. Benefiting from the rigor of
this method, a researcher will eventually support a hypothesis and overturns alternative
competing hypotheses. This method could be effectively used to account for the deviant
cases with outcomes that defy theoretical predictions or explanations.
In this research, the sequences and mechanism in the unfolding of hypothesized
causal processes regarding Iranian-Saudi security interconnectedness in the Persian Gulf
region is examined. This is not a one-directional approach since the causality chain is also
examined backward from the observed outcomes to potential causes. Such two-directional
examination of an apparently existing causal relationship between the variables helps with
testing the theory against evidence and modification of it, if necessary. Through this
process, the overlooked variables affecting causality chains will be uncovered.

STRCUTRE OF THE PROJECT
This dissertation is by and large structured periodically; however, a chapter that
contains an overall analysis of the faultlines in state-society relations in Iran and Saudi

17

Checkel, “Process Tracing.”

9

Arabia precedes the periodic organization of the rest. The logic behind including this
chapter lies in the necessity of extrapolating the potential impacts of the states’
vulnerabilities at the domestic level of analysis. These vulnerabilities determine the fears
and threat perception of a state. These fears stemming from domestic politics might render
other states in the region into structural threats even in the absence of hostile intentions on
their parts.18
Chapter three titled “Iran-Saudi Arabia (1924-1929): Early Encounters and the Rise
of Mutual Suspicion” provides a historical account of the very first encounter between Iran
and Saudi Arabia which occurred as early as the mid-1920s, almost a decade before the
official establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. This encounter was stirred
by the suppression of Sheikh Khazal’s rebellion in Khūzestān. The context of the encounter,
Saudis’ perception of Persia created thereof, and the 1927 Treaty of Jeddah and 1929
Treaty of Friendship as manifest practical responses of the Saudi king in face of the
growing Persia’s power are analyzed in this chapter.
The fourth chapter, titled “Iranian-Saudi Relations in the 1930s: A Curious Case of
"Disregard" in Foreign Policy” looks at a puzzling period of Iranian-Saudi relations. From
1932 (official establishment of Saudi Arabia) through the Second World War years, Persia
pursued a policy of avoiding any engagement with infantile Saudi Arabia. In order to give
presence to Saudi entity in the region and reaffirm their assumed identity, Saudis desired
to engage Iran but much to their disappointment, Persia did not reciprocate that desire,
making a curious case of ‘disregard’ in foreign policy. This chapter will make the case that

Ole Wæver, “Conflicts of vision – visions of conflict.” In Wæver, Ole, Lemaitre, Pierre, & E. Tromer,
eds., European polyphony: Beyond East–West confrontation (London: Macmillan., 1989)
18

10

geopolitically, Persia’s primary concern rested with the threats posed by Russia and
Britain. To be more precise, there was neither any real or perceived threat posed by the
neighboring Arab states that would amount to that level of gravity, nor these states could
be part of any solution to Persia’s affliction with Russo-British interventionist policies.
Reza Shah’s hallmark of foreign policy during his reign was playing Russia and Britain
against one another. In fact, nothing amounted to that level of urgency in Iranian foreign
policy making than to find a way to rid the country from the menace of foreign influence
or at least ameliorate its impact by balancing the two powers. In these calculations, there
was no place for the infantile state of Saudi Arabia. Aside from the geopolitical aspect, the
case will be made that there was an ideational/geo-cultural layer of analysis that gradually
dominating narrative of Iranian nationalism predicated on a romanticized notion of glorious
pre-Islamic Persia which was essentially anti-Arab. This narrative informed Reza Shah’s
European-style modernization and his pursuit of the Persian fate in relation with Europeans
and not “racially sub-par Arabs.” The (re)construction of Iran’s classical past as an epoch
in which the nation existed in its homogeneous and unsullied form was the foundation of
the nationalist discourse that called for a return to pre-Islamic Iranian culture and an
appropriation of racialist Aryanism. This essentially anti-Arab discourse defined Reza
Shah’s foreign policy toward Arab states, specifically Saudi Arabia.
The fifth chapter which focuses on the time period between 1944 through 1962 is
titled “WWII-Stirred Shift of Power Balance and the Spillover effect of Nasserism and
Arab-Israeli Conflict.” With a noticeable shift in the regional balance of power during and
immediately after the Second World War, the Iranian-Saudi relations entered an era marked
by ever growing complexity. It is in this period that the United States enters the regional

11

politics of the region not only because the United States needed raw material for its energyintensive economic model, but also because the United States realized that the
entrenchment of Soviet power” in the Persian Gulf and possible Soviet disruption of oil
flow from the region would have caused a “decisive shift in the world balance,” and “the
economy of the free world,” leading to the ultimate “triumph [of the Soviet Union]
throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe. Therefore, this chapter looks at where Iran and Saudi
Arabia fit in international politics and Western strategic thinking. In this regard, the
architecture of the 1955 Baghdad Pact strained the Iranian-Saudi relations. Furthermore,
this period entailed signs that Iranian-Saudi relations are not immune to the spill-over
effects of adjacent regions. In fact, Iran’s de facto recognition of Israel in 1951 due to its
strategic potentials, the rise of charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser who espoused Third World
neutralism and advocated Pan-Arab empire the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf under his
leadership, and the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the Sinai War proved that Iranian-Saudi
relations are notably sensitive to factors exogenous to the region. In addition, this chapter
will cover two major developments in Iran and Saudi Arabia which could have had
immense impacts on the relations of the two states. The first set of these developments that
unfolded in the early 1950s entailed the 1951 Iranian nationalization of oil, Shah’s
departure of the country and the 1953 CIA-led coup to overthrow the democraticallyelected government of the Mosaddeq and reinstate the fleeing king. The second set of
developments which unfolded in the aftermath of the passing of King Abdul Aziz swirled
around the controversies, royal family infighting, economic crisis, and disarray in foreign
policy as the result of King Saud’s ineptitude and ambitions. Why Iran and Saudi Arabia

12

did not seize the political opportunity to exert pressure on one another was an interesting
feature of this period.
The sixth chapter, titled "the Development of an Iranian-Saudi Alignment: Cautious
and Curtailed,” analyzes the relatively amicable Iranian-Saudi relations between 1962 and
1979. Such amicability in spite of a variety of factors which could potentially distance the
two states shapes the puzzle of the Iranian-Saudi relations in this period. Among the factors
which could have negatively impacted Iranian-Saudi relations, one can note Iran’s
persistence with its ties with Israel, Iranian-Arab territorial disputes, change in Saudi
leadership with the assassination of King Faisal, withdrawal of Britain from the region and
a power vacuum created thereof, Iran’s demonstrable regional assertiveness and its rapid
military build-up, contention over the sovereignty of Bahrain, etc. Two factors being
Egyptian President Nasser and his pan-Arab ideology, and cooperative norms propagated
by the Nixon Doctrine encouraged Iran and Saudi Arabia to pursue cautious political ties,
in spite of disagreements and differences. This chapter makes the case that despite the
relatively stable period in which Iran and Saudi Arabia could align their policies and tacitly
cooperate on many levels, that cooperation did not spawn a radical change in the historical
patterns of amity/enmity between the two states as Saudi Arabia and Iran never surmounted
their mutually stigmatizing differences deeply embedded in their political cultures. In other
words, while the facade of interactions between the two states in this decade alludes to
cooperation, the convergence of policies between the two countries did not occur as the
result of a genuine transformation in historical perceptions. The reason is to be sought in
an exacerbated Arab-Persian divide which was pushed to the back of geopolitical
considerations, yet limiting the extent of an Iranian-Saudi integration.
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The concluding chapter revisits the five themes informing this research in order to
trace the patterns of amity and enmity in the Iranian-Saudi relations. This chapter captures
almost 60 years of Iranian-Saudi relations along the lines of security interconnectedness,
agential capacity and power of the players, great power influence and clientelism,
domestically generated vulnerabilities, Shiite-Sunni schism, and eventually Arab-Persian
divide.
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CHAPTER II
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
According to Buzan, examining the state-society relations can provide insight into
domestically generated vulnerabilities that can have important repercussions for the
regional security.19 In any analysis of regional security interconnectedness, it is important
to identify domestically generated vulnerabilities and what they mean for either actual or
perceived regional threats. An important set of such vulnerabilities is determined by the
state-society relations enshrined in the idea of the state. Problematizing the interplay
between the levels of sociopolitical cohesion of a nation-state on the one hand, and the
type of security dynamics generated thereof on the other is essential to analyze security
patterns in a particular region.20 The sociological cohesion of a nation-state affects the
way a given state perceives security and where threats to that security originate. While
these threats or (mis-)perception of threats emanate from the domestic politics of the
states, vulnerabilities as such, real or imagined, define the state’s security fears and their
potential response.21
The Persian Gulf region is mostly comprised of states that rank low on the scale
of sociopolitical cohesion. These states are rentier in nature and/or artificial products of
decolonization. These factors can hollow out state-society relations from any substance
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and degrade it to a contractual façade, typically maintained by the state’s heavy hand.
The following sections identify state-society faultlines in Iran and Saudi Arabia and how
these faultlines may serve as sources of national insecurity. Identifying these dynamics
would enable any investigator to understand where domestically originated
vulnerabilities in Iran and Saudi Arabia rest, and if there are exchanged threats in
response to those vulnerabilities.

The Idea of the State: Iran’s Major Security Commodity
Annals of Iran’s ancient history have a lot to reveal about the debates over
contemporary Iranian identity and politics. In order to trace the evolutionary trajectory of
Iran, Iranian nation, and Iranian nationalism, one has to go back to 550 BC in Babylon,
where Achaemenids’22 undeniable achievements on civilizational grounds left a hefty
legacy for Iranian nationalist movements for centuries. Iranian nationalism began its
maturation during the Sassanid era, notably manifested in the idea of Eranshahr,
Kingdom of the Iranians. Eranshahr was not yet representative of what Anthony W.
Marx refers to as a “collective sentiment of bounded solidarity or identity,”23 but it did
connote a meaningful degree of ethno-territorial awareness, and a sense of belonging.24
Gherardo Gnoli suggests that the idea of Eran emerged in the Sassanid era,25 but the
22
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nexus of ethnicity-territory embodied in the concept of Eranshahr dates back to
Achaemenid era.26 The romanticist view of the origin of Iranian nation is predicated on
such an impressive repertoire of mythological traditions as well as glorious factual
history in Iran.27
Modernist historians and political scientists who believe that the concept of
“nation” is a modern construct typically refute the primordialist view of Iranian identity.
Modernists entertain the idea that nations are artificial constructs engineered by the ruling
classes, and such arrangement could not have existed before the birth of the modern
nations. According to modernists, nations do not primordially exist, rather they are
“invented.”28 Accordingly, Bert Fragner, a modernist Iranologist, argues that modern
Iranian national identity is radically divorced from Iranian historical past.
There is a third synthetic approach in identifying and assessing nations’ trajectory
of evolution and the emergence of nationalist sentiments.29 This approach has a
historicizing perspective, to which the present research subscribes. Accordingly, nations
are deemed as modern constructs and elites play an important role in orchestrating topdown nationalist projects, however, the long-term historical forces and processes in the
formation of modern nations are equally important. Time plays an important role in the
synthetic approach. Time serves as a bedrock for the emergence and development of
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myths, memories, values and symbols. It is the ‘time’ that allows for peoples of various
creeds, languages, classes and strata to go through identical historical experiences and as
a result develop shared identities and pass on similar stories to their descendants.
During the Sassanids,30 the pre-Islamic Iranian identity reached the height of its
fulfillment. The pillars of the pre-Islamic Iranian identity were the appeal to a heroic past
and the Zoroastrian tradition.31 However, the Arab invasion of Iran was a landmark
development in Iranian history and identity.32 The Muslim conquest of Iran is perhaps the
most important historical episode in Iran’s history with tremendous formative
significance for how the ideational landscape of Iran is shaped. The arrival of Islam was a
watershed to the pre-Islamic Iranian identity. Alessandro Bausani, the prolific Italian
orientalist, acknowledged the gravity of the matter, and concluded that the foundation of
modern Iranian identity is the medieval Irano-Islamic culture, not the pre-Islamic
Achaemenid image.33 The conquest of Iran by Arabs was a historical moment that
introduced Islam as an enduring pillar of Iranian identity.34 Nevertheless, it is important
to note the embrace of Islam by Iranians was not coupled by an embrace of the Arabs and
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their culture,35 a sign indicative of the voluntary nature of that ideational shift. This was
the beginning of centuries-long coexistence of two competing sources of identity in Iran.
This coexistence was at times peaceful and at others confrontational.
In the medieval era, Arabo-Islamic and ethno-nationalistic sentiments based on
the pre-Islamic Iran’s traditions continued to serve as two competing sources of identity.
Fast forward to the 16th century, another important episode in the formation of Iranian
national identity took place with the Safavids’ enforcement of a hybrid of Iranian-Shiite
identity.36 Following his conquest of Iran, King Ismail I. embarked on a systematic
Shiization of the country, an initiative that was picked up by other Safavid kings
succeeding him. The compatibility between Shiism and traditional Iranian values,
arguably, resolved the centuries-long ideational confusion of commitment to Islam and
loyalty to Iran.37 From the earliest days of Islam, Iran was the cradle for the Shiite
thoughts but it was not until the Safavid era that Shiism entered as an ideational elements
in the ethnic consciousness of the Iranians, leading to a transformational shift in the
Iranian perception of “self.”38
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Shiism deeply influenced the collective identity and, by necessity, the political
culture in Iran. Shiism fostered a national unity that overcame the divisions along ethnic
lines between the Persians and other minorities, most notably, Turkic speaking
populations who had lived in Iran since the destructive invasions by Turks39 and
Mongols.40 These invasions had extensively shifted the country’s linguistic and ethnic
balance. The new ethno-religious identity of Iranians in a context of rising Ottoman
Empire in West Asia and North Africa, the Gurkani Empire in India,41 and the Uzbeks in
Central Asia — all adhering to Sunni Islam — helped Iran assume a distinct status among
these political entities. Such distinct sense of collective identity was a determinative
factor in preserving the political and territorial unity of Iran in the face of the Ottomans
who had brought the Sunni Arabs under their rule.
It is correct that the introduction of Shiism in Iran might have created its own
faultline of sectarian nature as some Iranian peoples like Kurds remained Sunnis;
however, the unifying effect of Shiism in Iran over the centuries outweighs its divisive
effect. The notion that religion may play a constructive role in the formation of ethnonational identities might be debatable, but at least in two phases of Iranian history,
religion has appeared to act as a catalyst for fostering strong nationalistic sentiments.
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Hobsbawm identifies these two phases as pre-modern Iran with the role of
Zoroastrianism in the formation of the Iranian ethno-national identification in the
Sassanid era, and the modern Iran with the contribution of Shiism at the time of the
Safavids.42
During the 19th century, Iran entered the age of nation-building and nationalism
with a longstanding legacy of historical awareness and cultural consciousness of its
identity. Comparative historians of nationalism acknowledge that Iran was among the few
nations that experienced the era of nationalism with a deep historical root and experience
of recurrent construction of its own pre-modern identity.43 The modern era of Westernstyle ideas of nation and nationalism conveying the ideals of autonomy, unity and
prosperity only reinforced the rich historical repertoire of Iranian identity, which has
lasted to the present day.
The religio-nationalist ideational basis of Iran makes the idea of the state strong
and resilient. This ideational basis is highly encompassing, if not overarching. The length
of history in Iran dating back to the immemorial time has allowed for the formation of a
riveting mélange of pre-Islamic nationalist identities and Islamic/Shiite proclivities that is
palatable to the majority of people living in territorial Iran across ethnic, religious, and
linguistic cleavages. Even those who may repudiate either Shiism or glorified pre-Islamic
Iranian history as a source of identity usually does so by assuming heavier leaning toward
the other end. In other words, most peoples within the territorial limits of the country,
find themselves somewhere on the gridlock of Shi'ism and Iranian ethno-nationalist
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sentiments. Most Iranians comfortably and proudly identify with the territorial Iran
despite their political, social, and economic grievances, and discriminations that target
ethno-religious minorities. This is what makes Iran, according to Michael Axworthy, an
“Empire of the Mind,”44 an empire that effortlessly binds together an ethnically and
linguistically diverse nation.

Saudi Arabia’s Raison D’etre: A Challenge to the Authority of the House of Saud
The idea of the Saudi state is extremely weak and fragile. Saudi Arabia is often
presented as the result of the 1744 pact between a Najd45 oasis ruler, Muhammad Ibn
Saud46 and a Muslim revivalist, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab,47 but the fact of the
matter is that the creation of Saudi Arabia is a far more recent phenomenon. Although,
the 1744 pact was the normative basis for the Al-Saud’s legitimacy to ascend to the
throne almost after two centuries of failed attempts to create a polity, one has to
acknowledge that there are more nuances to the emergence of a centralized government
in Central Arabia for the first time in history.
In most scholarship on Saudi Arabia, the onerous event of Al Saud’s rise to rule
over Arabia with its extremely inhospitable environmental features and highly
segmentary society in terms of political identity is often times neglected or reduced to the
44
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military might that Al-Saud enjoyed in the beginning of the 20th century. As a matter of
fact, the success of Abdul-Aziz48 in establishing a central authority in Arabia was due to
his political genius in understanding tribal networks, the political power of Islam, and the
impact foreign powers could have on the course of local politics.49 A brief overview of
the course of historical events that led to the formation of Saudi Arabia in 1932
illuminates why the idea of Saudi state is highly fragile.
Before the emergence of contemporary boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula, this
terrain was divided into four distinct regions of Hijaz, Asir, Ahsa, and Najd. These
regions were also referred to as Western Arabia, Southern Arabia, Eastern Arabia, and
Central Arabia respectively. Among these regions, Najd, currently hosting the country’s
capital Riyadh, was home to the initial developments that led to the establishment of
Saudi Arabia in 1932.
Central Arabia was a highly diverse social context with such fluidity in the
boundaries of identity and loyalty that prevented the establishment of any central
authority beyond the parochial traditional intra-tribal and inter-tribal hierarchies. Despite
this fluidity, Abdul-Aziz’s understanding of tribal networks and dynamics enabled him to
effectively use the message of Islam in order to establish his authority across tribal lines.
In a context in which the survival of individuals and groups relied heavily on the careful
replication of centuries-old practices of their ancestors, Abdul-Aziz established Al-Saud
authority in Central Arabia through such novelties in approach that were unique in the
history of Arabia. Within such a forbidding context, Abdul-Aziz used a religious
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narrative to cut across tribal assabiyah,50 in a land where no sheikh or amir51 had ever
claimed authority on the basis of religion; he revamped the traditional patterns of
authority within and between tribes by eliminating the traditional elements that would put
in place and maintain the authority of tribal sheikhs, and the authority of one tribe over
another; he boastfully claimed the noble pedigree of Al-Saud as a basis of his rule,52
which was an uncommon practice among amirs in Najd who intentionally sought
neutrality from tribal rivalries for effective ruling; and he unapologetically established the
hereditary rule of his sons in spite of oppositions both within Najd and the Al-Saud
family.53
The religious narrative upon which Abdul-Aziz justified his authority in Najd,
was Wahhabism.54 Abdul-Aziz capitalized on the popular Wahhabi message in order to
establish his rule in Arabia, where authority had for centuries been a function of
continuously “shifting balances.”55 Having realized that only through religion could one
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overcome the difficulty of controlling a society as segmented as that of the Arabian
Peninsula, Abdul-Aziz, in his quest for authority over tribal and urban leaders in Central
Arabia, stressed that the Al-Saud would represent “a lawful Islamic government.” This
assertion resonated well with the people of the peninsula. The union of politics and
religion went a long way for Abdul-Aziz as within two centuries — from 1744 to the
beginning of the 20th century — a majority of the Central Arabia’s settled populations
had identified with Wahhabism. Abdul-Aziz’s recourse to the power of religion was of
course propped up by the alliance of the families of Al-Saud and Al-Wahhab, dating back
to the 1744 meeting of Muhammad Ibn Saud and Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, when
the latter found protection in Diriya,56 ruled at the time by Muhammad Ibn Saud.
Benefiting from the two-centuries-old alliance with the Al-Wahhab family, Abdul-Aziz
invoked the message of the Wahhabi religious movement, presented his rule as a divine
representation of God’s Divine law. It was this message that permitted him (and later
Saudi rulers) to transcend parochial tribal and urban loyalties. The discourse on which
Abdul-Aziz was claiming political authority was unprecedented as the authority to rule in
Central Arabia had remained secular all along for centuries.
Due to ecological exigencies of Central Arabia, the social, economic and political
activities within Najd were essentially structured by its patriarchal tribal system, and the
nature of authority held by the tribal sheikhs. For centuries, the tribe acted, and still does
in many capacities, as the medium and guarantor of one’s survival in the desert life. This
function of tribal life create such a strong spirit of bounded tribal solidarity that would
preclude individuals from an identification with other sources of identity. Ibn Khaldun
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referred to such tribal sentiment as Assabiyah.57 This is not a recent 20th-century
phenomenon, rather it has been woven into the fabric of desert life for centuries. AbdulAziz’s claim to Islamic leadership required that he abolish some aspects of traditional
tribal customary law in order to weaken the position of the tribal sheikhs. In a fascinating
maneuver in this pursuit, Abdul-Aziz revoked khuwa58 and replaced it with zakat, a
compulsory “religious tax” that could only be collected by the Islamic leader. Beyond
being a source of revenue for the burgeoning Kingdom, zakat played a more important
normative role in reinforcing the legitimacy of Abdul-Aziz’s rule on Islamic grounds.
Abdul-Aziz was successful with his initiative of changing the status of the tribes and their
traditional patterns of authority and eventually turning them into his loyal fighting force.
Eventually, Abdul-Aziz managed to establish a hereditary rule of his sons by having the
tribal leaders pledge allegiance to his nominee,59 an initiative that received the British
support as well.
By 1912, Abdul-Aziz had restored the power of his ancestors and brought Najd
under Al-Saud’s control. With the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the British
began intervening into Western and Central Arabia, the fringes of the Ottoman Empire.
The British, through treaties, imposed protectorates on Najd and its rival Hijaz ruled by
the Hashemites. However, the British gradually leaned towards Al-Saud as their
potentially main reliable ally in Arabia, and as a result supported Al-Saud’s successful

57

Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah : an introduction to history, 3 vols. (Princeton University Press, 1969).

58

Khuwa was the tax levied by a stronger tribe on a client tribe in exchange for military protection
Harold Richard Patrick Dickson, the Arab of the Desert. A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and
Sau'di Arabia (Routledge, 2015) 117.
59

26

bid over Al-Rasheed amirate in 1921,60 the most formidable enemy of the Al-Saud in
Najd. This move was the precursor to the British eventual support of Abdul-Aziz’s
procession to Mecca and Jeddah to end the rule of the Hashemite dynasty in Hijaz.61 By
the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927, the British recognized the independence of Abd Al-Aziz’s
rule as the Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd.
The conquest of Hijaz and later expansion of Saudi rule over Arabia was indebted
to the Ikhwan’s daunting warfare skills.62 Their militarist prowess, their mobility and
stamina in spite of the constraining features of desert life, and their religious zeal had
made Ikhwan such a formidable force, loyal to Abd Al-Aziz, that was feared all over
Arabia. Ikhwan emerged from the traditionally nomadic badu63 who had embraced the
Wahhabi dawa. After Abdul-Aziz successfully brought the badu under his rule by
settling them in “agriculturally oriented colonies called hijra,”64 they embraced the
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Islamic message of equality of all men, recognized Abdul-Aziz as the Imam of a lawful
Islamic Imamate, branded themselves the Ikhwan, meaning “the brethren,” and formed a
self-appointed Wahhabi religious militia that ultimately played an important role in
helping Abdul-Aziz establish himself as the ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The Ikhwan, who had themselves received the basic tenets of Wahhabism through
mutawwiun,65 sent out to them by Abdul-Aziz, took the Wahhabi message to another
level and ultimately became so radical in their practice and dawa that, after a while, they
became critical of Abdul-Aziz for religious laxity. The Ikhwan later rebelled against the
Al-Saud’s rule and its policies in 1929. The rebellion, under the leadership of Sultan bin
Bajad Al-Otaibi and Faisal al-Duwaish, was triggered when Abd Al-Aziz curbed the
expansionist zeal of the Ikhwan into the British protectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and
Kuwait. Ikhwan’s leaders charged Abd Al-Aziz for “dealings with infidels.”66 Ultimately,
the Ikhwan’s rebellion was defeated in the Battle of Sibila, where Saudi forces, with the
help of the British, crushed the Ikhwan mercilessly in 1930.67 This victory paved the way
for Abd Al-Aziz to continue Saudi conquest of the peninsula. In 1932, the two kingdoms
of the Hejaz and Najd were united as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
One of the key factors in Abdul-Aziz’s success was his understanding of the role
that foreign powers could play in support or against his bid for authority over Arabia.
Abdul Aziz’s rapport with Britain secured his authority, credibility and power. Britain’s
role in the establishment of the Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd in 1925, and later the

65

Muttawwiun, literally meaning those who obey or volunteer, were the most intolerant of all Wahhabis.
They served as the only authorities in direct contact with hijras, assigned to teach the badu the basic tenets
of Wahhabi doctrine. They were also responsible for the collection of Zakat.
66
Joseph Kostiner, The making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From chieftaincy to monarchical state.
(Oxford University press, 1993).
67

Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian sands (Penguin, 2007).

28

unification of the two in 1932 is undeniable. Also, Britain helped Abdul-Aziz
consolidate his power by assisting him with the recalcitrant Ikhwan, stubborn Hijazi
inhabitants, the financial difficulties of the kingdom, and international recognition of his
state. Of course, one cannot discount how a rapport with Saudi Arabia was beneficial also
to Britain, as a strong ruler in Hijaz and Najd could bring peace to Central Arabia and
stability to the regions bordering the British protectorates.
This brief historical account on the formation of the modern Saudi state
demonstrates has interesting insights on the strength of the idea of Saudi state. The most
difficult challenge that Saudi Arabia faces within its own polity is the weakness of the
idea of Saudi state. The concept of nation in Saudi Arabia is highly underdeveloped to the
extent that the real meaning of being a “Saudi national” is subject to public debate. The
weakness in the idea of the state in Saudi Arabia could be accounted for form three
dimensions: temporal, ideational, and structural.
From the temporal point of view, the fact that Saudi Arabia as a modern state, as
opposed to centuries-long history of Arabia, has been around for slightly more than
eighty years, explains why the idea of the state might still struggles to bring about loyalty
to the central authority within the territory of the state. Identification with the higher
sources of identity by individuals and groups does not happen instantaneously, rather it
takes a long time for groups forming a community to go through identical historical
experiences that would bind them through the creation of the same actual or mythical
narratives. These narratives get passed on to next generations who would help, on their
part, strengthen the national imagining. The emergence of Saudi Arabia as a state,
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compared to other Arab states of the region, was quite glorified.68 Although one may
think that such narrative would spur valorization of one’s state, in fact, perhaps only in
Najd, the events leading up to the 1932 independence are reminisced, as these events
were humiliating and painful for those who lost their autonomy to an outsider in Arabia.
The other milestones in Saudi Arabia’s relatively short history are of the same
exclusionary essence, and not contributing to the strength of nationalistic sentiments. The
Saudi establishment, through various top-down nationalist projects such as the annual
Jenadriyah festival,69 attempts to enforce submission to the idea of the state through
fostering a sense of national belonging among Saudi nationals; however, it seems that the
kingdom is years away from experiencing the national awareness and solidarity enjoyed
by older states.
On the ideational grounds, one has to look at the “organizing ideology”70 of the
Saudi state which happens to be the state’s raison d'etre. Once the idea of the state (its
raison d'etre) is not self-referential and relies on an imposed ideology, this can turn into a
host of threats to the survival of the state. Al-Saud’s rule over the peninsula, began and
was sustained over the years solely based on its heavy reliance on the message of Islam,
particularly according to Wahhabi teachings. Wahhabi ideology grants legitimacy to
Saudi political authority in so far as it conforms to the Divine Law and seeks to protect
the Islamic umma71 from disruptive forces and civil disturbance. The exclusionary nature
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of such strict reading of Islam alienates non-Wahhabi Muslims, and even those Wahhabis
whose adherence to Wahhabism is not considered “up to par.” The issue with Shiites,
constituting 10 to 15 percent of the population, is straightforward. Shiites have hardly
ever been accepted in the Wahhabi dominated society and they have been subject to
systematic discrimination. Not only are Shiites doubted by the Wahhabis to be truly
Muslim, but they are often times lumped with Iranians and referred to as Majus which is
a pejorative term for Persians.
The case with non-Wahhabi Sunnis is trickier. It might be argued that some
moderation in the Saudi’s organizing ideology can help make it less exclusionary so to
include more non-Wahhabi Sunnis from other schools of jurisprudence; however, this is
not a simple maneuver. Al-Saud family has learned from the turbulent years of the 1920s
and 1930s that any retreat from their position could be highly detrimental to their rule.
Ikhwan’s challenge to the Saudi rule in the late 1920s, the seizure of the Mecca Grand
Mosque by Juhayman Al-Oteibi72 in 1979, the political activities of Safar Al-Hawali73 as
a part of Al-Sahwa Al-Islamiyah movement,74 and Al-Qaeda’s accusation of the Saudi
ruling family are among the examples that can be seen from this prism. In other words,
Saudi rulers always face the highly destabilizing threat that the idea of the state,
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regardless of its deficiencies, could be appropriated by a group claiming to profess the
idea better than the state does.
There are some structural hindrances that prevent the full anchorage of the idea of
the Saudi state. The existence of strong social forces such as regional, and tribal/familial
ties which have never fully and willingly succumbed to the Saudi idea of social and
political order is a direct challenge to the state’s sovereignty within its territory. These are
strong sources of identity that have to be reckoned with. When Saudis refer to the region
they are from or their tribal affiliation, they make a fully-loaded statement of their class
and social standing. Looking at the Hijaz region, the other regional pole of the Saudi state
other than Najd, reveals how the “population has never fully accommodated to Saudi and
Wahhabi rule.”75 The cosmopolitan people of Hijaz look to the Red Sea, Egypt, and Syria
for cultural sustenance, not to the desert of Najd with its strict Wahhabi ideology. In Asir,
on the border with Yemen, Wahhabism is accepted only sporadically and reluctantly and
the region has maintained its distinct traditions.76 In most regions other than Najd, the
Saudi rule is perceived as an imposed concoction of Najdi rule with a distinctly myopic
reading of the religion.77
On another important front, the idea of Saudi state is at constant competition with
tribes which are traditionally reliable sources of identity in Arabia, and often than not,
have delivered their promises. The natural impositions of Arabia’s geography, for
centuries, forced the inhabitants of the region to structure their social life in a way that
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was not hospitable to the formation of any central authority. In an environment where
man had to be on a constant move for his survival, and where tribal structures and
traditional customary values would preclude the formation of allegiance to any other
source of authority, the natural course of events would likely not have culminated in the
emergence of any state, in a bottom-up process as it did, for example, in Japan. The tribal
sentiments characterized by assabiyah, even in its diluted form, “corrode the foundation
of urban citizenship”78 by resisting the eradication of traditional solidarities and
intermediary linkages in favor of identification with and loyalty to the abstract of the
state, which seems to require, more than anything, in Arab societies, a leap of faith. The
establishment of Saudi Arabia is indebted to the brilliance and talent of a political
entrepreneur, Abdul-Aziz. Abdul-Aziz realized the imperative of the top-down process of
forming a “state-nation,”79 in which the state fosters an encompassing identity with which
individuals and groups can identify beyond other allegiances. Abdul-Aziz used the
powerful message of Islam to construct a new reality for arab and hadar80of mixed tribal
populations, a reality that would supersede customary tribal bonds, laws and values. As
the result of his initiatives, Saudi Arabia was brought into existence, nevertheless,
unaccompanied by a strong idea of Saudi state.
The idea of the Saudi state is weak which requires that the Saudi leaders
continually work to procure and maintain the loyalty of Saudi citizens, the fact that
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connotes a lack of “cultural sensitivity of sovereignty”81 among Saudi nationals. This is a
point of concern for Saudi officials and a host of serious national security challenges. As
Juergensmeyer aptly puts, “attachment to the spirit of social order” is inseparable from
submitting to an “ordering agent.”82 Juergensmeyer argues that the degree of submission
to the social order and the ordering agent correlates with political stability.
Saudis’ traditional way of tackling challenges to the political stability has been
one of coopting tribes and receiving their loyalty to the king. The rapid modernization of
the oil era enabled the Saudi regime to pursue this policy quite effectively as it could
incorporate tribes into the political system and rent distribution networks through
informal patron-client linkages. To be fair, over the years, this policy helped strengthen
Saudi national identity, but not on a solid and sustainable basis. Saudi nationalistic
sentiments are, for the most part, a fragile function of the state’s ability to handle
economic crises, and provide employment, basic services and other public goods. There
is no primordial, nor self-referential attachment to the Saudi state that would be on a par
with the appeal and attraction of other social, centrifugal forces. In other words, the
attachment does not go beyond the contractual level of interaction between the state and
society.
This ties to the ideational dimension of the state the economy of Saudi Arabia
which, understandably, tends to be highly politicized. The politicization of the economic
sector in Saudi Arabia arises from the fact that the performance of economy, or lack
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thereof, has serious security ramifications. In the absence of an organic submission to the
idea of the state, the ability of the central government to provide Saudi nationals with real
jobs, and adequate income remain to be a critical measure of national security. One might
think that Saudi Arabia, the oil rich country, should have no problem paying for the
loyalty of its nationals. This is not true. Saudis face some serious conundrums in
economic sector. Saudi Arabia’s high dependence on oil revenues bears serious political
and economic ramifications. Typical authoritarian character of most rentier states which
tend to be the benefactor of society, an economy that dissuades innovation in the private
sector, high level of unemployment and serious socioeconomic inequalities are among the
most notable of these ramifications.

Assessment
The challenges and opportunities provided by the Iranian/Saudi idea of the state
are inordinately in favor of the Iranian side. It appears that Saudi Arabia does not have
much leverage over Iran’s political processes and the challenges to the ruling elite as the
result of these processes. For most of the period investigated in this research, Iran’s
political processes have been engineered and/or controlled, accommodating various
political discourses, unless they surpass certain lines. Most Iranian political trends during
the past century have operated within the legally defined boundaries of political activity
— in spite of all deficiencies — and pushed the boundaries only slightly and
sporadically. A glimpse over the records of political activities in Iran demonstrates that
none of major political trends, Islamic, moderate, reformist, liberal, and leftist sought
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directions from the Arabs in the region, nor they had anything in common with the
Saudis’ political discourse.
On the other hand, Iran does not seem to have much leverage on the political
processes in Saudi Arabia. The royal family politics in Saudi Arabia is more in tune with
the power politics in other royal families in the region. John Duke Anthony documents
interesting political interaction between Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states
in the region on dynastic rivalries.83 Also, by assigning reliable family members to senior
national security related cabinet posts, the Saudi royal family has maintained — with few
exceptions — its control over the national and bureaucratic politics. Except from the
Shiite opposition that may have been receptive to Tehran’s directives after the 1979
revolution, almost no brand of oppositionists to the royal family, either secular or
religious, looks up to Iran for directions. The discourse of the Sunni religious opposition
has rarely, if ever, had any commonality with the Iranian anti-Saudi discourse. Yet, from
within, it is apparent that Saudi Arabia is “formed out of force main and religious
convictions in a forbidding land, ordered by divine law and a highly developed sense of
shame, and governed by hereditary rulers strongly attached to a single of its regions.”
Therefore, the condition in Saudi Arabia remains “ripe for change.”84 This condition
encourages certain approaches and policies by the Saudis that brings about conflict of
interest, rivalry, tension and possibility of conflict between the two states.
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CHAPTER III
IRAN-SAUDI ARABIA (1924-1929): EARLY ENCOUNTERS AND THE RISE OF
MUTUAL SUSPICION

1924 Khūzestān Rebellion
The very first encounter between Iran and Saudi Arabia occurred as early as the
mid-1920s, almost a decade before the official establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia in 1932. This encounter was stirred by the suppression of Sheikh Khazal’s rebellion
in Khūzestān.85 This encounter came on the heels of the first direct confrontation between
the Soviet Union and Western powers. The site of this confrontation was Iran, a country
whose strategic location had rendered it the object of British and Russian rivalry as early
as the end of the nineteenth century.86 Before delving into the developments leading up to
Reza Shah’s move to put an end to Sheikh Khazal’s revolt, a brief historiography of
Khūzestān, the center stage of this encounter, is warranted.

A Brief History of Khūzestān and Arab Settlements in this Region
It was in the early Islamic times that Arab geographers used the name Khūzestān
to refer to the land inhabited by the Khūzīs, who are believed to be ancient Elamites’
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descendance.87 Elamites had preceded both Arabs and Persians88 and were related to
neither.89 This community also gave its name to the region’s capital, Suq al-Akhwaz
(market of the Khūzīs), which later became al-Ahwaz/Ahvaz. Before the Islamic conquest,
the Achaemenids and Sassanids ruled over Khūzestān uninterruptedly, yet one needs to
bear in mind that the history of Khūzestān in this period reveals extensive Persian-Arab
interactions, as well as Arab tribal residence well before the Muslim conquest in the
seventh century.90 With the Arab conquest, the Arab population in conquered areas rose
significantly, before another round of Arab settlement in Khūzestān in the tenth century.91
Due to the geopolitical necessity of buffering against the Sunni Ottomans, the Safavids
invited Shiite Arab tribes from Central Arabia to settle in Khūzestān.
The arrival of Shiite Najdi tribes at the invitation of the Safavids rendered the
demographic mode of southern Khūzestān Arab.92 This massive Arabization explains why
the western part of Khūzestān, and later in the eighteenth century the entire province came
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to be referred to as Arabistan.93 “Even though medieval Iranian rulers often left the Arab
sheikhs of Khūzestān to their own devices,”94 the name Arabistan never implied the
formation of any autonomous political entity, independent from Persian central
government. This is not to contend the geographic and demographic proximity of
Khūzestān to Mesopotamia, but politically, this province has been connected to the
adjacent Iranian plateau for millennia, under both Persian and non- Persian dynasties.95

Sheikh Khazal at the Clutch of the British Interests in the Great Game
Under Qajar rule, Arabistan had a hereditary local ruler, who was subordinate to
Tehran. However, by 1923, Khūzestān was effectively outside Tehran’s weakened control.
The province at the time was ruled by an ambitious local Arab leader, Sheikh Khazal who
enjoyed the British protection delivered by the British army operating in southern Iran. 96
Since Sheikh Khazal’s defiance toward Tehran and his bid for independence were
reinforced by the British promise of support against the central government, therefore, the
support and protection that the United Kingdom offered Sheikh Khazal needs to be
contextualized. This protection is best explicated by the long-standing, yet growing in
complexity, British interests in the Persian Gulf in early years of the 20th century.
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In the decades prior the First World War, Iran had turned into a stage for BritishRussian rivalry, with the two parties having Iran effectively partitioned into their spheres
of influence. The discovery of massive amounts of oil in Iran elevated the British stakes in
the Great Game. The advent of oil and the exclusive oil rights granted to a New Zealander,
William Knox D’arcy,97 in 1901 for 60 years virtually turned Iran from a terrain solely
serving as a buffer between the Tsarist Russian Empire and the British interests in the
region to an important geopolitical and geo-economic asset.
According to Spykman and Rollins, a historically evidenced common behavior
among states is their push toward the sea.98 Perhaps, Russia represents the most striking
case of such behavior. Historically, Russia has been persistently pursuing access to the
open seas. After the founding of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great in 1703, Russia’s avarice
for real estate shoring on various bodies of water began. From 1703 through 1808, Russia’s
conquest of the lands from Sweden and Finland, in this pursuit, did not quite yet put Russia
on the North Sea or the Atlantic Ocean. Within two centuries, Russia tried every direction
and all means for access to the open seas, including fighting seven wars with the Ottomans
in an attempt to reach the Mediterranean by way of Constantinople, aggressive policies
towards Serbia aiming at securing an Adriatic port, establishing Nikolaievsk at the mouth
of Amur in 1851 and Vladivostok in 1860; and leasing Liaotung and Port Arthur to reach
to the Korean Peninsula. Russia’s effort to access the open seas was opposed and rejected
by major powers or a coalition of them at every turn. Consequently, at the opening years
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of the twentieth century, Russia found itself with an unrealized dream of shoring a major
warm water port.99 Particularly after its unsatisfactory bid to obtain predominance in the
Balkan Peninsula and control of the Turkish Straits, Russia redirected its expansionist drive
to a dormant quest for access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. Russia rightfully
deemed bidding for the Persian Gulf as a more plausible strategy than going for the
Mediterranean. Access to the Mediterranean was guarded by the Ottomans who, in the
hindsight, were a couple of decades away from their demise. On the other hand, nominally
independent Persia, blocking Russia’s access to the Persian Gulf, was dramatically
weakened during the Qajar rule, thus impotent to effectively hinder Russia’s
encroachments.
Russia’s effort to increase influence and presence in Iran did not go unchecked
because of Iran’s significant role in the protection of the British interests in the region.
Russian economic penetration of Persia in the early years of the twentieth century, which
included the issuance of loans, plans to construct a railroad from the Russian frontier to the
Persian Gulf, and the acquisition of favorable tariff treatment for Russian exports, had
resulted in an acute rivalry with Great Britain. London viewed the prospect of Russian
economic hegemony in Persia as a prelude to political predominance, a menace to the
security of the British sea lanes to the Far East. The British also felt threatened by the same
encroachments in Afghanistan, the traditional buffer between Russia and British India. As
a consequence, Russian expansionism in southern Asia met with British opposition at every
turn.100
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The constitutional movement in Persia at the turn of the century gave Britain an
edge over Russia. In December 1905, the constitutional movement began as a protest by a
coalition of reformers of all walks of life who demanded the government to accede to their
demands for a constitutional government.101 The constitutional movement was more
inclined to receive support from Britain than Russia because it was a parliamentary
democracy, unlike the authoritarian nature of the tsarist Russia.102 Mozaffar e Din Shah
eventually succumbed to protesters’ demands in August 1906 and issued a decree to allow
for a constitutional assembly to convene. Mozaffar e Din Shah’s death was a turning point
in this balance. Upon the passing of Mozaffar e Din Shah, his pro-Russian son Mohammad
Ali ascended to the throne in 1907. Mohammad Ali Shah was subservient to Russia’s
imperialism in Iran from the outset, the sign of which was his heavy reliance on the
Russian-officered Persian Cossack Brigade.103
The weight of Russian influence, however, waned temporarily with the 1917
Bolshevik revolution and the collapse of Tsarist Empire. This meant that the British had
the opportunity to organize and supervise the exploitation of the vast reserves of recently
discovered petroleum while striving to establish predominant political influence on the
government in Tehran. D’arcy, on behalf of the British government, approached the Anglo
Iranian Oil Company (APOC) which had discovered oil104 in commercial quantities in
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Khūzestān in 1908, the first of such discovery in the Middle East,105 in order to pave the
way for Britain's involvement in the Iranian oil business. Soon, the British government and
APOC were engaged in business deals without consulting Tehran, turning Iran into the first
and primary oil producer for the British Empire.
The significance of oil for Britain was first and foremost in its utility for the oilmilitary complex. New technology has always been cited as an impactful element on the
assessment of “threats, vulnerabilities and the (in)stabilities of strategic relationships.”106
Such an impact is as much a function of non-military technology as it is a function of the
military kind as the history of military and civilian technologies is one of interplay and
“dual use.”107 By 1912, the British Navy was converting the fuel systems of its vessels
from coal to oil for more efficiency and potential outmaneuvering the German fleets.108
This was a transformational shift in the British strategic calculations. While the
disadvantages of coal were reflected in Churchill’s advocacy for the use of oil,109 it was
difficult to justify transitioning the royal fleet from the use of coal to oil, considering
Britain’s massive strategic reservoir of coal and the scarcity of oil resources. Even
Churchill had his own hesitations. He knew that “the advantages conferred by liquid fuel
were inestimable” but he also recognized that to switch “the foundation of the navy from
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British coal to foreign oil was a formidable decision in itself.” 110 Eventually, with the
advisory of Admiral Fisher,111 the First Lord of the Sea from 1904 to 1910, who regularly
offered Churchill advice on a variety of naval matters, 112 and also the assessment of the
war college,113 Churchill started to believe that outmaneuvering the German fleet would
only happen with his endorsement of the transition. This evolution redefined the
significance of the Persian Gulf in strategic calculations of the Britain.
In face of the growing strategic significance of the region and encroachment of
Russia and other rival European powers, Great Britain found it imperative to keep all the
Arab rulers onboard to protect this important body of water from hostile approaches.
Britain’s comprehensive policy of tasking the local Arab rulers to defend British
geopolitical and oil interests gradually prevailed the entire region. The Sultanate of Muscat
and Oman overlooked the longest coastline in the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf nearly
1000 miles stretching from the frontier of Hadhramaut Protectorate on the Arabian Sea,
round the cape of Ras al-Hadd, and along the south coast of the Gulf of Oman to the Straits
of Hormuz. During the 19th century, The Sultanate had concluded several treaties of
friendship and commerce, reinforced by the 1908 Agreement of Friendship.114 On another
front, by the Exclusive Agreement of March 1892, Britain had the seven Trucial Sheikhs,
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shoring on 400 miles of coastline beyond the Strait of Hormuz, pledge not to enter into an
agreement or correspondence with any government except the British Government, and
not to receive foreign agents and make concessions.115 Therefore, there was not much of
an effort needed on the part of Britain to socialize the Trucial Sheikhs into the arrangement.
The Sheikhdom of Qatar entered an agreement containing similar stipulations with Great
Britain in 1916.116 British relations with Bahrain were even closer as the ruling dynasty
had been in treaty relations, first with the East India Company, and then with the British
Government since 1820. Bahrain had considerable economic importance for Britain
because of its pearl fisheries, its placement in the corridor of trade to Najd and Al-Ahsa,
and then later because of oil discovery in 1932, and eventually its excellent airbase on the
island of Muharraq on the Imperial Airways Route to India. The ruler of Bahrain had
committed to Britain not to enter into relations with any other foreign power. Kuwait, on
the bay of the Arabian coast near the head of the Persian Gulf and contiguous with Iraq
was already formal British Protectorate. The Kuwaiti Sheikhdom included the island of
Bubiyan which could serve as an important base in the defense of hostile approaches to the
Shatt Al-Arab. In case of Iraq, Great Britain had special treaty relations with this country
despite its very short coastline at the head of the Persian Gulf. Even beyond that, the
important port of Basrah, just like all other ports in the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf
was “to some extent liable to British control.”117
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In the order that the British had designed for the Persian Gulf region, Iran could
have played a significant role; however, Qajar kings had proved to be highly incompetent
to enforce effective rule throughout an already shrinking country. During Qajar rule, Iran
lost large swaths of its integral territories to Russia and it was not surprising that the British
did not want to risk their interests in the region by handing over the protection of their
assets to the inept central government in Tehran. Britain had no confidence in Qajars and
the central government in Tehran for securing their oil and regional interests.118 As the
result, Britain began forging ties with many of Iran’s southern tribes, notably the chiefs of
Bakhtiari tribes119 and Sheikh Khazal, the leader of Khūzestān’s Arab-speaking
population,120 with the hope that they would protect the APOC facilities.121

Sheikh Khazal’s Rise to Power and Quest for Autonomy
Khūzestān had been semi-autonomous but subject to the Iranian crown for several
centuries. Qajar shahs typically appointed a governor-general to manage the affairs of the
province. Following the same pattern, the leadership of the Bani Kaab and the city of
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Muhammara122 was assumed by Maz’al Khan in 1881, whose position as a governorgeneral was confirmed by a royal edict from Tehran. In 1987, Maz’al Khan was killed by
his brother Khazal in his quest to become the sheikh of Muhammara.123 While the Qajar’s
authority in Khūzestān was plummeting and it was not long before Tehran’s control over
the province was only nominal, the king approved Khazal’s position as the new governorgeneral of Khūzestān and gave him the Neshan e Aqdas medallion in 1920. By 1921,
Sheikh Khazal had achieved complete dominance over Khūzestān and rough independence
from Tehran.
As mentioned above, Britain found utility in creating and maintaining a bond with
the governor-general of Khūzestān. The first written assurance of support to Sheikh Khazal
by the British goes back to 1902 which was repeated in 1907 by Sir Percy Cox.124 The most
serious of such assurances came after the discovery of oil in massive quantities in Iran,
which urged the British to sign a treaty with Sheikh Khazal in 1909-1910 assuring him of
their support against any attack against his rule.125 This treaty honored Sheikh Khazal by
giving him the title, “Knight Commander of the Indian Empire.”126 In exchange, Sheikh
Khazal vowed to protect British oil assets and ensure stability in the region. By 1919, the
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British had equipped Khazal with 3000 rifles, ammunition and a steamer for the specific
purpose of protecting British oil assets.127
There is evidence that Sheikh Khazal’s bid for dominion over Khūzestān had more
substance to it than the age-old problematique of center-periphery relations. In fact, Sheikh
Khazal had claimed the mantle of Arab nationalism. He had consciously relinquished his
identity and ethnicity from Arab-Iranian to Arab so that he could obtain Great Britain’s
attention and connect with the rulers of the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf.128 For that
matter, Persians consider the British treaty with Sheikh Khazal “as a national
humiliation.”129 This historical low point in the collective memory of the Iranian explains
why Sheikh Khazal has often been negatively portrayed in the contemporary Iranian
history.130
Britain trusted Khazal as he increasingly demonstrated a cooperative attitude and
unwavering commitment to securing the British interests in the region.

This bond

strengthened to the point that in 1909, Khazal negotiated the Cox-Khazal agreement on
behalf of the Anglo-Persian oil company (APOC) without consulting Persia’s central
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government.131 Sheikh Khazal had greater ambitions. According to Ferrier and Bamberg,
the stature he was aspiring was becoming the mere trusted agent in the region assuming
responsibility for the safety of the oil fields in all Arabia. 132 Sheikh Khazal remained
effectively outside Tehran’s control as late as the early 1920s. 133 Sheikh Khazal benefited
the weakness of the central government, and established ─ with the British support and
encouragement ─ an autonomous Sheikhdom in Khūzestān and brought oil bearing
territories under British suzerainty and control.134

The Rise of Reza Khan to Power
Some other crucial developments were unfolding during these years in Iran. In
January 1921, the commander of British forces in Iran, General Edmund Ironside chose to
promote Reza Khan, who had been leading the Tabriz battalion, to lead the entire
brigade.135 Within only a month, Reza Khan led his detachment of the Cossack Brigade to
Tehran and seized the capital. He forced the dissolution of the previous government and
demanded the appointment of Seyyed Zia'eddin Tabatabaee as Prime Minister. Britain
assisted Reza Khan with the 1921 coup d'état, hoping that it would slow down and ideally
halt the Bolsheviks' penetration in Iran. Britain received the rise of Reza Khan exuberantly
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as this policy seemed to be providing what it had promised at its face value. In a situation
report to the British War Office on Dec. 8th, 1920, General Ironside praised Reza Khan as
a capable Persian officer in command of the Cossacks which "would solve many
difficulties [for Britain] and enable [them] to depart in peace and honor."136
Reza Khan spent the rest of 1921 securing Iran's interior, responding to several
revolts that erupted against the new government and suppressing the federal rulers of
Qajarid Iran.137 In the same year, alerted by Reza Khan who had just staged a coup with
Seyyed Zia’eddin Tabatabaee,138 Khazal proceeded to take steps to protect himself. Khazal
attempted to form an alliance with all the Bakhtiari, Lur and Khamesh tribes, believing that
such tribal alliance would become an impenetrable barrier in the Zagros Mountains against
the forces of the central government. Khazal’s tribal alliance proposal, nevertheless,
remained mostly unanswered. Khazal then tuned to Ahmad Shah Qajar and the Imperial
Court of Tehran, presenting himself as a loyal defender of the dynasty, calling upon the
Court to take necessary actions against the ambitions of Reza Khan. This initiative was not
successful either. Khazal’s next recourse was to seek alliance with the opposition to Reza
Khan in the parliament. In this pursuit, he wrote a letter to Ayatollah Modarres, presenting
himself as a constitutionalist, a liberal democrat and a fierce Iranian nationalist. Although
the opposition cautiously accepted his proposal but the parliamentary opposition to Reza
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Khan failed on its very own mission.139 In 1924, Khazal decided to take his case to the
League of Nations and gain international recognition for the secession of his sheikhdom
from the Iranian territory, yet this attempt ended in failure as well.
In November 1924, Reza Khan sent 3000 soldiers to subdue the rebellious
Sheikh.140 Khazal turned to the British for help; however, Britain did not honor Sheikh’s
request as they had already determined a new course of policy toward Iran and the region.
After refusing to mediate between Sheikh Khazal and Reza Khan,141 Britain had to decide
whether to continue supporting Sheikh Khazal’s local autonomy or side with a strong
central government that was forming up in the hands of Reza Shah. British policymakers
embarked on debates over the utility and feasibility of such a policy shift.142 Sir Percy
Loraine, the British minister in Tehran from 1921 through 1926, called London on May 5,
1923, urging a policy reexamination toward Iran. Loraine argued that “support[ing]
Minister of War, [Reza Khan] … might enable [Britain] to control [him] to some extent
and perhaps tie him down to definite assurances. [This] support would also strengthen
bulwark against Russia.” He continued that opposing Reza Khan meant the “gradual
collapse of our position and influence … [which can play] into the hands of Russia.”143 At
first the Foreign Office opposed Loraine’s guidance and argued for the support of the
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Bakhtiaris and Sheikh Khazal even if it takes “dispatching a gunboat to Muhammarah.”144
However, in an October memorandum prepared by military attaché Lieutenant-Colonel
Sanders, Loraine explained to London that the tribes are no match for Reza Khan’s growing
power.145 Once the crisis began, the Foreign Office instructed Loraine to support Reza
Khan even at the expense of the Sheikh’s ”disappearance from Arabistan.”146 Eventually,
Britain completely withdrew its support and protection of Khazal’s rule, telling Sheikh that
the only reason they had supported him to begin with was due to the central government’s
inability to properly enforce its rule in Khūzestān.147 Reza Khan's arrival to Bushehr and
concentration of Iranian soldiers around Ahwaz were enough to convince Sheikh Khazal
to seek a negotiated settlement. Sheikh Khazal then disbanded his Arab forces and retired
to Mohammerah. Later in 1925, Reza Khan forcibly took him to Tehran, liquidated his
assets in the Iranian territory, and put him under house arrest until his death in 1936. There
are doubts whether his death was due to natural causes or he was murdered by one of the
guards at the direction of the Shah.148 The latter is by no means an unlikely scenario. In his
Inside Asia, John Gunther describes the climate of fear during Reza Shah’s reign:
There is no trial, no sentence. Enemies are supposed to be removed, if
removal for good is deemed necessary, not by the headman’s ax or firing
squad but by more melodramatic method of poisoning. The disgruntled call
it cheerlessly the inoculation Pahlavi. A pellet in the breakfast coffee one
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fine day — and then there aren’t any more fine days. It may be announced
that the victim died of a stroke.149

How Abdul Aziz Perceived the Developments in Persia
These developments in Iran did not go unnoticed by Abdul Aziz who at the time
was unifying the Arabian Peninsula under his rule. There is no evidence of direct contact
between Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Khazal at the time of the crisis; however, a close rapport
among Sheikh Khazal and Abdul Aziz of Najd and Sheikh Jaber Al-Mubarak, the Amir of
Kuwait has been documented.150 Al-Qassemi, the widely recognized Emirati commentator
on Arab affairs, corroborates this assumption and argues that Sheikh Khazal, during his
reign “was in constant contact with the tribal chiefs of Basra (both Sunni and Shia), Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia. In fact, he had called for an Arab alliance in the face of what he saw as
a growing Persian threat.”151 Although Al-Qassemi does not directly refer to the ruler of
Najd, but it is strongly likely that Sheikh Khazal, considering his political opportunism,
was in tune with the developments in Central Arabia from 1912 onward. An edited
document on the career and legacy of Abdul Aziz contains a picture of him with some of
his entourage in Basra with Sheikh Khazal standing on his immediate right-hand side.152
Therefore, it is not unimaginable that Abdul Aziz would have found the developments in
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Khūzestān, and Reza Shah’s ambitions in the region alarming, particularly with respect to
Bahrain. The Persians had long claimed sovereignty over Shiite majority Bahrain, and it
was not hard to assume the same fate for the rulers of Bahrain as that of Sheikh Khazal in
Khūzestān.

1927 Treaty of Jeddah: Foiling Iran’s Claim to Bahrain and the Resulting Increase
in Mutual Skepticism

Saudi Arabia’s major international base of support was Britain. In fact, the link with
Britain helped Abdul Aziz maintain his power and strengthen his regional position both
during and after the First World War up to the Second World War. The initial pressure to
initiate close relations was pursued by Abdul Aziz rather than the British.153 Abdul Aziz
had reached out to British representatives in the region almost immediately after his
conquest of Riyadh in 1902, hoping to consolidate his power by persuading the British to
offer protection for his emirate against other local emirates.
At the turn of the century, the Ottomans who had overall suzerainty over the interior
regions of the Arabian Peninsula, therefore, Britain was more invested in coasts of the
Persian Gulf fearing that any meddling in the interior of the peninsula would jeopardize
their relationship with the Ottomans. Even when Ikhwan forces took control of Al-Ahsa in
1913, thereby reaching the Persian Gulf coast, Britain refused to give Abdul Aziz any
commitment.154 Britain’s position, however, changed radically with the outbreak of the
First World War, especially after 30 October 1914, when the Ottomans declared war on
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Britain, France and Russia in alliance with Germany and Austro-Hungary. In December of
the same year, negotiations for a treaty of alliance between Abdul Aziz and Britain were
revived which eventually led to the signing of a treaty on 26 December 1915. The treaty
described Abdul Aziz as an independent ruler yet giving the responsibility of the emirate’s
foreign affairs to Britain in exchange for guarantees against external attacks. The treaty
also brought Abdul Aziz access to weapons and subsidies.
Despite the 1915 Treaty, the extent of British involvement with Abdul Aziz
remained limited and it was not until 1926 when Abdul Aziz completed his conquest of
Hejaz that Britain began a permanent representation in Abdul Aziz’s territories. It was
evident at this time that the control of Abdul Aziz’s external relations was no longer a
realistic option for Britain. Abdul Aziz was so intent on expanding his territorial control
that the British believed curbing that ambition would be costly.155 With that understanding,
Britain did not try to restrain Abdul Aziz’s territorial expansion into northern and eastern
Arabia, leading to the removal of Britain’s ally, Sharif Hussain in Hijaz.156 Nevertheless,
Britain’s role in determining the course of Saudi’s borders with Kuwait, Transjordan and
Iraq was substantial. In February 1926, Britain recognized Abdul Aziz as King of Hejaz,
Najd and its Dependencies, and proceeded to negotiate a new treaty which was concluded
in May 1927 in Jeddah. This treaty had important aspects to it regarding Iranian-Saudi
relations. Below is an overview of this treaty and some of its implications.
The fall of Sheikh Khazal and the impending threat to Bahrain was highly alarming
for Abdul Aziz but the disparity of military might between Iran and the Kingdom of Hijaz
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and Najd had eliminated the option of countering Reza Shah militarily. Politically savvy
Abdul Aziz, however, masterfully preempted the first formal Iranian claim to Bahrain
through 1927 Treaty of Jeddah with the Great Britain. Under this treaty, Britain recognized
the “absolute independence of the dominions” of Abdul Aziz and in return Abdul Aziz
agreed to respect British treaties with the Trucial Sheikhs.157 The Clause 6 of this treaty
states that Abdul Aziz undertook “to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the
territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, and with the Sheikhs of Qatar, and the Oman Coast who
were in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty’s Government.” 158 This treaty
was an implicit acknowledgement of Bahrain’s sovereignty, thus a challenge to Persian
claims in the Persian Gulf including sovereignty over Bahrain and a number of islands in
the lower Gulf, namely Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa.
In response to the Treaty of Jeddah, the Iranian government emphatically protested
the inclusion of Bahrain in the clause on the grounds that this was an infringement of
Persia’s territorial integrity.159 In response, Reza Shah ordered his envoy in Cairo to submit
a “memorandum of objection” to the Saudi government and demand the return of Bahrain
to the Persian domain of authority. On 26 November 1927, Persia lodged an official
complaint with the League of Nations.160 The letter cited Iran’s earlier protest of 1869 and
Lord Clarendon’s reply as proof of its proprietorship over Bahrain. In the letter, it was
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asserted that a private treaty between Shaykh Isa bin Ali al-Khalifa, the ruler of Bahrain,
and the British government was contrary to the territorial integrity of Iran.161 Britain,
however, denied the validity of Iran’s claim162 and informed the secretary general that the
two countries would resolve the dispute in direct negotiations.163 It is believed that Britain
disfavored any arbitration by the League of Nations in fear that it would weaken the
confidence of the region’s Arab rulers who were in treaty relations with Britain, mostly as
as a protection against Persian expansionism. Also, Britain worried that giving in to the
idea of arbitration could set a precedence for other powers in the region such as Abdul Aziz
who might have wished to challenge Britain’s position in Kuwait.164
In spite of the British denial, Iran insisted on its claim. In the aftermath of the British
treatment of Iran in the League of Nations regarding the issue of Bahrain, there are
indications that the Iranian government had adopted a deliberate policy of challenging
British supremacy throughout Persian Gulf.165 These provocative policies compelled the
British government to seek resolution to the crisis. The British government prepared
several draft treaties for the settlement of issues between Britain and Iran. The main aims
of the British government throughout the negotiations were to normalize their position at
Hengam Island where they already maintained a naval base; attain Iran’s recognition of the
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Persian Gulf Arab rulers and Britain’s treaty relations with them; obtain a renunciation of
Iran’s claims to Bahrain, Abu Musa and the two Tunbs; and to reach a settlement on a host
of secondary issues such as the issues surrounding the Slavery Convention of 1882, the
Zahedan railway, lighting and buoying in the Persian Gulf, the transfer of wireless and
telegraph stations, and a settlement of Iran’s “war debt.”166 Iran’s aims, as described by
Teymourtash in his letter on 10 May 1928, were to normalize Iran’s status vis-à-vis Great
Britain and to secure London’s recognition of Iran’s “legitimate aspirations,” particularly
in the Persian Gulf.167 Iran wanted to reduce British influence in the south of Iran and
secure what it believed to be its rightful place in the Persian Gulf waterway. Iran desired
to see all islands in the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, restored to Iranian sovereignty.
Iran wanted full responsibility for policing the Persian Gulf, maintaining lighthouses and
buoys and operating telegraph and wireless stations on its territory. Furthermore, it wanted
Britain to accept and abide by new restrictions on the use of its port facilities. 168 Intent on
acquiring what Tehran believed to rightfully belong to Iran, Iranian government launched
an initiative in 1930 to build a navy to strengthen its position in the Persian Gulf waters.
Iran viewed the Persian Gulf as Iran’s rightful sphere of influence, and Reza Shah
viewed the ability to bring Iran’s influence to bear upon the Persian Gulf contested islands,
waterway and littoral states as a vital test of Iran’s independence and sovereignty. The
Iranian policies toward Muscat and the Arab sheikhdoms of the lower Persian Gulf during
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this time became so challenging that Britain sought to compel Iran within the framework
of the treaty to recognize its role as protector and sole intermediary in the foreign affairs of
these Arab states. Yet Iran’s policy, under Reza Shah, was to deny the legitimacy of
Britain’s claim to protect the Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf.169 It appears that this approach
was meant as a pressure point in negotiations about the fate of Bahrain. 170 Nevertheless,
the protracted negotiations of 1927-1932 between Britain and Iran failed to produce any
agreement. Teymourtash had maintained that the Iranian government “would never agree
to a treaty which, on the face of it at any rate, appeared to involve considerable territorial
sacrifices.”171 Iran demanded that as part of any agreement, Britain should recognize at
least one of its territorial claims in the Persian Gulf namely Bahrain, Abu Musa or Tunb;
however, the British were not willing to consider any of such demands. After hearing
several proposals for compensation by Teymourtash, the British came to understand that
sufficient compensation in Iran’s eyes, was Britain’s acquiescence to Iran’s rise as a
regional power.172 Nevertheless, Tehran did not drop its claim to Bahrain until 1970, during
the period of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region.173
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1929 Treaty of Friendship: Saudi’s Unilateral Appeasement of Iran
Reza Shah’s challenge of the British influence continued as his suspicion of
Britain’s role in the region grew stronger.174 Interestingly, Abdul Aziz was becoming
increasingly skeptical about how much he could rely on Britain to deliver its promises. As
the result, Abdul Aziz decided to directly reach out to Reza Shah, the outcome of which
was the 1929 Treaty of Friendship. This treaty might have been referred to as a cautious
beginning of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which indeed was the case,
but what the literature has ignored altogether about this treaty is the fact that it was a classic
example of bandwagoning in international relations. Stephen Walt illustrates the causes
and pathways leading to alliances in response to threats. According to Walt, states that
respond to real or perceived security threats either bandwagon or balance. The balancing
behavior, which according to Walt is more prevalent and typically the preferable choice,
runs on the balance of power theory and entails forming coalitions against states or a
coalition of states posing a threat. Bandwagoning on the other hand, Walt explains, is
joining the sources of the threat in hopes that appeasement of the weaker side may
encourage the stronger side to divert attention elsewhere.175
In the closing years of the 1920s, all crucial elements that Walt identifies for
deciding moves towards alliances were in place. Iran’s aggregate power compared to Abdul
Aziz’s state which was in its infantile years had rendered Iran as a potential threat to the
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territories controlled by Abdul Aziz. Persian nationalism which was essentially a blend of
anti-colonialism and anti-Semitism was on the rise in Iran and purposively channeled
behind Iran’s territorial claims and regional aspirations.176 On the other hand, Abdul Aziz
was facing the Ikhwan revolt beginning in 1927, a nation unwilling to surrender to his
authority, and a long way before having his sovereignty consolidated within the territory
under his control.
The Ikhwan rebellion in 1929 is among the earliest crisis that Abdul Aziz had to
deal with. The roots of this crisis are to be sought in Abdul Aziz’s religious crusade that
had instilled in the Ikhwan the idea that the days of the Prophet had returned. The Ikhwan
was Abdul Aziz’s primary means of extending his authority in Arabia through raids on
tribes and forcible conversion of them to Wahhabism. However, the boundaries delineated
in the period following World War I had effectively prevented further territorial expansion
of the Al-Saud’s rule to the north and west. Once the Ikhwan stepped over the boundaries
into the British mandates, Abdul Aziz had to curb the Ikhwan’s expansionist zeal. Britain
forced Abdul Aziz to acknowledge fixed borders through a series of treaties with the
mandates of Iraq and Transjordan. Abdul Aziz’s surrender to the British imposition put
Ikhwan’s pent-up grievances on fire, leading them to accuse “Saudi Imamate of subverting
Islamic ideals,” and rebel against both Saudi rule and the British protected territories.177
Ikhwan’s grievances against Abdul Aziz were older than what immediately caused
the rebellion. The beginning of Ikhwan’s dissatisfaction with the Saudi rule may be traced
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to the successful completion of their campaign against al-Hijaz. After this success, much
to the surprise of Ikhwan commanders Ibn Bijad and Faisal al-Duwish, Abdul Aziz did not
treat them as they expected. Ibn Bijad had anticipated an appointment as the General
Commander of the Saudi forces and al-Duwish aspired for governorship of Medina
including surrounding territories and villages. Nevertheless, Abdul Aziz felt insecure in
face of Ikhwan’s growing strength, hence he decided to reward neither of the
commanders.178 Ikhwan’s grievance of Abdul Aziz grew when Abdul Aziz, in his effort to
transition from a religious leader to a political leader, prevented Ikhwan’s further massacres
and looting in Hijaz, whereas the Ikhwan believed that Hijazis deserved a “divine wrath.”179
The fanaticism of Ikhwan was no longer appropriate under Abdul Aziz’s new policy
of reconciliation. In 1925, Abdul Aziz decided to send the Ikhwan empty-handed back to
their hijras. The warriors returned home in 1925 only to find that drought had decimated
their herds, and their women and children had turned to panhandlers.180 Almost a year after,
al-Duwish and Ibn Bijad convened a meeting of Ikhwan tribes in 1926 and listed a number
of complaints against the Saudi leader, among them allegations of Abdul Aziz’s religious
laxity; inappropriate treatment of apparent manifestations of disbelief, idolatry and
polytheism; giving in to the use of cars, telegraphs and telephones which they referred to
as “innovations of the Devil;” and insufficient enforcement of Wahhabism among the
Shi'ites in al-Ahsa and Iraq. Once notified of the Ikhwan’s gathering, Abdul Aziz responded
by convening Ikhwan leaders with Wahhabi ulema in al-Riyadh to issue a fatwa that

178

ibid. 252.

179

ibid.

180

Louise Dame, “Four Months in Nejd,” The Muslim World, 14.4 (1924) 354.

62

conceded many of the Ikhwan demands.181 The compromise reached in al-Riyadh did not
last long. Ikhwan began their raids in growing intensity and savageness on British mandate
territories. After several failed efforts by Abdul Aziz to manage the crisis, Abdul Aziz
ordered his troops to attack Ikhwan forces on 30 March 1929 in the battle of Sabila to crush
Ikhwan decisively. Ironically, Abdul Aziz had to suppress the very force that helped him
expand his territorial authority, the force that was founded on the same Wahhabi doctrine
that legitimized his own political authority.
Above was only a synopsis of the political circumstances in Iran and Saudi Arabia
in the turbulent decade after WWI meant to make the case for the massive discrepancy in
the aggregate powers of the two polities. Such power disparity was coupled by the
geographical proximity between the two states. This proximity had magnified the gravity
of any assault by Iranians since Saudi controlled territories could easily be among the first
in Reza Shah’s harm’s way. The growing power of Reza Shah in the region, his aggressive
approach and intentions, the revival of exclusionary anti-Arab nationalist sentiments in
Iran, and the British favorable view of him due to coincidence of Reza Shah’s power with
the British interests had turned Iran into an offensive power able to “threaten the
sovereignty or territorial integrity of [neighboring states] at an acceptable cost.”182 Abdul
Aziz, being a political savvy, could not afford to overlook these developments.
Cynical of Reza Shah’s intentions, wary of Iran’s growing power, and disenchanted
by the precedence that the British had set in leaving the side of Sheikh Khazal despite all
the promises of protection, and Britain’s lenience toward Reza Shah over the issue of slave
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trades,183 Abdul Aziz decided to unilaterally appease Iran. Having realized that the cost of
balancing the stronger and seemingly adversarial Iran would exceed its benefits for the
infantile Saudi state which was at the time still grappling with domestic challenges, Abdul
Aziz sent a Saudi delegation led by Sheikh Abdallah Al-Fadl, the Supervisor of Foreign
Affairs, to Tehran on August 10, 1929 to negotiate and conclude a security alliance with
the regional powerhouse. This proposal was rejected by the Persian government and as the
result the two countries only agreed to the less binding promise of non-aggression, which
was a satisfactory progression for Abdul Aziz. However, the Saudi-Iranian Friendship
Treaty signed on August 24 set out the basic principles for establishing political, diplomatic
and commercial relations between the two countries.
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CHAPTER IV
IRANIAN-SAUDI RELATIONS IN THE 1930S: A CURIOUS CASE OF
"DISREGARD" IN FOREIGN POLICY

From 1929 through 1943, an overwhelming stability in the Saudi-Iranian relations
is traceable. The literature on Iranian-Saudi relations typically attributes this stability to the
1929 Treaty of Friendship, which unlike its title was primarily an appeasement of Iranian
rising power by the Saudis. Some credence given to the regional order imposed by the
British is traceable in the literature as well. There are some merits to these two analyses.
Even though 1929 Treaty of Friendship was far from a documentation or an articulation of
friendship between the two states, a successful move by Saudis to appease Iran under Reza
Shah might have contributed to the stability of the region during this period. On another
level, Britain was at the zenith of its hegemonic power, and as the result had effectively
constricted the foreign policy of both countries. Unlike Iraq that was hamstrung in its
foreign policy-making by the restricting clauses of its 1930 treaty with Britain, Iran and
Saudi Arabia willingly refrained from adventurous regional policies in face of
disproportionate British strength which kept them in awe. Britain had considerable interests
in these two countries and neither of them wanted to jeopardize its relationship with Britain
for minor gains in the region. This leverage allowed Britain to create a political order with
careful balancing of regional forces. With such a balance, Britain could partially appease
Iran and manage Saudi pressures in this decade. There were, however, more nuances to the
stability characterizing this period of Saudi-Iranian relations.
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Ontological Security and Saudi Arabia’s Quest for Regional Acknowledgement
Once King Abdul Aziz consolidated his gains domestically and established Saudi
Arabia in 1932, he began to look outward. He believed the destiny of the new kingdom
entailed an important role in the regional configurations. Matters of behavior predicated on
a belief of the trajectory and end-point of one’s destiny are typically entwined with a
conception of oneself. Self-conceptions could be fragile. They are neither immutable nor
imperishable. As a matter of fact, in a social world, the ‘conception of self’ fades out or
simply loses coherence unless they are reinforced by commensurate practices.
Accordingly, Abdul Aziz needed to engage in practices that would solidify the vision he
had for his kingdom. Even though Abdul Aziz’s political experience might have sounded
limited to traditional inter-tribal Arab politics, but as Jacob Goldberg documents, he had a
solid grasp of the “complexities of international politics” and he mastered the “art of
diplomatic negotiations with all the linguistic nuances and subtlety that it entailed.”184 His
pragmatism instructed him away from confronting militarily superior Britain over Saudi’s
historical claims of disputed territories of Bahrain and Trucial states, but he found it
crucially important to assert Saudi Arabia regionally by engaging Iran in multiple ways.
Considering the messianic zeal that characterized years of Najdi conquest and
expansion in Arabia, engaging Iran was extremely important for the Saudi infantile state.
This had to with preserving Saudi’s “ontological security.”185 Ontological security explain
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how routinized social relationships can help sustain ‘identity’ and a sense of agency
through creating “cognitive certainty.” Ontological security is about the subjective sense
of ‘self’ and ‘continuity’ which in a dialectic manner both motivates actions and receives
support by sustained actions that are commensurate to that identity over time. Ontological
insecurity could be, as Jennifer Mitzen argues, “incapacitating” and leading to agential
dysfunction,186 that is why establishing or joining routinized social relationships are of
great importance. These relationships create a basic trust system 187 where actors’
uncertainty and anxiety for the reproduction of their cognitive world diminish.
The outset of Saudi-Iranian relationships was characterized by mutual skepticism.
Following the victory over the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hejaz in 1925, Abdul Aziz
established the dual monarchy of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Najd; however, Persia
withheld its recognition of that entity until 1929. After the unification of the two
monarchies and the official establishment of Saudi Arabia, in May 1932, King Abdul Aziz
sent his son Prince Faisal, the viceroy of Hijaz at the time, to meet with Reza Shah. During
the visit, Prince Faisal delivered to Reza Shah a personal message from his father and
discussed several issues with the Persian Foreign Ministry officials. Even though the entire
mission was termed as “successful” in diplomatic parlance, Reza Shah never returned the
visit to Saudi Arabia.188
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The customary practice of diplomatic representation and returning official visits are
deep rooted in the history of politics. These practices are expected to be carried out
honorably and with high respect among states. Breaking from customary diplomatic
practices, in any form, is typically a sign of disapproval, discontent, or new direction in
foreign policy making, which can have strong and durable ramifications for inter-state
relations. The fact that Reza Shah did not act along what is customarily practiced by state
officials demonstrates that Abdul Aziz’s endeavor to “stabilize” Saudi’s identity was not
received as anticipated by Persia as a “powerful external [actor]” and in an environment
that suggested possible “hostility.”189
Reza Shah’s decision not to return the visit was only an instance of a larger
attitudinal pattern toward Arabs that characterized Iran’s foreign policy in this period. Reza
Shah’s foreign policy was marked by a dismissive attitude toward Persia’s Arab neighbors.
According to Saeed Badeeb this attitude was deemed by the Arab states in the region as
“hostile isolationism.”190 Such dismissiveness needs to be properly contextualized in
before making the case for the relatively stable Saudi-Iranian relations in this period. Two
aspects of this context are notable. First, geopolitically, Reza Shah was concerned with
interventionist policies of Russia and Britain and the threat they posed to Iran’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty. The Arab states littoral to the Persian Gulf posed no threat on
their own rights in this period. Second, geo-culturally, the growth of anti-Arab sentiments
among the nationalist Persian literati who were shaping the discourse of Iranian
nationalism in a bottom-up process at the time, coupled with Reza Shah’s predilection
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towards European-style modernization had him pursue the Persian fate in relation with
Europeans and not in dealing with “inferior Semitic folks.”

Iran Entangled in Great Power Politics
Any explanation of Iran’s modern history has to account for the role that outside
powers played in shaping, or at least influencing, Iranian politics. The geostrategic location
of Iran warranted great powers’ motivation to impact the course of events in Iran and have
them unfold in their favor. Reza Shah’s ascent to power took place during and after the
First World War when Iran was largely disintegrated as an independent and autonomous
entity. Large swaths of Iranian territory were occupied by Russian and British troops in
clear violation of Iranian sovereignty and declared neutrality.
Reza Shah had utmost despise of foreigners’ influence in Iran. Such resentment of
the foreign influence in Iran apparently predated Reza Shah’s rise to power. Muhammad
Reza, Reza Shah’s son, recounts in his interview with Karanjia that his father “resented”
receiving orders from Russian officers when he was in the Cossack Brigade, 191 and as a
soldier he would “ponder over… how to minimi[z]e all foreign influence in Persia and
rescue at least the army from Russian domination.”192 In a declaration that then Reza Khan
made shortly after his February 1921 coup, he asserted that he desired to “establish a
government that [would] not be an instrument of foreign politics.” As the king of Persia,
Reza Shah routinely lectured the Iranian people against the evil of foreign interference in
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the country’s domestic affairs, and his desire to end the dependency of his country on
foreigners.193 An excerpt of one of Reza Shah’s speeches is telling in this regard:
I consider myself duty bound to warn the public of the incalculable harm of
such dependence and to demand its immediate cessation. No civilized
person anywhere in the world should take upon himself the shame of
appealing to foreigners in order to attain his aims. It is incumbent on every
Iranian to maintain the glory of Iranian history by learning to rely upon
himself and upon the powerful force of the nation. The Iranians should be
of an independent mind, and should live with an independent will.
Compatriots! It is a thousand times better to starve in poverty and destitution
rather than prostrate yourself in humiliation before foreigners.194

Iran Facing Russia’s Aspirations and the Communist Fervor
Below is a discussion of the gravity of Russia’s influence in Iran and Reza Shah’s
counter-measures. During the 1920s and 1930s, Iran was demonstrably preoccupied with
countering Russia’s geopolitical aspirations and their ideological thrust. Russian presence
and influence in Iran during this period were not unprecedented. In fact, the tragic changes
caused by the Constitutional Revolution and its aftermath paved the way for a smooth and
sweeping penetration of Russians in Persian politics.
With the unexpected death of Mozaffareddin Shah, his son, Mohammad Ali
succeeded to the throne in 1907. Mohammad Ali rescinded his father’s agreement to the
new constitution which antagonized the constitutionalists. Mohammad Ali Shah sought
support from Russia, and the Russians, motivated by their colonial aspirations in Persia
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and the vagaries of the “big game” among competing imperial powers, obliged. Therefore,
in the dusk of the century, Russia and England, longtime rivals in the “Great Game” of
influence in the Middle East and Central Asia, took advantage of the unrest and divided
Iran into their “zones of influence” with Russia in the north and Britain in the south. In this
agreement, the central region was left nominally to the Iranian government as a buffer.
Russians had never been shy expressing what they sought in Iran. In 1904, Russia’s
foreign minister, Count V. N. Lamsdorf, sent a memo to A. N. Shteyer, his minister in Iran,
explaining Russia’s aims, “We have tried gradually to subject Persia to our dominant
influence, without violating the external symbols of its independence or its internal regime.
In other words, our task is to make Persia politically obedient and useful, i.e., a sufficiently
powerful instrument in our hands. Economically — to keep for ourselves a wide Persian
market using Russian work and capital freely therein.”195 By 1914, Russian influence in
the Iranian north had become fully entrenched, to the extent that George Buchanan, the
British ambassador in St. Petersburg, complained to the Russian tsar that “Northern Persia
was now to all intents and purposes a Russian province.”196
Buchanan’s diplomatic memoirs reveal that Russians entertained the idea of
dividing the Persian neutral zone with the British, but the outbreak of war and the Bolshevik
revolution curtailed the pursuit of this policy. The Treaty on the Division of Persia (as the
1907 Anglo-Russian Convention was known in Russia) came under fire by the
international resolutions that the post-revolution Soviet state adopted. On October 26,
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1917, the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets passed the “Decree on Peace” declaring
the abrogation of all unequal treaties between the tsarist Russia and other nations. Lenin
clearly specified in his decree that “in accordance with the sense of justice … any
annexation or seizure of the foreign lands… without precisely, clearly and voluntarily
expressed consent … of that nation” under any circumstance was impermissible.197 On
December 3, 1917, Soviets published the Appeal of the Soviet government “To All
Working Muslims of Russia and the East.” Among other items, this document called for
the annulment of the Treaty on the Division of Persia.198 Accordingly, it was decided that
once the military activities of the Russian troops in Persia were over, their troops would
withdraw and the Persians would be granted the right to freely decide their destiny on their
own.199 These resolutions were palatable to the Persian government; therefore, it was
among the first governments to recognize the Soviet government in December 1917.
Russia’s adamant pursuit of its commitments even led to their persistence on
including some clauses in the text of the 3 March, 1918 Brest-Litovsk peace treaty
signifying the necessity of withdrawing foreign troops from Persia. 200 The Russian
Revolution arguably saved Iranian independence and territorial integrity. Mohammad
Taghi Bahar renowned Persian poet, politician, journalist and historian figuratively
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captures the sense and essence of the time writing, “two enemies each pulling one side of
a rope, were strangling a man. Suddenly, one of them let the rope go and said ‘poor man’
... and the miserable man was freed. The man who let the rope go on our throat was
Lenin.”201
Just as much the Soviet decision to ease on Persia stemmed from an ideational turn
in Russian foreign-policy making after the Bolshevik Revolution,202 it was pragmatist.
Faced with the civil war, turmoil in Transcaucasia, and the challenge of consolidating its
authority over the Russian territory, the Soviet regime found it prudent to court neighboring
Turkey and Persia. The Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Leon Trotsky, as one of the
earliest gestures of friendship toward Persia, denounced on 14 January, 1918 the AngloRussian Convention of 1907 and “the preceding as well as subsequent [tsarist] treaties
which, in whatever form, limit[ed] and restrict[ed] the right of the Persian people to a free
and independent existence.”203 In a memorandum to the RSFSR government dated 20
January 1918, the Persian government expressed “readiness to start negotiations for
concluding new treaties … on the principle of free agreement and mutual respect of
peoples.”204
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In February 1918, as the prospects for the Parliament’s ratification of AngloPersian Agreement faded, the Soviet government became more insistent in its negotiations
with Iran apropos of the promises made. Subsequently, the Soviet government officially
ordered the General Headquarters of the Caucasian Front to evacuate the Russian troops
from Persia, and by the end of March, the evacuation was over. On June 26, 1918, Foreign
Commissar Georgi Chicherin addressed a more explicit note to the Persian government,
announcing the voluntary nullification by Moscow of all Russian concessions, debts and
special privileges, among them the capitulations. The Persian government responded a
month later with a supplementary decision, abrogating all earlier Russian instruments. Yet,
the matter was not formally settled until the treaty signed on 26 February 1921 went into
effect.205
The Russian withdrawal from northern Persia created a power vacuum. This was
an opportunity for Britain. Lord Curzon,206 defying the British government’s desire to
constrain commitments in the Near and Middle East, found Persia “the most vital link” in
realizing his dream of “creating a chain of vassal states stretching from the Mediterranean
to the Pamirs.”207 He seized the opportunity to force Persia into preferential treaty relations
with the United Kingdom. The 9 August, 1919 agreement between Great Britain and Persia
was the embodiment of this policy.
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In response to the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, the Soviet government in its
appeal “To the Workers and Peasants of Persia” made clear that it did not recognize the
Anglo-Persia Agreement. Aiming to weaken the British position in Persia and acting from
ideological considerations — mainly having the idea of spreading the proletarian
revolution to the East — the Soviet leadership started to provide considerable help to the
Jangali movement of Mirza Kuchak Khan.208 The order of the political office of the
Revvoensovet (Revolutionary Military Council) of the RSFSR No. 107, dated October 8,
1920, stated that “political work in the East is the most vital objective for the RSFSR. This
work must be taken up with as much determination as was done for the preparation of
October.”209
Almost three years of negotiations and the “political work in the East” came to
fruition with the Soviet-Iranian Treaty signed on 26 February, 1921. This treaty had been
prepared and agreed upon prior to the military coup of Reza Khan on 21 February, 1921.
The new Persian government sought international recognition; therefore, mutual
understanding was advantageous to both states.210 According to the terms of the treaty, the
Soviet government annulled all its previous treaties with Persia, as well as other treaties of
the tsarist government concluded to the detriment of Iranian interests. The treaty lay the
ground for the renunciation of all Persian debt and economic concessions to the Russian
Tsarist government and/or its subjects, and the return to Persian government of all
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properties acquired in Iran under such concessions. According to the article 6th of the
treaty,211 the two states pledged mutual cooperation to prevent their territories to become
bastions for any hostile activities targeting the other side. This article entailed an important
caveat which provided the possibility of the Soviet troops entering Iranian territory if the
Persian government proved unable to avert a foreign attack. Later in the mid-1930s, this
controversial clause which was clearly a violation of the Persian sovereignty overturned a
trend that bore an improvement of Perso-Russian relations starting in the mid-1920s.212
These policies began to be implemented at a time when Reza Khan was
consolidating his power and influence over Persia. Even though Reza Khan was concerned
over the expansion of communism and even his assassination by agents of the NKVD
[People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs],213 History of Russo-Persian relations provided
ample evidence as to why he could not neglect Russians in either tsarist or socialist guise.
In February 1926, Reza Shah made a statement to Sir Percy Loraine which he reported as
follows:

…because Persia has to live somehow with Russia, he and his government
have got to keep the Russians in play, yielding as little as possible and
The 6th Clause of the Treaty reads, ”If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by
means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of
operations against Russia, or if a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of
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leaving the nation through its Parliament free to decide where the limits of
national security and essential interest lie.214
Reza Shah elaborated on his position to the new British minister, Clive:

The basic thing in the foreign policy of Persia today was to free herself from
the danger threatening her from the North and to make herself stronger to
resist any pressure which might come from that quarter. Secondly, Persia
wished to live on the friendliest possible terms with Great Britain and hoped
to draw British sympathy to herself and to be able, should danger threaten
imminently from the North, to count of British encouragement if not
actually British help to save herself.215
Once Reza Shah ascended to the throne, he found normalized relations with the
Soviets in the interest of the country. Initially, Soviets were skeptical of Reza Shah due to
the role Britain allegedly played in his ascent to power, and the notion that his effort to
centralize power in Persia was in line with British hostile policies of containing Russia and
curtailing its interests.216 Russia demonstrated its disapproval of the turn of events by
putting an embargo, without prior warning, on all Iranian exports short of cotton, which
was later included in the ban.217 This was a considerable blow to the Iranian economy at
the time, considering the volume of trade between the two countries.218 This view changed,
nevertheless, as Soviets found Reza Shah’s success in establishing order and eliminating
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British privileges reassuring. This was an enhancement in the Persia’s function as buffer
state between the two powers. Another reassuring factor was Reza Shah’s modernization
project which was turning Persian society from feudalism to capitalism. Soviets believed
that this would prepare the country for a socialist transformation.219

On 1 October, 1927, Persia and the USSR signed two treaties. One of the two
treaties, the Soviet Caspian Sea Fisheries Concession in Persia,220 addressed the difficulties
arising from the stipulations in Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921 regarding Caspian fisheries.
By the act of the other agreement, the Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality, 221 Persia was
brought into Soviet defense arrangements. Accompanying this treaty were two protocols
in which the signatories declared that they had “no international obligations whatsoever
contrary to the said Treaty and will not undertake such obligations during the whole
duration of that Treaty.” The signatories also stated the article 6 of the 1921 Treaty
continued in full vigor.222

These treaties did not placate Reza Shah’s skepticism of the Soviets, nor slowed
down Russia’s intelligence activities in Persia that were at best disruptive if not subversive.
In October, 1930, the Agabekov revelations, published first in a series of article in Le
Matin, made clear that he had been sent to Iran in the spring of 1927 nominally as an attaché
of the Soviet embassy, but in reality as a resident general of the OGPU to improve the
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coordination and efficiency of the Soviet Secret Organization.223 The Russian defector,
Yuri Agabekov, outlined Soviet aims in Iran and named many agents from the Persian
network who worked for him. Agabekov was instructed by Moscow to overhaul the
existing OGPU apparatus and to concentrate its attention on the potentially disquieting
situation in the northern provinces, as well as to investigate the problems and grievances
of the national and tribal minorities.224 Particularly alarming was the revelation that the
Soviets planned to help Kurdish tribal area secede from Iran. Moscow hoped that this
support would encourage the Kurdish tribesmen fight for the Soviet Union, should there
be any conflict with Britain.225 With that in mind, in 1927, the Politburo had entertained
the idea of creating an independent Kurdish Republic of that small part of Kurdistan which
lay within Soviet territory.226 The purpose of this scheme was to attract Kurdish sympathies
in Iran, Iraq and Turkey; and it appeared to be highly favored by the Foreign Department
of the OGPU.227 This proposal was not followed through.228 Instead, the Soviets decided
to set up a network of agents among the Kurds in order to conclude a secret alliance with
their tribal leaders. In spite of Tehran's slow response to these revelations, this turn of
events further corroborated Reza Shah’s distrust of the USSR and its subversive activities.
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Irrespective to the distrust Reza Shah felt toward Russians, he opted for keeping
the prospect of economic cooperation with the USSR open and strong. The framework of
such cooperation was provided on March 1, 1931, when the Persian parliament ratified a
treaty of commerce with the USSR. The treaty was highly unpopular among merchants of
the northern regions in Iran,229 yet Reza Shah’s primary concern rested elsewhere, the
problematic 1921 Treaty.

Ever since the inception of the League of Nations, Iran had solemnly attempted to
uphold the Article 10 of the Covenant being collective security measure with the hope that
it would protect Iran against any threat and coercion.230 When the USSR joined the League
of Nations in 1934, Iran seized the moment and tried to persuade the USSR to eliminate
clause 6 from the Treaty of 1921, on the grounds that the Charter of the League of Nations
itself guaranteed the members’ security. The USSR government turned the request down.
The Soviet’s refusal to amend the 1921 Treaty following Agabekov’s revelations in 1930
adversely affected any further development of relations between the two countries in the
years to come. The Soviets had already had their grievances against Reza Shah’s repressive
measures against Iranian communists, and the latest developments were enough for the
Soviet government to expel Iranian migrants from the USSR. Ensuing these developments,
the USSR cut down the network of its consulates, and demanded the Iranian government
to follow suit. This encounter was the tipping point of relations between the two states in
the years preceding the Soviet occupation of Iran during WWII.
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Persian communist movement was the other major challenge that Reza Shah had to
face in connection with the Soviet Union, even though he would not have attested to the
gravity of the matter. Once asked whether he thought there was any threat of Bolshevism
in Iran, Reza Shah replied, “Not at all” and continued, “Enough Persians travel to Baku
and Yerevan to be able to compare the poverty and misery of Russia with the conditions
existing in their own country. They are too wise to wish to exchange.” 231 Reza Shah’s
policies, nevertheless, proved otherwise. As a matter of fact, the drive against communist
and communist sympathizers persisted all along during his reign.

The founding of the Tudeh in 1941 is commonly regarded as the beginning of the
modern communist movement in Iran, discounting the old Persian Communist Party, or
PCP, founded in 1920, as an organization with few, if any, historical connections to the
Tudeh. That is not true. As a matter of fact, the PCP had a strong organizational as well as
ideological influence on the formation of the Tudeh. The Persian communist movement,
which had strong ties to the Russian Bolshevik party, was born among Iranian workers in
the Caucasus. In 1905-1907, Social-Democratic Party of Iran232 emerged among those
workers. During World War I, the more radical members of the party, such as Assadullah
Ghafar Zadeh and Bahram Agayev, formed a clandestine organization, Ferqa-ye ʿAdālat
(Justice Party). Ferqa-ye ʿAdālat later renamed to Ferqeh Komonist-i Iran, or Communist
Party of Iran (PCP) in its first congress held on Iranian soil on July 23 rd, 1920.233 This
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congress came on the heels of the Soviet naval forces’ entrance at the Persian Caspian port
of Anzali in pursuit of the remnants of the White army. The presence of Soviet forces in
Anzali substantially reinforced Adalat.234
After the 1917 revolution, Adalat joined forces with Bolshevik organizations in the
Caucasus, recruiting Persian workers and other immigrants to join in the Russian civil war
against the Whites.235 Adalat’s leading theoretician, Avetis Sultanzadeh was impatient for
a world revolution which would extend to Iran.236 The party published several newspapers
as part of a vast propaganda campaign among Persian immigrants in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, with the aim of recruiting them for the “Iranian Red army.” Adalat also sent
activists to other major towns in northern Persia to revive the declining old SocialDemocratic Party of Iran which had maintained ties with the Persian labor movement from
its early days. In Tehran, the PCP formed a parliamentary alliance with the Socialist party
which also had historic ties to the Russian Social Democratic party.237
At a meeting on 25 January 1922, representatives of the Comintern, the Caucasian
bureau of the Bolshevik party, and the various central committees agreed on a new
composition of the central committee in Persia. The cornerstone of the new approach was
the acceptance of, and operation within, the existing Persian political framework, that is,
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the new government dominated by the commander of the army, Reza Khan, whom the
Soviets recognized as “representative of the Iranian national bourgeoisie.” During this
phase the communist party conducted its activities in semi-clandestine fashion, recruiting
and educating new cadres in Persia and striving to spread its revolutionary message. The
newspaper Ḥaqīqat (Truth), which began publication on 30 December 1921 under the
editorship of Moḥammad Dehghn was the principal instrument in this effort. The paper
claimed to be the “supporter of workers and labor unions,” and its editor had vowed to
express “the interests of workers and peasants, preach class struggle, and fight, in the most
vigorous manner, against the existing regime.”238 Reza Khan closed the newspaper in 1922.
In the ensuing period, the communist party made a concerted attempt to achieve a
modus vivendi with the government of Reza Khan. In March 1923 a more moderate
communist newspaper, Kār (Labor), began publication under the editorship of Abul-Fazl
Lesani who praised Reza Khan’s “struggle against the landed aristocracy.”239 By the same
token, Sultanzadeh, declared that Reza Khan enjoyed “great popularity,” and he was an
“esteemed politician.”240 Despite this conciliatory attitude, Reza Khan pursued his
repressive policy of crushing all labor unions and newspapers with communist tendencies.
The breaking point for the party must have come in December 1925, when Reza Khan
chose to establish a dynasty, rather than the republic on which both the Soviets and the
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party had counted.241 The influence of the communist party on Persian domestic politics in
the initial years of Reza Shah’s reign was marginal and by the time the party was
reorganized in late 1927, all hopes of conciliation with Reza Shah had been lost.
The second congress of the PCP, known as the Urmia congress, revitalized the party
for another round of communist propaganda in Iran. In this congress, Sultanzadeh assessed
the history of the party since its foundation in June 1920 and emphasized the “revolutionary
experience” that the party had acquired “[despite] periods of defeat and division.” The
representatives at this congress indirectly criticized the Soviets for having fallen victim to
Reza Shah’s “clever hypocrisy.”242 The congress emphasized the necessity for close
collaboration with the peasantry, “the seizure of power in the cities … with the [help of
the] revolutionary segment of the population . . . the workers, artisans, and petty
bourgeoisie;” and “the penetration of revolutionary ideas into the army and the passing of
troops to the side of the people in struggle.”243 These three elements constituted the party’s
program of “national revolution.” As its immediate tasks, the second congress called for
the overthrow of monarchy and abolition of special privilege; establishment of a “popular,
revolutionary, independent, and federated republic” in Persia; confiscation of all large
landed estates, as well as government properties; nationalization of factories, oilfields, and
the installations by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; and cancellation of all treaties
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detrimental to Persian independence. After the conclusion of the congress the party
manifested a new vigor and energy for activism.

The second congress generated considerable activity among workers, not only in
the factories, but also in the tightly controlled oil industry in the south. At the instigation
of PCP, on 1 May 1929, Persian workers at the APOC went on strike which was met by
the prompt response of the Persian authorities.244 The communists, nevertheless, continued
their long and patient effort among workers. The next major communist-led strike took
place in Isfahan in May 1931, at the Waṭan textile factory. Reza Shah defeated this oneday strike and crushed its communist nuclei as well.245

While party activists in Persia experienced considerable frustration owing to Reza
Shah’s policy of repression, they made vigorous efforts to recruit students who had been
sent by the government for higher education abroad. The recruitment was supplemented
by heavy Marxist ideological education and vehement anti-Shah propaganda.246
Immediately after the second congress, a brochure announcing the formation of the
Revolutionary Republican Party of Iran (R.R.P.I.) was distributed in the West. The R.R.P.I,
addressed the “Iranian nation,” blaming “the rich and the aristocracy” of the country for
the “misery and poverty” of the people. The brochure was an invitation to overthrow the
Pahlavi monarchy and replace it with a “national regime.” Many of the scholarship students
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who were recruited in Europe subsequently played decisive roles in the communist
movement in Persia.247 These recruiting activities supplemented by the distribution of
Setāra-ye sorḵ (Red star), the new theoretical organ of the Persian communist party, led to
a conference of Persian communist students in Cologne in February 1931. Delegates
resolved “to uphold the standard of liberty and revolution [and] . . . to use all in [their]
power to overthrow the regime of robbers . . . [as] Persia [had to] belong to the laboring
masses.” Immediately afterward, the newspaper Peykār (Battle) was launched in Berlin
with the goal of extending political propaganda against the Pahlavi regime to a wider, nonstudent readership.

The strikes and recruiting activities among Persian students abroad alerted the
government to the resurgence of the communist movement. The government in response
reinforced the enforcement of repressive measures. In that pursuit, the Parliament passed a
bill on June 9, 1931 designed to remedy the fact that the criminal code contained no
provision for action against those intending to overthrow the government by force.
Although neither communism nor the USSR were cited by name, the intent was clear. In it
various clauses, the bill provided for prosecution of individuals preaching the
establishment by force of one social class over others, advocating the violent overthrow of
the political, social and economic order, taking part in a party or organization planning the
separation of any of its territory from Iran or belonging to organizations with any such aims
that had branches within and without Iran.248
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In 1933, Taghi Arani, Bozorg Alavi and Iraj Eskandari founded a theoretical
magazine named Donya [The World] with an aim to propagate Marxism. In 1935, Dr.
Arani travelled to Moscow. During the trip, he contacted the officials of the Comintern and
persuaded them to assist him in building a new Communist Party in Iran. Following the
visit, the Donya group chose a 'Provisional Central Committee', with Arani as SecretaryGeneral until a new Congress of the PCP could be held. The Provisional Central Committee
was entrusted with establishing an underground organization capable of operating under
Reza Shah's dictatorship, forming unions among workers and students, and organizing
Communist Party members. The Provisional Central Committee succeeded in establishing
youth and student organizations with established cells on college campuses for the
discussion of Marxism and current affairs. Tthe student organization was not devoted
solely to theoretical discussions. In 1936, the student union organized a couple of
successful strikes which did not invoke Reza Shah’s repressive response.249 In another
attempt, Arani clearly breached a serious red line and tried to organize party activities in
Khuzestan which invoked the government’s unapologetic response.250 In April 1937, the
government arrested Arani and 52 of his followers, followed by the trial of 48 of this
number in November, 1938 and eventual imprisonment of 45.

Contemporaneous to the arrest of Arani and his followers was the ongoing Stalin's
purges in the Soviet Union which cost the lives of many Iranian communist leaders,
including Sultanzadeh. The dismantling of the PCP and the liquidation of its leaders in the
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Soviet Union did not result in total elimination of the communist movement in Persia. In
fact, some of the old cadres and leaders such as Pishevari, Ovanessian, and Eftekhari
survived their prison time to form the Tudeh party in 1941.251 On 29 September 1941, only
13 days after Reza Shah’s abdication and exile, the Tudeh party was founded by 27
members of Dr. Arani's followers who along with most other political prisoners were
released from prison in the wake of the Allied invasion while the 1931 anti-communist act
was still in effect.

Iran Facing Britain’s Aspirations and Entrenched Interests
At Loraine’s farewell meeting on June 27, 1926, he brought up to the Shah of Iran
that Iranian “foreign policy was not clear,” an assertion upon which Reza Shah lost his
composure and reacted fiercely. Loraine suggested that it was imperative for Iran to seek
closer relations with Britain and severe any relations with all state that Britain found
objectionable. Reza Shah responded to Loraine saying that “it would appear to my
countrymen as if we were subservient to Britain and I would not allow it.”252 This was how
Reza Shah set the tone for Persia’s relations with Britain during his reign. It was obvious
from the outset that the British would not find Reza Shah’s distinct vision for Persia
palatable.
Harold Nicolson who replaced Loraine as the Charge d’Affair at the British
Legation, immensely disliked Reza Shah. In a report that he sent out to Chamberlain, the
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Foreign

Secretary,

on

September

30,

1926,

Nicolson

called

Reza

Shah’s

“personality...alarming,” lacking “intellectual and moral [caliber] necessary for his high
functions.” Nicolson reported how the “tribes [were] restless… [and] people [were]
impoverished and oppressed.” However, beneath the altruistic rhetoric, Britain’s real
intention stands out at the punchline of the report where Nicolson complains that
“[Britain’s] old tribal friends [had] been sacrificed to [Reza Shah’s] policy of
centralization.” Nicolson vehemently opposed this policy, and rejected Loraine’s idea that
a “strong and stable Iran would serve Britain’s strategic and economic interests in the
East.”253
Soon, Britain was convinced that Reza Shah was intent not to serve the British
interest in the region. It is fascinating how Nicolson, representing the British government,
had the audacity to “question the value of national independence for Iran.”254 According to
Cyrus Ghani, who is among prominent scholars in Iranian studies, British figures such as
Robert Byron, Christopher Sykes, David Talbot Rice and Owen Tweedy were discontent
with Reza Shah’s attempts to “instill self-respect in his countrymen.”255 Among such
condescending grievances, one can read “emerging Persian arrogance,” Reza Shah’s
imposed “puritanism” as opposed to the “gaiety” of the period, Persians’ “insolence
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because Reza Shah [had] made them think Persia [was] important,” revocation of
“extraterritorial rights and privileges for foreigners,” etc.256
However, Britain’s influence in Iran was and remained more entrenched than that
of Russia due to their past economic penetration and the control of the southern oil fields
in Iran. The concession that William Knox D’Arcy had received in 1901 from the Qajar
Mozaffareddin Shah to “explore and exploit”257 oil in Iran, discovery of oil in massive
quantities in May 1908, the establishment of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1909,
Churchill's campaign to replace coal with oil as the primary fuel for the British warships
with an aim to help the British navy outmaneuver the German fleets, Britain’s decision to
buy 52.5 percent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1914 in order to ensure the British
control over Persian oil policies, the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919258 which effectively
placed Iran under British tutelage in many ways constitute the course of events that
gravitated Britain to Persia, yet eventually made inevitable a clash between the two sides
during Reza Shah’s reign.
The British had ensured their uninterrupted oil profits by forming alliances with
tribal leaders in Persia. Throughout its existence, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had paid
Persia a pittance compared to what it made as profit and paid the British government in
taxes. By 1920, a year before Reza Khan’s coup, the Iranian position had deteriorated to
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the extent that in the negotiations toward a settlement of disputes with the company, Iran
was represented by Sir Sidney Armitage-Smith, a British treasury official. The agreement
that had been reached, however, was not ratified by the Iranian parliament, allowing Reza
Shah to consider it immaterial. Reza Shah deemed the D’Arcy concession unfair, extracted
when Iran had been at its nadir. Soon after coronation, Reza Shah ordered the government
to look into the original D’Arcy agreement and renegotiate it. Formal negotiations which
began in 1929 and lasted until August 1931 yielded no results. In the meantime, Iran’s oil
revenues fell by 76 percent from 1930 to 1931. This was an unbearable loss considering
the enormity of Reza Shah’s modernization projects.
On November 27, 1932, Reza Shah, presiding over the council of ministers, called
for the text of the D’Arcy agreement and records of the discussions and in a fit of anger
had them thrown in the furnace that was heating the room. He then instructed the minister
of finance, Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, to inform the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that the
D’Arcy concession was cancelled.259 The British government objected to the cancellation
on the ground that the agreement stipulated arbitration in case of dispute and threatened to
take the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Persian government argued
that Persia was a sovereign state, and only the Persian courts had jurisdiction in the case.
On December 15, 1932, the British took the case to the League of Nations. After some
discussion, the president of the League mediated between the Iranian government and the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company encouraging both sides to reach an agreement on a new
concession. On April 4, Sir John Cadman and Sir William Frazer of the Anglo-Persian Oil
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Company arrived in Tehran to begin negotiations. Soon, there was another deadlock but
Reza Shah managed to prevail on Cadman, and eventually an agreement in principle was
reached on April 21. The Ninth Parliament soon ratified what came to be known as the
1933 Agreement. Cadman later said, “The Shah, and only the Shah, made the agreement
possible.”260
The 1933 Agreement, which would later be criticized during the oil nationalization
struggles of the 1950s, was celebrated at the time as a success. It significantly reduced the
area under concession, increased Persia’s revenues, reduced the company’s intrusion in
local affairs, and made the company’s accounts more transparent. It also obligated the
company to train Iranians for taking over technical responsibilities, and give priority in
employment and promotion to technically eligible Iranians. The agreement increased the
lifespan of the concession as well. The original D’Arcy agreement was valid for sixty years,
terminating in 1961 and in 1933 more than half of its life had passed. The new concession,
valid for another sixty years, extended it from 1961 to 1993. The issue of the extension was
raised toward the end of the negotiations. Even though the Shah initially objected to it, he
finally acquiesced because he could not afford to lose the oil revenues in the midst of
several development projects.261
In 1940, the tension between Iran and Britain flared up over the 1939 fall in Iran’s
oil revenues, plunge in the value of Iranian currency per pound sterling, and growing
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budget deficit. The way Reza Shah conducted his grievances against the British indicates
the relative success of his government to extricate Iran from the British influence.
Following the negative economic figures, Reza Shah accused the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC) of deliberately restricting production, thereby cheating the Iranian
government. Reza Shah impatiently demanded a parity of production with the amount of
production in 1937.262
Disappointed with Britain’s failure to honor the terms of the Anglo-Iranian oil
agreement that was signed in February 1940, Reza Shah unilaterally cancelled the
agreement using a trenchant language that received wide coverage in the Iranian press.263
Bullard believed that Britain had to better accommodate Iran in order to preserve the
lucrative oil agreement.264 It is interesting that in his response back to Bullard, the British
Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax dismissed the cancellation of the agreement and instead
instructed Bullard to inform the Iranian government that the language and tone of the
cancellation had left “the worst impression on His Majesty’s Government.”265
Reza Shah increased the pressure on Britain by threatening the oil concession
altogether which had the British contemplate accommodating Reza Shah. Bullard was
instructed that England deemed the Iranian oil of “great strategical importance [because]
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oil from other alternative sources [would] have to be bought largely in dollars.” However,
Bullard was told that “there [were] limits to patience of His Majesty’s Government.”
Matching the rhetoric, the British government authorized Bullard to threaten the Iranian
government at his own discretion. He was instructed that “if Iranian Government [did] not
share the desire of His Majesty’s Government for friendly relations … His Majesty’s
Government could and probably would exercise complete control over all exports of oil
from Iran.”266
Bullard did not deliver the threat. The British government concluded that they could
not risk losing the oil from the world’s largest refinery and it was more prudent to honor
Reza Shah’s demands. Possible cancellation of the oil concession which was an intolerable
alternative that Britain wanted to avoid at all costs. The idea of giving in to Iran’s demands,
however, was repulsive to the British but there seemed to be no other way out of the
dilemma. “To give way to the Shah,” wrote Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Kingsley
Wood to Lord Halifax, “would create a feeling throughout the East that we are in so
perilous a situation that we are ready to submit to any bullying or blackmail, even by a
small and poorly armed state such as Iran.” Sir Kingsley Wood believed that this was highly
detrimental to Britain’s prestige around the world. He wondered whether Halifax would
want to take up the matter with the War Cabinet for a thorough debate, 267 but Halifax
strongly opposed incurring unnecessary military risks in the Middle East. Halifax believed
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that it was imperative “to take account of the possible reactions of the Soviet Union if by
mischance a serious quarrel with Iran developed.”268
Reza Shah was aware of the quandary that the British were in due to their
deteriorating position in the Far East, meaning that Britain could not jeopardize their oil
interests in Iran. Reza Shah had said previously that under no circumstance would he accept
oil payments smaller than £3.5 million per year, equal to the amount paid in the peak year
of 1937. The Iranian government elevated the pressure even further by asking the AIOC to
pay Iran’s revenues in gold premium which according to the company’s calculations gave
him an extra £1.5 million for the period 1938 to 1941. At this time, the British had
concluded that there was no point in talking to Reza Shah whom Cadman had likened to a
“brick wall.”269 On 21 August 1940 the dispute was resolved on the terms favorable to
Iran.270
The pressure Iran put on Britain in these tumultuous years immensely antagonized
the British but they had to bear with Reza Shah’s intransigence. Lacy Baggallay of the
Foreign Office expressed the sentiment in a note to A. P. Waterfield of the Treasury,
“However disagreeable it may be to have to give way to the Iranian demands, the price is
on the whole a cheap one when one considers the benefits which we secure from retaining
our hold till happier times on this vital supply of oil.”271 The bitterness between the two
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states went so far to the point that Britain began to entertain the idea of replacing Reza
Shah. From the correspondence between Leo Amery, secretary of state for India, and
Anthony Eden, the new British foreign secretary who replaced Lord Halifax, it is clear that
at some point, the British even pondered reviving the Qajar dynasty.272

Germany as a Balancer, the Final Years of Reza Shah’s Reign
The friction that Reza Shah’s increasingly self-assertive foreign policy caused with
Britain and the Soviet Union was exacerbated by a German drive for economic, political
and military presence in Iran which was welcomed by the Iranian government. Germany
could help balance excessive Russian and British influence on Iranian affairs. With that
understanding, the Iranian government allowed Germany to become the leading country in
Iran’s foreign trade from 1939 to 1941, controlling about half of it. Germans made some
political advancements as well which met no obstruction by the Iranian side. Reza Shah
was not averse to Nazi ideology, language and methods. In fact, Reza Shah personally
admired Hitler and found his approach suitable for his dictatorial and nationalistic
predilections. So, by the World War II, Iran had already established important economic
and political commitments tied to a pro-German policy, while hosting a considerable
number of German agents.
Reza Shah thought of Germany and its prospect of winning the war as an
opportunity that could ultimately rid Iran of the pressure and influence of the Soviets and
British. The pervasive idea was that a victorious Germany would treat Iran differently from
272

See Leo Amery to Anthony Eden, 16 May 1941, PRO FO 371/27196, E 2583; Eden to Amery, 18
August 1941, PRO FO 371/27197, E 4586/3691/G.

96

the way England or Russia had treated Iran in the past. This was a tough bet.
Geographically, Germany was far from Iranian borders, therefore, as long as the war
continued, Iran would have to guard its independence and territorial integrity on its own.
However, the dazzling events in Europe such as the absorption of Czechoslovakia, the
Munich Pact, and Germany’s swift move into Poland, and then the fall of Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium looked promising.
Hitler’s invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941 drastically changed Iran’s strategic
position in the war. The pervasive feeling in the Iranian government was that Germany’s
eventual drive through the Caucasus after defeating the Soviets would return, to a friendly
Iran, those areas of the Caucasus and Turkmenistan taken from Iran by the Russian empire
early in the 19th century;273 however, Reza Shah was aware of the gravity of facing Russia
and England without the counterbalance of Germany. As a remedy to the dilemma, Reza
Shah ordered his ambassador in Moscow to declare Iran’s absolute neutrality. Reza Shah
personally talked to the Soviet ambassador to Iran to assure him that he always “wish[ed]
to have good, constructive, and cordial relations with the Soviet Union.” He wished, he
said, to move beyond any misunderstanding that might have existed between the two
countries in the past.
Reza Shah promised helping Allies within the bounds of neutrality, but this was not
enough for the Allies. In July, Eden explained that Britain is committed to the maintenance
of fully independent Iran and the upkeep of its commercial relations, on the condition that
Iran expelled the Germans. “There can be no doubt that these persons will be employed
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whenever it may seem fit to the German Government for the creation of disorder either in
Iran itself or in the neighboring countries,” Eden cabled Bullard. “His Majesty’s
Government take a grave view of this situation and you should urge upon the Iranian
Government the vital importance . . . of a drastic reduction of the number of Germans who
are permitted to remain in the country.274 Similar diplomatic notes were dispatched by
Russians to the Iranian government on June 26, July 19 and August 16, 1941.
The growing Soviet-British pressure over Iran was accompanied by the
concentration of troops at the borders. Reza Shah had already ordered his government to
expel as many Germans as would be possible without appearing to have given in to the
Allies’ pressure. By the end of July 1941, the British had decided that they probably would
invade Iran. The Iranian government kept assuring England and Russia that under no
circumstances it would permit the remaining Germans to interfere in Iran’s affairs, but to
no avail. On August 13, Russia informed England that it was prepared to move into Iran
but wanted to coordinate with Britain. On the 16th. Britain and the Soviet Union jointly
gave Iran another ultimatum demanding the expulsion of all remaining Germans. Iranian
government replied that few remaining Germans in Iran are all technicians working in
technical and industrial fields, and could not threaten the security of the Allies. On the 19th,
Eden sent British military and civilian leaders a top-secret cable in which he said that the
terms of the Iranian reply were “unacceptable and designed in collaboration with Germans
to play for time and that military action should begin as soon as the Russians are able to
cooperate.” On the 22nd, Reza Shah expelled all German nationals not absolutely needed
for technical reasons, only to witness the occupation of his country three day later. Reza
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Shah’s policy was to accommodate the Allies while maintaining Iran’s neutrality, but he
had misread the Russians and particularly the British. Reza Shah’s fundamental problem
was who he was, therefore, whatever he did or could have possibly done would not have
satisfied the Allies.275
Reza Shah’s concern for Iran’s foreign relations, its sovereignty, and destiny among
European and Asian great powers haunted his reign. Under Reza Shah, Western incursions
became far more indirect than before,276 and in spite of rapid growth in foreign investments,
particularly in the oil fields, transportation and communication infrastructures, he managed
to establish and retain significant political independence. Reza Shah managed to abrogate
all foreign capitulations in 1928,277 and many other concessions by 1933. Considering
political circumstances in the early 1920s Persia, Reza Shah’s achievements in this regard
are notable.

Anti-Arab Sentiments: The Fate of Aryans Rests Elsewhere
Along with the geopolitical exigencies of the time, there was an ideational layer to
the Iranian government’s avoidance of Saudi Arabia. This ideational layer rests on growing
anti-Arab sentiments in Iran at the turn of the century, upon which Reza Shah developed a
vision of Persian prosperity that was achievable only through an engagement with racially
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up-to-par Europeans and not “inferior Arab folks.” Vanessa Martin describes the
“presiding ethos” of the Reza Shah’s era “a militant form of secular nationalism, with a
vision of Iran regaining the glories of its pre-Islamic past.”278 Sandra Mackey provides the
same impression of the time:
Reza Shah launched his attack on Islam by painting the religious leaders as
symbols of the old, impotent Iran and himself as the great deliverer of the
nation. Freeing Iran from the stultifying influence of Islam, the shah would
gain his authority as the leader of a modernized state protected by a
mechanized army, not as the “Defender of the Faith” or the “Shadow of God
on Earth.”279

Concomitant to this form of “militant secularism” and glorification of pre-Islamic
ancient Persia was a rejection of Islam and Arabs on the belief that they were the main
culprits in bringing Iran to its ruin. The lamentable state of Persia during the rule of Qajar
dynasty encouraged some intellectuals to search for a remedy to the country’s inferior
world standing. In their diagnosis, these intellectuals found Islam and Islamic culture as
the sources of all ills. In their view, the reason that Iran was embarrassingly backward in
the 19th century had to do with the “savage” Arab invasion that replaced the “peaceful and
civilized” Persian culture with one of “vulgarity,” “violence,” “superstition,” and
“backwardness.” In response, an attempt was made to rescue Iran from such a legacy by
bringing back the pre-Islamic Iran to the limelight.280
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This cultural/intellectual (re)articulation preceded the political manifestation of
Iranian nationalism by at least two generations. Therefore, in order to fathom the context
to the rise of Iranian nationalism informed by the Persian pre-Islamic legacy, it is important
to briefly examine the efforts of those who tried to cast a new conception of Iranian nation
through a complex synthesis of traditional Iranian myth narratives and new European styles
of thought long before Reza Shah’s employment of that narrative.281
The genealogy of this (re)articulation began with cultural innovators such as the
Qajar Prince Jalal al-din Mirza, Mir Fath’ali Akhundzadeh, Hassan Taqizadeh, and Mirza
Aqa Khan Kermani who were among the most active participants in constructing a history
of Iran that idealized the pre-Islamic period as the period of prosperity, glory and
progress.282 Their writings reﬂect a synthesis of cultural and religious heterodoxy with
European orientalism, anthropology, and historiography.
Educated at the Dar al-Fonun,283 Jalal al-Din Mirza — one of many Fath Ali Shah’s
sons — was among the most important figures of the time to articulate a modernist
construction of Iranian national history. Mirza’s Nameh-ye Khosravan includes indications
of the experimental and heterodox ideas that were beginning to circulate among a small
sector of Iranian intellectuals during the Qajar period. Nameh-ye Khosravan is an
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imaginative narrative of Iranian history which portrays a host of influences that informed
the narratives of an emerging modern Iranian intelligentsia who aimed to (re)construct Iran
as a modern nation capable of serving as a political subject of history. 284 A key feature of
the Nameh-ye Khosravan was the inclusion of images and visual motifs from Iranian
antiquity which helped forge a direct link between the viewer and the pristine past, assisting
them in embracing the cultural renaissance that was underway. 285 Name-ye Khosravan
projects Iran as an indivisible conceptual-territorial entity whose historical continuity was
only momentarily disrupted by the Arab-Muslim invasion and the Mongol assaults. As
possessor of an autonomous and continuous history, Iran, Jalal al-Din Mirza argued, could
reclaim its core identity and national essence whose authenticity had remained intact
despite the vicissitudes of history.
Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh (1812-1878) was among the most important figures
to participate in the Iranian national revival. His literary works played a significant role in
constructing a classical past as the basis of modern Iranian national identity.286 These works
reflect a romanticized notion of a classical past and a racialized understanding of culture.
In his construction of Iranian political-historical consciousness, Akhundzadeh decried an
association of Arab cultural and ethnic characteristics with anti-modern Islamic practices.
He was convinced that the deplorable condition of Persia was due to its long association
with Arab-Islamic culture. Therefore, he called for dissociating Iran from its Arab-Islamic

284

Jalal al-Din Mirza Qajar, Nameh-ye Khosravan, vol. 1 (Tehran, 1869) as seen in Marashi, Nationalizing
Iran.
285

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso Books, 2006), 175.

Mirza Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadeh, Tamsilat: Seh Namayesh va Yek Dastan (Tehran: Entesharat-e Kharazmi,
1977).
286

102

heritage in order to revive “authentic Iran.” He believed that only through what he called
an “Islamic Protestantism,”287 the reconstruction of Iranian identity would be possible.
Iranian authenticity, in his view, had a natural affinity with ethos of modernity, unlike
inauthentic, anti-modern, Arab-Islamic elements in Iranian culture. His most important
work Maktubat-e Kamal al-Dowleh288 which is one of the earliest challenges to the
Islamicate narratives of Persian history reflects this fervor. Maktubat is a lamentation of
the state of Iran’s once elevated civilization. In the iconoclastic tone with which
Akhundzadeh treats Islam and his racial undertone in his polemics against Arabs, one can
trace the likes of Ernest Renan’s treatment of Catholicism, and popularized Aryan
mythology implying distinct and sublime social and cultural practices of Aryans. 289
Accordingly, his articulation of Iranian national-cultural imagining entailed purging the
pristine essence of Iranianness from Semitic Arab and Muslim heritage woven into the
fabric of Iranian culture. His harsh tone and pronouncements, his deliberate word choice,
and the nature of criticisms he espoused fit his radical approach in deposing the
“impediments of progress.” He portrays in his various works how the Persian glorious
“Islamic Protestantism” was a recurring theme in Akhundzadeh’s writings. In his autobiography, for
example, he discussed the reasons for writing his Maktubat-e Kamal al-Dowleh: “In order to change the
basis of this religion [Islam] . . . and for the awakening of the peoples of Asia from entrenched sleep and
ignorance and for promoting the emergence of Protestantism in Islam.”
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kingdom of perfect justice290 was brought to decline by the “violent assault”291 of “barefoot
and hungry Arabs.”292 Akhundzadeh’s contribution to the nationalist project was one of
infusing modern standards of progress with a mythic antiquity.
Hassan Taqizadeh played an active role in the 1905-1911 constitutional struggle in
Iran, distinguishing himself as a strong advocate of the constitutionalist cause against the
increasing autocracy of the Qajar rule.293 Taqizadeh was among the most politically
conscious intelligentsia of his time. He was “capable of inspiring great enthusiasm … [and]
sacrifices.”294 In 1906, Taqizadeh was elected as a representative of Tabriz to the first
Iranian parliament.295 His criticism of Qajar autocracy and clerical conservatism made him
the target of attacks by both fronts which eventually encouraged him to leave Iran in
October 1910.296 Taqizadeh lived in Istanbul, Paris, London and New York before he
arrived in Berlin on January 9, 1915.297 Once in Berlin, Taqizadeh immediately began to
gather a circle of agitators and intellectuals to cooperate with the Germans in charting a
new nationalist course for Iran.298 This circle established the “Iranian Committee for
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Cooperation with Germany” which undertook a series of initiatives against British interests
in Iran.299
The Iranian Committee began the publication of a semimonthly Persian-language
periodical called Kaveh,300 under Hassan Taqizadeh’s editorship. Kaveh, one of the
weightiest voices of nationalism, combined markedly pro-German political coverage of the
war with cultural, historical, and literary articles referencing Iranian antiquity. Kaveh
bridged the foundational work of the earlier generation of nationalists with the statist
project that was to emerge with the ascendance of Reza Khan. The burgeoning of a
journalistic print culture was conducive to Kaveh’s success in circulating the novel
articulation of nationalist narrative beyond the culturally heterodox elites, making it more
accessible to a broader audience. Kaveh employed a populist language to situate an
invocation of Iran in a romantic construction of mythic antiquity within a modernizing
agenda.301 By juxtaposing the present against a mythic antiquity infused with modernist
values and standards, Kaveh made the present recognizable as a moment of decay that had
to be transcended. Kaveh aimed to bridge “an immemorial past… [to] a limitless future.”302
This was a profound historical consciousness with important political implications. The
politicized version of this organic conception of political community which was slowly
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pieced together from a newfound awareness of Iran’s pre-Islamic past became an
increasingly ubiquitous model by the beginning of the twentieth century leading directly
to the rise of the Pahlavi state.
During this transitional period, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani,303 the prolific
intellectual reformer of late 19th century played an important role.304 Kermani’s reformist
ideas along those of his contemporaneous intellectuals set the stage for the Constitutional
Revolution of 1906. In the same vein, he had an idealized image of pre-Islamic Iran for its
geographic vastness, the virtues and mercy of its kings who were aided by wise court
advisors and Zoroastrian clergies, the order of her fighting men, and the all-encompassing
rule of law that governed her lands.305 Kermani believed it was the invasion of barbaric
Arabs and their institution of an unjust rule that were responsible for the lost glory and the
problem-riddled Iranian society.306 Kermani was convinced that Islam and the “inferior”
Arabs destroyed the populous, prosperous and powerful Persian Empire and its greatness.
Kermani viewed the influence of Arabic far worse than Mongols’ carnage in Iran and
rebuked Arabs for debasing Iranians moral characteristics.307
After the collapse of the Qajar dynasty and the constitutionalist projects, built upon
half a century philosophical/intellectual effort to (re)construct Iranian nationalism, political
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dynamics swayed toward a model of political community that could impose political order
and offer a new cultural synthesis to mediate the relationship between state and society.
Reza Khan emerged out of such political dynamics. He made use of the nationalist narrative
that had been developed since the late nineteenth century in order to cast a new relationship
between state and society.
Xenophobic nationalist sentiments kept rising into the 1920s. This was catalyzed
by intellectuals and the press propagating anti-clericalism, hostility to the Muslim Arab
conquest of Iran, and glorification of pre-Islamic Iran. The radical anti-Arab and antiIslamic ideas of Kermani and others were expanded by a number of twentieth-century
writers and intellectuals—notably Sadeq Hedayat, Ahmad Kasravi, and Bozorg Alavi.
While there was no freedom of press in this period, newspapers of varying orientations
continued to publish. Many of these journals along with some others that were published
abroad had a role in propagating and reinforcing nationalist sentiments by reminding
masses of the past glories and long-forgotten virtues of Persia.308
Reza Shah’s vision of the country, its calamities, potentials and destiny did not
accidentally coincide with the ideas and ideals of his contemporaneous intellectuals, rather
his disdain of Islam and Arabs was fed by figures with demonstrable anti-Islam and antiArab predilections. Reza Shah habitually sought tales of history from figures such as Adib
al-Mamalek, Abdollah Mostofi, and Ahmad Kasravi who portrayed for him an idealized
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image of the pre-Islamic Iranian past.309 Therefore, Reza Shah was socialized into the
nationalistic discourse of the time which he found extremely appealing, if not convenient.
The main appeal of an idealized distant past is that a great variety of values may be read
into it, while the evils of the present could be ascribed to a deviation from that ethos. Reza
Shah picked up pre-Islamic Iranian nationalism and made it a foundation of anticlerical
monarchism, which by association was anti-Arab. According to Tajolmolouk,310 Reza Shah
was not religious but in his irreligiosity one could find traces of anti-Arabism or a
conflation of the two. He apparently used to sarcastically say “There is no point to speak
to God in Arabic everyday unless God is Arab.” She narrates that he used to say, “Islam is
the religion of the bedouin [pejoratively used] Arabs and long before they knew God,
Iranians were devout worshipers and had their own prophets.”311 In another instance,
Tajolmolouk quoted Reza Shah saying that “Arabs [were] Iran’s historical enemies, and
the one and only misfortune of Iran [was] having to live by Arabs.”312

Conclusion
In this chapter, a puzzling period of Iranian-Saudi relations was analyzed. What
characterizes the puzzling nature of this period was Persia’s policy of avoiding any
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engagement with infantile Saudi Arabia. In order to give presence to Saudi entity in the
region and reaffirm their assumed identity, Saudis desired to engage Iran but much to their
disappointment, Persia did not reciprocate that desire, making a curious case of ‘disregard’
in foreign policy. The case was made that geopolitically, Persia’s primary concern rested
with the threats posed by Russia and Britain. To be more precise, there was neither any real
or perceived threat posed by the neighboring Arab states that would amount to that level
of gravity, nor these states could be part of any solution to Persia’s affliction with RussoBritish interventionist policies. The composition of the 1937 Saadabad Pact, the only
security pact that Iran entered in this period attests to the latter clam. 313 This pact which
was a treaty of nonaggression was signed among Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan,
leaving out Saudi Arabia.314 Reza Shah’s hallmark of foreign policy during his reign was
playing Russia and Britain against one another. In fact, nothing amounted to that level of
urgency in Iranian foreign policy making than to find a way to rid the country from the
menace of foreign influence or at least ameliorate its impact by balancing the two powers.
In these calculations, there was no place for the infantile state of Saudi Arabia.
Going forward, an ideational/geo-cultural layer of analysis was added to make the
case for how a gradually dominating narrative of Iranian nationalism predicated on a
romanticized notion of glorious pre-Islamic Persia — which was essentially anti-Arab —
informed Reza Shah’s European-style modernization and the pursuit of the Persian fate in
relation with Europeans and not “racially sub-par Arabs.” The (re)construction of Iran’s
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classical past as an epoch in which the nation existed in its homogeneous and unsullied
form was the foundation of the nationalist discourse that emerged out of a complex
interplay between mobilized myths and legends representing pre-Islamic Iranian culture
and an appropriation of racialist Aryanism.315 This essentially anti-Arab discourse defined
Reza Shah’s foreign policy toward Arab states, specifically Saudi Arabia.
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CHAPTER V
(1944-1960): WWII-STIRRED SHIFT OF POWER BALANCE AND THE
SPILLOVER EFFECT OF NASSERISM & ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

1944 Test of the Treaty of Friendship, Halting of Diplomatic Relations at a Hajj
Incident
Saudi-Iranian political relations remained stable until December 1943, when the
Saudi police arrested an Iranian pilgrim inside the Great Mosque in Mecca for defiling the
area around the Ka’bah.316 In a letter sent to the Saudi Foreign Ministry on December 12,
1943, Iranian embassy vigorously reacted to the arrest, prosecution and later execution of
the culprit of this incidence, and threatened repercussions. The Saudis denounced the
Iranian claims and right to prosecute the case. The subsequent correspondence between the
two states only escalated vitriol to the point that the Iranian government threatened to
“review the continuance of its relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia.” 317 The
clash between the two countries grew beyond rhetoric and the two sides eventually recalled
their representatives and broke off diplomatic relations in March 1944. Later, Iran and
Saudi Arabia entrusted the representation of their interests to Egypt and Lebanon
respectively.
The fact that the entire diplomatic relations between the two countries could easily
come to a halt over the Hajj incident demonstrated the fragility of the 1929 Friendship
Treaty. The striking aspect of this encounter between the two countries was the way that
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Saudis handled the matter. Saudis were emboldened318 and resolute to treat the incident as
a matter of national sovereignty irrespective to what the Iranian government thought would
be the more proper course of action. This reality was indicative of a gradual shift in the
relative power of the two countries during the Second World War.
In 1939, both Iran and Saudi Arabia announced their neutrality towards the warring
coalitions at the beginning of the Second World War; however, they experienced the war
years very differently. The European Allies including the Soviet Union did not take the
neutrality announcement by Iran seriously. Perhaps due to the pre-war relations of Iran
with Germany, and Reza Shah’s admiration of Hitler’s personality and his ultra nationalist
rhetoric,319 Iran became occupied in 1941. Mohammad Reza who ascended to the throne
after the abdication of his father in the aftermath of the Allies’ occupation of Iran was too
inexperienced to be able to safely navigate the country through the troubled waters of the
war years. The Second World War damaged Iranian economy, fragmented the military
force and created the condition of potential domestic instability.320
Saudi Arabia’s war-time experience was drastically different. Abdul Aziz had
relinquished his normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany, and instead
sided with the Allied forces. Saudi government allowed Britain and the United States to fly
over Saudi territory, and facilitated Soviet re-supply efforts that the Allies were running up
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the Persian Gulf. These measures gained the Allies’ confidence and precluded the
occupation of Saudi territory. As the result, the Saudi monarchy came out of the war
stronger and more confident. The way the incident of Hajj in 1944 was unfolded between
Saudi Arabia and Iran can reasonably be explained by the deterioration of Iran’s power
relative to the growing power of the Saudis. In the incident of Hajj, Saudis seized the
opportunity to assert their regional power once they realized that the country is run by an
inexperienced young king, and that Iran had turned into the “Persian Corridor”321 for the
British aid and American supplies to the Soviet Union during the war. The estrangement
continued until October 15, 1946, when King Abdul Aziz sent a personal letter to the Shah
of Iran, urging the renewal of the Saudi-Iranian relations based on the old ties. Iran
responded favorably to the Saudi initiative in renewing diplomatic relations which took
place in early 1947.322
After the resumption of diplomatic relations, the overall Saudi-Iranian relations
gradually strengthened up to early 1960s except with the occurrence of minor setbacks.
Iranian-Saudi security interconnectedness in years following the end of the WWII was
directly impacted by the exigencies of the post-World War/Cold War international security.
The real security concerns in both Tehran and Riyadh rested in (re)positioning their
respective states in the post-WWII world order. During this period, Iran and Saudi Arabia
both converged and diverged policies on a number of issues; however, the realities of the
new era overshadowed these policy practices and neither gained momentum enough to
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develop into any amicable or hostile relationships. In fact, these encounters, regardless of
nature and outcome, were diluted, sporadic and episodic.

Post-War Context and International Security
The Western strategic planning for the post-war context granted both Iran and Saudi
Arabia an important role to play. In light of the growing geopolitical and economic
significance of the region, the Western powers determined that the stability of the region
would be guaranteed by ensuring the domestic security in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Below,
the presence of the United States in the region and where Iran and Saudi Arabia fit in the
post-war order are contextualized.
The historical origin of the United States’ interests in the Persian Gulf region is
rooted in the developments of the First World War along with the increasing importance
of oil as a key economic and strategic commodity for the United States.323 The US
involvement in the Middle East is best captured by Andrew Bacevich’ argument which
highlights the two interrelated historical processes that have shaped the United States’
global exercise of power.324 These processes are a mass consumerist ethos in American
culture and a corresponding drive to sustain global military supremacy in order to ensure
privileged access to global energy, markets and credit. During the 20th century, Fordist
industrial capitalism in the US was setting global standards of dynamism and
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productivity.325 This energy-intensive model required raw material for its pervasive
petrochemical industry, and inputs for its increasingly mechanized agriculture. As the
result, oil became indispensable to the Fordist capitalism and the twentieth century global
order. The significance of oil in shaping the American strategic interests can also be
accounted for by the exigencies of the modern era of mechanized warfare.326 Therefore,
the quest for oil and military supremacy correlated dialectically.
After the Second World War, creating a world which would be hospitable to the
growth of US-centered capitalism became as paramount as containing communism.327
This meant an inevitable juxtaposition of capitalist “free world,” created after the image
of the “American way of life,” with globally projected US military power.328 This
foundational vision of global order embodied in NSC-68 (1950, reprinted in May 1993)
normatively justified US interventions in order to counter political forces which might
inhibit the growth of US-dominated global capitalism and support those forces that are
favorable to such a geopolitical project.329 The reprint of NSC-68 in 1993 demonstrates
that the rationale behind this project far exceeded the exigencies of the grand ideological
struggle between the two superpowers.
Insofar as the Fordist global order depended upon ample and cheap supplies of
oil, US strategists sought to establish predominance in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region to
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secure “[an] unhindered flow of oil ...to the world market at a stable price.”330 Pivotal to
this strategy was the US relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, the United States
was not among the major powers historically having a foothold in the Middle East.
The entrance of the United States in the region was generally facilitated by the
positive image of the country in the Middle East between the two wars. Ever since the
early days of the republic, the United States had its destiny tied to serving as a beacon of
freedom, hope and advancement. Conceiving the values on which the republic was
founded as universal moral maxims had the founding fathers think of the United States as
a ‘shining city on the hill’ for others to emulate. Through the isolationist years of the 19th
century, such moral maxims did not come to the fore of the US foreign policy in
observance of the accepted Westphalian doctrines of sovereignty and non-intervention. In
fact, the promotion of such moral virtues was largely a missionary affair than political.
An evidence to this observation is John Quincy Adams’ famous statement that the United
States was only “the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all” but not a nation
that “goes in search of monsters to destroy.”
The presidency of Woodrow Wilson was a fundamental break from this pattern.
After a century of feeling inhibited by the Westphalian order, the First World War
presented an opportunity for Wilson to remake the international order based on the
underlying political moral maxims that captured the essence of America. Indeed, Wilson
explicitly justified America’s involvement as premised on the objective of reordering the
international system in its own image. Among the values that guided Wilson’s agendum
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was the notion that people had an innate right to determine their own future. These
values, specifically in clear tension with long-standing Westphalian notions on a nation’s
sovereignty over its internal polity, resonated with the Middle Easterners who on top of
the centuries-long abuses of colonial powers had to bear with the arrangements that the
British and French had established in the region as the result of the 1916 Sykes-Picot
Agreement.
Between the wars, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Point Proposal was commonly
cited by nationalists in their quest for self-determination and as the result America
gradually presented itself as a benign alternative to France and Britain. The United States
was completely aware of such sentiments in the region and, as the result, acted carefully
so not to upset the favorable vision of the US in the region. Between the two wars, the
United States clearly refrained from adopting policies that would insinuate semblance of
the French or British imperialism, and propagated ideas that most actors in the region
found appealing.331
Well before World War II drew to a close, the United States began to signal a
shift in its approach. During the war, U.S. officials began to articulate a novel conception
of the post-war world order and the role that the United States wished to play in that
context. Roosevelt had given an early indication of this broad reading of American
interests in a letter to Stalin. As he was referring to southeastern Europe where America
had traditionally no interest in, Roosevelt wrote, “You, naturally, understand that in this
global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is
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not interested.”332 Roosevelt made a clearer assertion in March 1944 in his letter to James
Landis, Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East. He wrote “the Middle East
is an area in which the United States has a vital interest. The maintenance of peace in that
area, which has so frequently seen disturbances in the past, is of significance to the world
as a whole.”333
The context of the US involvement in the region after 1945 closely followed those
early indications. Following the armistice, the Truman administration challenged
domestic isolationist sentiments in support of the view that, as the predominant world
power, America’s interests now stretched around the globe. From this point forward,
ensuring the nation’s security, Truman administration made clear, would require
maintaining military superiority and economic “preponderance.” This vision entailed a
guarantee of unfettered access to natural resources, skilled labor, and markets, as well as
military facilities on a global scale. American officials did not see themselves as pursuing
colonial interests nor did the White House consciously seek to establish outright
hegemony in international affairs. Instead, the new vision the administration embraced
was one of ensuring the conditions necessary for peace and economic prosperity for all
nations—conditions that were tightly linked, and seen as fully consistent, with furthering
the economic and national security interests of the United States.334
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The Soviets Union with its communist worldview was the principal source of
threat to the American novel conception of the peaceful world. A series of events
beginning even before the end of the war combined to reinforce Truman administration’s
suspicion of Kremlin intentions. The West had been concerned about Soviet aims for
years, particularly since the signing of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact, which had led to
attacks on Finland and the occupation of eastern Poland and the Baltics. By the time the
Allied leaders met at Yalta in February 1945, the Red Army’s brutal sweep across much
of Eastern Europe in the wake of Germany’s retreat had magnified Western worries over
the region’s postwar future. By the beginning of 1946, the Truman administration was
already under pressure by public opinion and growing Republican criticism for being soft
on Soviets when on February 9, Stalin delivered a speech that sounded like a renunciation
of the wartime alliance, a reassertion of Marxist-Leninism indicting the imperialist West,
and a warning to the Soviet population to prepare themselves for an eventual conflict.
The US global strategic considerations and concerns over Soviets’ ambitions
found stronger reﬂection in American foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region.
The reasons why the United States found key strategic interest for the United States
during the Cold War era are captured by Michael Hudson in his article “To Play the
Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Towards the Middle East.” Hudson argues that “the
entrenchment of Soviet power” in the Persian Gulf and possible Soviet disruption of oil
flow from the region would have caused a “decisive shift in the world balance,” and “the
economy of the free world,” leading to the ultimate “triumph [of the Soviet Union]
throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe.”335
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In light of these exigencies, Iran and Saudi Arabia found an important place in the
United States’ strategic thinking; however, the United States was more concerned with
Iran than Saudi Arabia in the immediate years after the Second World War through 1955.
Between 1946–1955, Soviet–American rivalry was concentrated largely in the non-Arab
‘northern tier’ of countries bordering the USSR itself, namely Turkey, Iran, and Greece.
In this phase of the global contest, the USSR possessed neither the will nor the capacity
to challenge the west in the Arab world.336

International Security and Where Iran Fit in the United States’ Strategic Thinking
Iran experienced the Cold War as early as 1944, well before the end of the Second
World War. This was when the Soviets launched a propaganda campaign against the
British and the Americans for their alleged role in persuading Iran to deny the Soviets an
oil concession that they were bidding,337 while Kremlin was fomenting separatism in
northwest Iran.338 In a secret letter to President Roosevelt on January 24, 1944, Churchill
wrote:
According to the reports received from Azerbaijan, a group of people who
are not native inhabitants to the region have launched a campaign with the
aim to culturally attach the Iranian Azerbaijan to the Soviet Azerbaijan.
Even though there is no information at hand confirming any attempt to
annex Iranian Azerbaijan to the Soviet’s politically, the possibility that
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cultural annexation may serve as a means for political annexation cannot
be ignored.339

Roosevelt replied to Churchill on January 26 in a letter which reflects, in the hindsight,
the limited understanding of the US policymakers of the possible course of events in the
aftermath of the WWII. Roosevelt wrote:
I received your letter but I believe it is too early to speculate about the
Soviets’ future plan in Azerbaijan. I agree with you that those propagating
the cultural unity of the two Azerbaijans are directed by the Soviets but I
cannot predict if cultural unification leads to any political unification.
Even though the Soviets might have plans for their neighboring countries,
but they are too entangled in the war to be able to implement those plans.
Once the war is over, we will see if they intend to spread their ideology in
their neighboring countries. If the Soviets decide to do so, then the United
States, in line with its international obligations, will counter that effort.340

With that background, Harry S. Truman and his advisers were intent to solidify
Iran’s anchorage in the Western camp from the earliest days of the Cold War. But, Iran’s
place rose in importance in the US strategic thinking as the United States became
increasingly concerned with the Soviets’ probable ambitions in the Middle East. One of
the earliest episodes that contributed to the stiffening of American attitudes toward
Soviets was the crisis in the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan. Since August 1941,
Soviet and British forces had occupied the northern and southern segments of Iran
respectively according to Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Iran in order to keep the
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Iran in face of the German threat. In January
1942, by agreement with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Soviets and British pledged to
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withdraw their forces within six months after the end of hostilities. When the March 2,
1946, deadline arrived, the British complied, but Moscow balked, citing threats to Soviet
security.341
Both Britain and the United States found the Soviet decision alarming but they
did not have much leverage over Soviets since they needed the Red Army in Europe, and
ultimately in Japan. Iran, with Washington’s encouragement, took the issue to the newly
founded United Nations while Tehran’s Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, traveled to
Moscow to strike a deal directly with the Kremlin. By early May 1946, Stalin finally
decided to remove his forces from Azerbaijan as the Soviets still needed to work with the
more powerful Western governments and their wartime agreements (especially Yalta) to
advance Soviet international interests. Stalin agreed to pull the Red Army out of Iran in
return for the creation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company, a guarantee of stability in the
northern provinces and a “friendly” attitude by Tehran toward Moscow. These demands
were closely tied to both Soviets’ traditional imperial aims and their more immediate
security concerns.342 Ultimately, Moscow left Iran empty-handed because the Iranian
parliament never ratified the agreement.343 This entire saga led the Truman administration
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to draw very definite conclusions about Soviet general conduct and in relation to Iran
specifically. Based on these events, the US concluded that Stalin’s conduct in Azerbaijan
and Kurdistan, coming on the heels of the Soviet suppression of Eastern Europe, could
only be seen as hostile to Western interests and a confirmation that the Kremlin could not
be trusted to honor its international commitments.
The recent archival revelations and scholarship show that Moscow’s outlook
during and after the war mirrored Washington’s perceptions in several fundamental ways.
Initially, Stalin seems not to have had a consistent postwar strategy. Beyond pursuing
certain cherished security aims such as establishing Soviet-dominated regimes in Eastern
Europe,344 he responded to each situation on a case-by-case basis, bringing to bear a mix
of motivations deriving from historical Russian objectives, revolutionary ideology,
security concerns, economic or material imperatives, power politics, domestic factors,
and even personal impulses. All of these strands together formed a pattern of steady,
probing expansionism that was opportunistic in the extreme but that also stopped short of
deliberately provoking a military confrontation with the West.345
As suggested by Kennan’s February 1946 “Long Telegram,” the mixture of
ideological and practical considerations drove Soviets, in Molotov’s words, “to expand
the borders of [their] Fatherland” as far as possible.346 As for the Near East, a typical
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report from July 1946 states, “The Soviet Union desires to include Greece, Turkey, and
Iran in its security zone through the establishment of ‘friendly’ governments in those
countries.” By the end of war, Stalin seemed reasonably satisfied with Soviet territorial
gains in all direction except the regions below Caucasus. Since at least the eighteenth
century, the tsars had eyed Persia both as a gateway to the Persian Gulf and south Asia
and as a barrier to outside, mainly British, interference.347 Accordingly, Stalin, as Albert
Resis recounts, points to this region on a map and says, “I don’t like our border right
here.”348
Truman’s concerns were reinforced by crises in Turkey and Greece. Along with
Iran, these two countries constituted the Northern Tier in U.S. strategy, a first line of
defense against communism stretching from the Mediterranean to South Asia. In August
1946, the Soviets demanded military rights to the Dardanelles with Turkey. Coming on
the heels of so many other apparently provocative steps, the Kremlin’s proposal for joint
defense of the straits with Turkey was interpreted in Washington as a hostile move that
would not only give the Soviet navy direct access to the Mediterranean through the Black
Sea but would also, as Truman later wrote, “in the natural course of events, result in
Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet control.”349
As the sense of urgency heightened on September 24, 1946, the views of the
president and his advisers became more rigid. In late September, a particularly influential
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study known as the Clifford-Elsey report was introduced to the president. This report
synthesized the consensus of several senior experts, depicting Soviet international
behavior in heavily ideological terms and warning of the need to be prepared to confront
the Soviets “vigorously,” using, if necessary, the “language of military power ... the only
language which disciples of power politics understand.”350 In the Near East, as in other
parts of the world, the Kremlin had been able to “flow into the political vacuum” of the
region “because no other nation was both willing and able to prevent it.” The Soviet were
prepared to “take over new areas in the same way,” warned the Clifford -Elsey report.
According to the U.S. intelligence assessments at the time, Moscow was unlikely
to risk open war under current conditions but instead would rely on infiltration,
cooptation, and subversion in Iran and elsewhere on the “periphery.”351 Therefore, on
June 26, 1950, the day after North Korean forces attacked South Korea, President Harry
S. Truman was more concerned with the Middle East and more specifically Iran and not
necessarily the Far East.352 This means that the significance of Iran for Washington had
grown beyond the strategic importance of the country on its own right to the point that
U.S. officials began to tie the fate of Iran to the rest of the Middle East. Iran, aside from
possessing oil reserves of its own, was an important buffer between the USSR and the
Persian Gulf and Indian subcontinent. U.S. officials had faith that the Russians had
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coveted a port on the “warm waters” of the Persian Gulf since Peter the Great. If Moscow
gained that access, Western strategists were afraid that it would place the even larger oil
fields of the Saudi peninsula, and beyond them British military and commercial interests
from Suez to India under direct threat. In this sense, Iran was “vital to the security of the
United States”353 and the British interests; therefore, neither Washington nor London was
prepared to let that happen.
During the immediate postwar period, by mutual agreement with the United
States, primary responsibility for defense of the Middle East rested with Britain. This
reflected a recognition of long-standing British economic and security interests as much
as an awareness of the limitations on the U.S. military’s global reach. But Britain’s own
economic picture was bleak as the crippling effects of the war forced a reevaluation of
the country’s ability to manage its far-flung assets. In February 1947, the Foreign Office
secretly told the US State Department that London would not able to uphold its military
and economic commitments to Greece and Turkey for a long time.354 This meant that the
Truman administration was going to be unassisted in the crucial defense of the Northern
Tier.
The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 reflected the United
States’ readiness to take on the onerous task of filling the void created as of the British
gradual withdrawal from the Near East. The Truman doctrine was a broad statement of
intent “to support free peoples who [were] resisting attempted subjugation by armed
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minorities or outside pressures.”355 Despite the seemingly broad scope of the president’s
address, the Truman Doctrine reflected the more constrained “strong points” strategy as
described by Kennan and already in use by the United States at the time. Originally, the
concept of containing the Soviet Union had entailed reacting to Kremlin aggression
anywhere it appeared.356 But U.S. strategists and politicians realized that a “perimeter”
defense was both militarily and economically unfeasible. The United States did not
possess the resources for an undertaking of that scope, and the domestic political mood
was not supportive of militating for expanding obligations overseas so early after the war.
Instead, certain areas of the world were identified as being crucial to American interests
and deserving of the commitments needed to keep them in the Western camp. For
postwar planners, Europe and Japan were the most critical areas because of their
enormous industrial and economic potential. They were therefore the focus of the most
extensive economic and military restructuring schemes of the period, including the
Marshall Plan, expounded in June 1947. Other areas of the world that were mainly rich in
strategic resources such as oil, and likely to be targets of the Soviets, formed a second tier
of importance. This category included the Near East, comprising Greece, Turkey and
Iran, also known as the Northern Tier.
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International Security and Where Saudi Arabia Fit in the United States’ Strategic
Thinking
The case of Saudi Arabia in the immediate years after the end of the Second
World War was different. Unlike Iran that was placed in the Northern Tier, therefore
deserving an important place in the American strategic thinking, Saudi Arabia was not
subject to direct communist threat until 1955 as the Soviets neither had the capacity nor
the willingness to extend their outreach to the Arab world by then. In contradistinction to
Iran which was passively dragged into the new world order, Saudi Arabia had to carve
itself a place in the American strategic thinking between 1945 through 1955. The fact that
Saudi Arabia was not included in the Northern Tier did not mean that Saudi Arabia had
no gravitational effect on American policies toward the region. Below, the (re)positioning
of Saudi Arabia in the American strategic thinking is discussed.
The overarching reason that explains Washington’s gravitation to Saudi Arabia
was economic interests. These interests were so vital that they justified cooperation
despite domestic backlash in the Congress on the charge that Saudi Arabia embodied a
political system that shared none of the American ideals. The Saudi oil, alone, rendered
this country indispensable in the post-war world order that the US envisaged, the context
of which has been laid out above. The United States’ intensified involvement in Saudi
Arabia could be traced back to the 1930s when Standard Oil of California (SoCal)
discovered commercial quantities of oil on the eastern shores of Saudi Arabia. When
SoCal won the concession in 1933 to explore oil resources in Saudi Arabia, it invited
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Texaco and then later Exxon and Mobil to become partners in newly established Saudi oil
company, ARAMCO.357
The importance of Saudi Arabia for the energy-intensive Fordist industrial
capitalism was so high that Franklin D. Roosevelt pronounced the defense of Saudi
Arabia among the US national interests, long before any hint of energy shortage.358 To
solidify this intention. Roosevelt established a strategic partnership with Saudi ruling
family in 1945 by forging “an agreement with Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of
modern Saudi dynasty, to protect the royal family against its internal and external
enemies in return for privileged access to oil.”359
During the Second World War, Axis powers’ threat to the Allies’ oil supplies and
transportation lines dramatically impacted the production of Saudi oil and revenues. The
drop in oil revenues was compounded by a sharp decrease in pilgrimage revenues,
causing a financial crisis in Saudi Arabia. In response, Abdul Aziz asked SoCal for a loan
and threatened to cancel the concession if his request was not honored.360 In hindsight, it
is obvious that Abdul Aziz was trying to take advantage of the rivalry between the great
powers in the region, especially Britain and the United States. The US strategists were
savvy enough to understand that Saudi Arabia’s financial crisis had to be handled right or
it would have had catastrophic repercussions. The financial crisis could have swayed
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Saudis toward the Axis powers had they outmaneuvered Allies to provide financial
support to Saudis. Not only would this jeopardize American interests, but Saudis’ move
toward the Axis powers could have impacted the fate of the war, considering the weight
of Saudi Arabia in both Islamic and Arab world.
SoCal turned to the US Government for help. President Roosevelt initially
vacillated whether the United States, Britain, or a joint venture should take on the task of
assisting Saudi Arabia.361 The representatives of American oil companies in Saudi Arabia
adamantly urged the US Government to support King Abdul Aziz as a strong and true
friend of the Allies. These representatives warned that the British possible provision of a
substantial loan to the Saudis would strengthen their position in Saudi Arabia which
would threaten American oil interests.362 SoCal representatives asked their government to
provide direct aid to Saudi Arabia and suggested that the Kingdom should be included in
the Lend-Lease Act. As a result, in February 1943, Roosevelt took the initiative and
instructed his government to include Saudi Arabia in the Lend-Lease aid program at an
estimated cost of $99 million. This enabled the American oil companies to have the upper
hand over their British competitors.363 Harold Ickes, the US Secretary of Interior,
perfectly captures this rivalry when he acknowledged that "When one turns to the
question of who the Saudi concession should be protected against, it is surprising to find
that the perceived enemy was Great Britain and the British-controlled companies."364
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With the discovery of more oil fields, Abdul Aziz better appreciated the
importance of Saudis’ sovereignty over such massive strategic wealth, and how fungible
to other sources of power this wealth could be. When the United States began to import
oil directly, owing to the shrinkage of domestic oil production and a substantial growth in
demands,365 Abdul Aziz perceived the American interests in the region as an opportunity
for Saudi Arabia. Undoubtedly, the ever-increasing importance of Saudi oil for the
American economy led to a fundamental change in the United States' policy towards
Saudi Arabia.366 This implied a decision by the United States Government to end the
British political supremacy in the region.367 By the early 1940s, America had become
seriously interested in Saudi Arabia and started to forge political links with it. The
American-Saudi link was solidified by the historical meeting between King Abdul Aziz
and Franklin D. Roosevelt after the Yalta Conference on February 14, 1945 onboard USS
Quincy in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez Canal.368 This meeting constituted a great step
towards establishing a strong and stable Saudi-American relationship, which has lasted to
the present day.
Abdul Aziz enthusiastically desired continued American involvement in the
region which could mean more American aid and contribution to the development of
Saudi Arabia. Much to the King’s satisfaction, there were reasons other than oil to keep
Americans interested in Saudi Arabia. During the Second World War, the United States
realized that Saudi Arabia could help bridge the two remote fronts in Europe and the
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Pacific where American forces were deployed. Therefore, during their summit, President
Roosevelt asked for King Abdul Aziz’s permission to use the Saudi’s eastern ports and
for the establishment of an air force base in the Eastern Province.369 King Abdul Aziz
agree in principle to the request by the US president. With Germany’s deteriorating
position, the United States needed to move some of the deployed forces in Europe to the
Far East against Japan. Thus, the United States requested to obtain a lease for an air force
base in Saudi Arabia pursuant of the exchanges between President Roosevelt and King
Abdul Aziz on board of the USS Quincy. This meant the possibility of further
entrenchment of American involvement in the region, which was of strategic importance
for Abdul Aziz. Since this was an opportunity that Saudi Arabia could not pass up, Abdul
Aziz honored the request and authorized in May 1945 the building of al-Dhahran
airport.370
The strategic importance of Dhahran airfield was clear to the American officials.
J. Rives Childs writes, “[without any] knowledge of air or defense strategy[,] one glance
at a map [would be] sufficient to persuade [one] of the prime importance of Dhahran,
situated on a land mass resembling a gigantic aircraft carrier, astride the Middle East, and
close to one of the world's richest oil fields, in which [America] had a controlling
interest.”371 According to the agreement reached by the two sides, the United States
committed to return to Saudi Arabia the airport including all the constructions and
equipment in it as soon as the Second World War was over. The war ended before the
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construction of the airfield was over, nevertheless, the Saudi government extended the
lease several times according to renewed negotiations and revised agreements that would
ensure Saudi sovereignty and full authority inside and outside the airport.
After its completion in 1946, the Dhahran airport continued to play an important
role in the US military strategy. The Dhahran airport was among the 109 overseas
airfields capable of handling American long and medium-range bombers, including the
B-36.372 The costly maintenance of the lease even after the Japanese surrender triggered a
backlash in the US Congress but the significance of Dhahran airfield as a potentially
useful second-strike base from which the United States could contain the Soviet Union
justified the renewal of the lease, what King Abdul Aziz found highly desirable.373 US
Ambassador Raymond Hare who was sent to Saudi Arabia mainly to negotiate the
Dhahran airfield recalls that “Dhahran airfield was particularly important as a staging
point in the event there was trouble with the Russians.”374 Dhahran contributed greatly to
America's continued presence in the region as well as solidifying Saudi-American
relations.
Saudi Arabia needed the United States to protect the Al-Saud regime and provide
the kingdom with the means necessary for the survival of Al-Saud rule and sovereignty
over the largest political entity on the Arabian Peninsula. King Abdul Aziz was
apprehensive of the ambitions of Hashemite thrones in Iraq and Transjordan as a
potential threat. This apprehension was intensified by King Abdul Aziz’s growing
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skepticism of the British assistance to the Hashemite kings of Iraq and Transjordan, and
to a lesser extent, Saudis’ regional rival, Iran.375 On various occasions, King Abdul Aziz
expressed his concerns to the Americans about potential Hashemite attacks, and the
British reluctance to restrain the Hashemites' ambitions. During an official visit to the
United States in 1947, Prince Saud requested Americans on behalf of his father to extend
their support to Saudi Arabia in response to Britain’s support of the Hashemites and other
regional opponents.376 Abdul Aziz believed that only the United States could guarantee
Saudi Arabia’s security against these threats.377 The policy of tying Saudi’s security to
the American interests in Saudi Arabia yielded Abdul Aziz’s desired outcome when
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, confirmed to Prince Saud America's full support for
Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty against any external threat.
By playing into the discourse of the time and citing the communist threat, Saudi
Arabia convinced the United States to aid Saudi Arabia militarily. This included the
American involvement in training the Saudi officers, and furnishing Saudi forces with
modern American weapons.378 These developments were extremely desirable for King
Abdul Aziz. The Saudi King was committed to replacing the tribal and quasi-military
forces of the Kingdom with a prestigious modern army symbolizing the sovereignty of
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the infantile state. The Saudi-American agreements made possible long strides in this
direction.
After contextualizing Saudi-Iranian post-WWII relations, below the occasions of
Iranian-Saudi encounters and missed opportunities are examined. As a reminder, the
argument is that these encounters, regardless of nature and outcome, were diluted,
sporadic and episodic.

1951 Iranian Recognition of Israel
Before the end of the Second World War, Abdul Aziz was among the most
influential Arab leaders to the extent that President Roosevelt felt obliged to obtain his
support of the settlement in Palestine of the Jewish refugees from Germany and Eastern
Europe. President Roosevelt believed that Abdul Aziz had the clout needed to facilitate
the Zionist bids.379 Roosevelt attempted to make the case for the Zionist movement
before the Saudi King; however, Abdul Aziz decisively negated Roosevelt arguments.
King Abdul Aziz's replied, "If the Jews are to be compensated for the outrages
perpetrated against them, then it should be the perpetrators who carry the cost. If the
United States and its allies wished to see the Jews settled on land of their own, then it
should be German land that is appropriated." Upon the question of partitioning Palestine,
Abdul Aziz uncompromisingly asserted, "Why should the Palestinians be expected to
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atone for the sins of the Germans? Why should the United States look to its friends rather
than to its enemies to make reparations for the crimes of its enemies?"380
President Roosevelt was impressed by Abdul Aziz, the clarity of his argument and
his determination on the issue of Palestine.381 During the Summit meeting, the President
Roosevelt pledged not to assist the Jews against the Arabs, and made a promise to consult
with both Arab and Jewish sides before making any decision. Shortly before his death on
April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt confirmed these verbal assurances in a letter to King
Abdul Aziz. In this letter, Roosevelt committed that he would take no hostile action
hostile against Arabs.382
Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, broke the commitment that Roosevelt, as
the United States Commander in Chief, had given to Abdul Aziz.383 President Truman
was sympathetic to the Jewish cause for pragmatist purposes. In November 1945, Truman
summoned his Ambassadors in the Arab countries to Washington, and annulled his
predecessor's promises with the words "I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to
hundreds of thousands of people who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not
have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."384 King Abdul Aziz tried
to counter this ominous course of events by insisting on the pledge the United States had
made during Roosevelt's administration. He also emphatically asserted that the Arabs
were determined to resist the Jewish state and it could only be established and maintained
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by force. He insisted that the only acceptable solution to the Palestine dispute was
handing the country to its rightful Arab owners and that any other solution would
constitute an inhumane aggression.385 Abdul Aziz was unsuccessful to turn the tides, and
eventually, Truman officially endorsed the partition of Palestine and supported this policy
at the United Nations in 1947.386
The creation of Israel entailed some strategic potentials for Iran. The creation of a
non-Arab, yet pro-Western state in the region, especially with the specificities of Israel’s
creation, could give Iran an edge over the rival Arab states. Israel would have Arabs rechannel their attention and resources to deal with such an emergence, a desirable outcome
on its own right for the Iranian government. 387 Iran withheld the recognition of Israel due
to Israelis’ initial effort to cultivate ties with the Soviets but when Tel Aviv’s pro-Western
leanings became clear, Mosaddeq government extended de facto recognition to the Jewish
state in 1951.388 The possibility of close ties with Iran was appealing to Israel as it found
itself surrounded by hostile Arab states. The remedy to this geographical imperative was
reaching out to the non-Arab states of the peripheral region. This perception predicated
Ben-Gurion’s doctrine which suggested the necessity of building ties and alliances with
state and non-state actors such as Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, Kurds and the Lebanese
Christians.389 Iran shared some of the Israelis’ concerns regarding the threat of radical pro385
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Soviet Arab states and the pan-Arabism propagated by the Anti-Western regime of Nasser
in Egypt. Nasser’s anti-colonial and socialist rhetoric was gaining strong traction in the
Arab world; therefore, neither Israel nor Iran could overlook that.390 Another viable
explanation regarding the urge on the Iranian side for establishing ties with Israel would
be the pragmatist objective of solidifying relations with the United States in light of the
capacity that the Jewish population demonstrated by impacting American politics
beginning with the election of President Truman.
The de facto recognition that Iran granted Israel troubled the Arab states the region
including Saudi Arabia and King Abdul Aziz whose strong take on the matter was wellknown. What compounded the ideological grievance that Saudis had against that
recognition, Riyadh was concerned with the implications of Iranian-Israeli ties specifically
in the military domain. Despite these grievances, it is interesting that Riyadh did not
confront Iran on that matter. While denying recognition to Israel, Abd al-Aziz decided to
adopt a policy of “quiet restraint.”391 King Abdul Aziz was not willing to take on any
unnecessary challenge which would alienate the United State and deprive Saudi Arabia
from American aid and contribution. Even though King Abdul Aziz had to face strong proPalestinian sentiments not only on the Arab streets but also within the royal family, he
considered any policy that would jeopardize the American-Saudi ties illogical. These
calculations secured the newly reestablished Iranian-Saudi diplomatic relations as well,
and nothing came out of the possibility of an encounter over the divergence of policies
toward Israel.
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1951 Nationalization of Oil and 1953 CIA Coup in Iran
While Iran was ofﬁcially in the pro-American camp, its unstable domestic politics
threatened to undermine the Shah’s commitment to the west. The Shah’s position was
challenged both by the nationalist forces of the National Front, led by Mohammad
Mosaddeq, and by the pro-Soviet Tudeh party.
Ever since 1908 discovery of a large oil field, Iran conceded the right to exploit
oil to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)392 in return for only a pittance of the oil
export profits. The Iranian middle class and intelligentsia blamed Britain and its
imperialist policies for the country’s underdevelopment.393 Given these sentiments, in
March 1951, Iran’s Parliament voted to expropriate the oil industry and oust AIOC from
Iran. The British responded by placing an embargo on Iranian oil from 1951 to 1953
which caused serious financial hardship for Iran.
When Mohammad Mosaddeq was elected Prime Minister in April 1951, his bid to
change Iran’s contract with AIOC received support by the sympathetic Truman
administration. Washington believed that the popularity of Mosaddeq could provide an
alternative to the socialist Tudeh Party.394 This support, however, did not carry over to
the next administration. Once Dwight Eisenhower was elected president, the United
States ceased to demonstrate the same level of patience with Mosaddeq’s bargain with
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the West in the height of the Cold War. The Eisenhower administration feared that severe
economic condition in Iran caused by embargo could drive the whole country into the
Soviet sphere of influence. Furthermore, the US began to fear possible ties between
Mosaddeq, the clergy and the Tudeh Party, believing that such ties could spur a collusion
to counter Western influence in Iran.395 With the strengthening of such a perception, the
Eisenhower administration joined the British-led conspiracy to overthrow Mosaddeq’s
democratically elected government. Even though the Eisenhower administration did not
view Mosaddeq as a communist, the State Department and CIA had come to believe that
Iran was ripe for a communist takeover and as the result Mosaddeq’s government had to
be toppled.396 Kermit Roosevelt,397 the mastermind of CIA operations in Tehran, who had
been plotting Mosaddeq's overthrow for months operationalized the plot to pave the way
for the return of the Shah. Once the Shah returned to Iran he declared, “I regained my
throne thanks to God, the Iranian people and the CIA.”398
August 1953 was a decisive moment in Iranian politics and in Iran’s relation to
the Cold War. The opposition bloc of nationalist and communist forces was destroyed,
and power came increasingly to be held by the Shah. In 1953, Iran and the US
consolidated their strategic relationship which lasted until the revolution of 1979. The
coup also led to a reorganization of Iran’s oil industry, with US ﬁrms now acquiring a 40
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percent share of total output in a new consortium, therefore, technically, the
nationalization of 1951 was not reversed.
Surprisingly, Iranian-Saudi relations remained untroubled in these tumultuous
years. During the early 1950s leading up to the Shah’s fleeing from Iran in March 1951,
not to return until August 1953, Saudis refrained from adopting any provocative policy
toward Iran, even though the time might have been right for Saudis’ further regional
assertion. There is hardly any document from this period that suggests Abdul Aziz’s
concern with Saudi Arabia’s regional rival, Iran. Instead, the Saudi ruler was more
preoccupied with Britain than any other real or perceived threat in this period. The Buraimi
crisis is a clear indication of where King Abdul Aziz’s real concerns rested.
The villages of Buraimi Oasis were disputed territories sitting on a large swath of
unchartered oil deposits. Abdul Aziz was aware of the importance of sovereignty over
this undemarcated land which was disputed among several claimants. Emboldened by his
putative oil holdings, on September 17, 1952, Abdul Aziz invoked a previously declared
American commitment to “preserve the independence and territorial integrity” of Saudi
Arabia, but not against Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Iran or even the Soviet Union, but rather this
was a call on the United States to defend Saudi Arabia against Britain, the Washington’s
closest ally. In yet another attempt, in May 1953, King Abdul Aziz requested the
American assistance against Britain in the Buraimi dispute,399 erroneously thinking that
the United States would forgo the Cold War strategic contingencies for the interests of
the American oil companies. The United States clearly did not want to jeopardize its
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alliance with Britain over a land dispute. In a delayed response, American government
encouraged both sides to practice quiet diplomacy in order to settle their differences. In
May 1953, during his visit to Riyadh, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles made
it clear to Saudi officials that the United States would not appreciate Saudis’
compromising American policies by bringing up local and regional disputes.400
Regardless of the outcome of the dispute and what Saudi Arabia could harvest from an
attempt to raise the bars of an alliance with the United States, the Buraimi crisis indicates
where Abdul Aziz’s primal security concerns rested in his final years of reign and life. 401
Another explanation as to why Saudis refrained from any provocative policy
toward Iran during these years need to be sought in the way these developments were
perceived and received in Saudi Arabia. Iran’s oil nationalization inspired identical calls
to end oil concessions to Western corporations in other countries such as Bahrain and
Iraq.402 In Saudi Arabia, officials putatively praised Mosaddeq’s efforts. Iran’s vicegerent
in Jeddah, Mozafar Alam, reported that during his hours-long dinner with Prince Faisal
which almost exclusively focused on Iran’s oil nationalization, the Saudi prince spoke
highly of Mosaddeq and the National Front. The ulama in Mecca and Medina took an
extra step and on a separate occasion told Alam that their prayers were with Mosaddeq.
In 1952, the kingdom expanded trade ties with Iran despite the boycotts, and in April
1953, it concluded a one-year commercial agreement, subject to subsequent renewal, to
facilitate trade between Iranians and Saudis. As explained, during these years, Saudis
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were fighting a quite similar battle with the British. Arguably, the coincidental alignment
of anti-British policies in this period contributed as a secondary factor dissuading
adventurous Saudi policies toward Iran.
There is another factor that may explain why the Arabs and more specifically
Saudi Arabia did not conduct any anti-Iranian opportunistic policies. This had to do with
the recognition of Israel by Iran in 1950. Even though Iran’s initial recognition of Israel
was only meant to preserve the rights of Iranian citizens inhabiting in that region and any
de jure recognition in face of home-grown pro-Palestinian sentiments was impossible,
there are signs that the two countries moved to deepen their relations in the mid-1950s.
This was concerning for the Arabs in the region; however, due to the growth in power of
the Mosaddeq’s National Front — which was adamantly against the recognition and
contending that it was attained through bribery — and the important role of Ayatollah
Kashani, the policy of enhancing ties with Israel got derailed. With growing pressures by
the religious hubs in the region including Baghdad and al-Azhar, Iran closed down its
Jerusalem consulate. It appears that closing the consulate was, on the one hand, a gesture
to empathize with Muslims in the region and regain the confidence of the religious
groups. On the other hand, this gesture could have garnered the support of the Arab states
in the region for Iran’s legal dispute with the Great Britain. Neither of such desired
outcomes lasted long enough as with the overthrow of Mosaddeq’s government,
everything reverted back to where it was prior the departure of Shah from Iran.
Nevertheless, the assumption that the closure of the Iranian consulate in Jerusalem meant
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rescinding the 1950 de facto recognition was enough for Arabs to forgo the seizure of
opportunities in Iran.403

1953 - The Succession of King Saud and Disarray in Saudi Foreign Policy
In 1953, the same year that Mohammad Reza Shah was reinstated by CIA-led coup,
Abdul Aziz, the founding father of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia died and his eldest son,
King Saud ibn Abdul Aziz ascended to the throne. King Saud ruled Saudi Arabia during
one of the most tumultuous periods (1953-1964) in the history of the country. In this period,
the ruling family experienced a sharp division of power between King Saud and his Heir
Apparent Faisal which escalated into a bitter feud over political and policy differences.404
The bitterness of this feud negatively impacted Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in this period,
marked by disarray in foreign policy making, confusion and reversals.
The succession of Saud was smooth, but troubles began within a few years into
his rule when real differences between Saud and Faisal surfaced. These differences
created irreparable schism in the ruling family. Saud and Faisal disagreed on
appointments which constitute a crucial aspect of state-building in any nascent political
system. King Saud tended to strengthen his power base within the family, while Faisal
concentrated his efforts in the Council of Ministers. Saud appointed his young and
inexperienced sons as commander of both National and Royal guards, chief of the Diwan,
minister of defense, and governor of Riyadh. This was both concerning and embarrassing
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to many senior members of the ruling family.405 On the other hand, Faisal did not limit
the opportunities to his sons, rather he extended them to his half-brothers as well. The
deterioration of the Kingdom’s finances amidst charges of corruption and extravagance406
compounded by the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser on a wave of Arab socialist ideology
which was an unprecedented threat to the conservative Saudi establishment407 eventually
broke down the unstable state of disunity in Saudi royal family by the early 1958.
The anxiety of King Saud’s possible intention to break form the tradition and
instead transfer power to one of his sons was exacerbated by the king’s excessive
expenditure habits amidst deteriorating fiscal health of the monarchy. Therefore, senior
members of the royal family urged King Saud to relinquish power to Faisal. Facing the
pressure, King Saud transferred executive powers to Faisal by a royal decree on March
24, 1958. Faisal rectified the fiscal situation, reduced the royal family expenditures, made
the appointments to the Council of Ministers methodically, and personally took over the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Commerce and Finance.408 Faisal’s success in
turning the tides in both financial and foreign policy realms encouraged King Saud to
reclaim full power. With the support of tribal and commercial circles and a disgruntled
faction of younger princes, by late 1960s, King Saud reshuffled the council of Ministers
by appointing himself prime minister and replacing some of the cabinet officials with his
sons and the supportive “free princes.” In response, Faisal and Council of Ministers
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resigned, and this resignation ushered in a complex period of royal family politics. In the
ensuing months, King Saud strengthened the power and position of his sons, especially
Minister of Defense Muhammad, who was being discussed as a possible
successor.
At the height of his power, however, Saud’s health deteriorated, and in December
1961, the monarch sought medical care in the United States. This marked the beginning
of Faisal’s return to power. Although several Al Saud family members urged Faisal to
take control of the government and the country, the Heir Apparent declined, citing a
promise he had made to his father to support Saud, even though later he broke the
promise. Instead of an outright overtake, Faisal became prime minister, named Khalid
deputy prime minister, and formed a new government. He took command of the armed
forces and quickly restored their loyalty and morale. This step proved to be a turning
point, as later developments proved.409
About the same time that Faisal was effectively in charge, civil war broke out in
Yemen, and Egyptian forces arrived to support revolutionary elements there against
Saudi-supported royalists. Faisal sized the crisis as an opportunity to secure and
strengthen his authority by appointing a new Council of Ministers composed of loyal
princes.410 Among Faisal’s loyal supporters, Khalid, the Deputy Prime Minister, was
outstanding. Khalid’s ties to Jiluwi tribe could undercut Saud’s traditional power base. In
1963, Faisal replaced King Saud’s sons with new appointees as commander of the
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National Guard and the governor of Riyadh.411 In 1964, King Saud, however, made one
last effort to reclaim his position by ordering the restoration of all his executive powers.
In response, Faisal invited leading religious figures and princes to convene in Riyadh in
order to find a settlement to persistent feud. At the same time, he cut off King Saud’s
access to military force by arresting Saud’s son Sultan bin Saud, commander of the Royal
Guard, among others.
On March 26, a delegation composed of religious leaders met with King Saud and
demanded that the King attach the Royal Guard to the Armed Forces, attach the
monarch’s personal guards to the Ministry of Interior, abolish the Royal Diwan, and
rechannel excessive royal expenses to development projects.412 King Saud rejected the
demands and immediately mobilized the Royal Guard around the palace. What followed
was a classic coup because Defense Minister Sultan and National Guard Commander
Abdallah had surrounded both the palace as well as the Royal Guard. Even though King
Saud’s traditional sources of support disappointed him and even the Royal Guard
declared allegiance to the Heir Apparent, the king refused to abdicate. On November 2,
1964, the Council of Ministers, under Deputy Prime Minister Khalid bin Abdul Aziz,
“asked the Kingdom’s Ulama to examine the October 28, 1964 letter from the ruling
family—deposing King Saud and proclaiming Faisal monarch—from a canonical point of
view, and to issue a suitable fatwa.”413 A fatwa confirming the latter was issued on the
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same day, and Faisal immediately became King, and Saud, along with some of his sons,
went into exile.
In this tumultuous period, Saudi foreign policy positions fluctuated with the back
and forth changes in the political balance. Series of blunders by King Saud in the realm
of foreign policy specifically toward Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and the United States
further separated the king from his Heir Apparent. Among King Saud’s novelties in this
realm were lukewarm attitude toward the United States, favoring rapprochement with the
Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, and aligning with Egypt as Nasser was mobilizing Arab
masses for Arab ideals. When Faisal was granted the executive power in 1958, he turned
around these misjudgments and revived the conservative approach of Abdul Aziz in
foreign policy-making. These fluctuations as well as severe factionalism within the ruling
family deterred Saudi Arabia from developing a strong stance on Iran in light of the
exigencies of this period. What is documented from this period of relationships between
the two states suggests ambivalence or, at best, a hesitant approach. The encounters of the
governments in Tehran and Riyadh around the problematique of 1955 Baghdad Pact and
1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the Sinai War attest to this claim.

1955 - The Problematique of the Baghdad Pact
With the return of Mohammad Reza Shah to Iran after the 1953 CIA-led coup and
the succession of King Saud ibn Abdul Aziz to the throne as the eldest son of the founder
of modern Saudi Arabia, the relations between the two countries entered a new era. Shah
demonstrated positive intentions by sending King Saud and his Heir Apparent Crown
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Prince Faisal a Pahlavi Order and a Crown Order respectively. Iranian king also expressed
an interest to extend ties with the Saudi Kingdom.414
In May 1955, the United States launched the Baghdad Pact to connect the US
geographic spheres of influence in the Middle East. The short-lived and “ill-fated”415
Baghdad Pact was a pro-Western mutual security alliance416 suggested by the US Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles after his trip across eleven Middle Eastern capitals in May
1953. This pact which was meant to block possible expansion of the Soviet Union into the
Middle East417 was concluded among Great Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. The
nucleus of the pact was formed in February 1955 by a mutual defense treaty between
Turkey and Iraq. The Eisenhower administration strongly supported the Turkish-Iraqi pact
and hoped it would form the nucleus of a Northern Tier defense organization that the
Western powers could support without actually joining. Britain, however, seized the
opportunity of reviving the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty and reasserting its influence among
Arab states by joining the pact in April, 1955. Pakistan joined later and Iran was the last
state to join the pact on October 11, 1955, interestingly, in spite of Britain’s encouragement
to do the otherwise. In fact, Mohammad Reza Shah, who had regained power after the 1953
coup, viewed joining the Baghdad Pact vital for the preservation of his throne and his
state’s capacity to contain the Soviets and counter the communist threat.
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This anti-Soviet regional bloc marginalized Saudi Arabia and sidelined its possible
role in a regional defense pact. For obvious reasons, Saudi officials were discontent with
this configuration and blasted that as blatant interventionism in the region. King Saud
publicly charged the pact for strengthening Israel’s position due to the wedge it created
within the Arab world and the secret clauses, King Saud believed it contained, in favor of
Israel and to the detriment of Arab states. Although King Saud’s rhetoric in his opposition
to the Baghdad Pact resembled that of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the belief that the Baghdad
Pact was a colonial framework that undermined Arab interests and independence, and
served the Western political and economic interests, his disappointment primarily
emanated from the fact that the pact had excluded Saudi Arabia. The architect of the pact,
John Foster Dulles, believed that the Arab states were not prepared to take part in an anticommunist pact because of their growing nationalism and that they were more concerned
with Israel than with the Soviet Union. Another reason for the Saudi King to oppose the
pact was the inclusion of Iraq and the prospect of including Jordan later on. Iraq and Jordan
were two Hashemite states that had lasting feud with Saudis. The officials in Saudi Arabia
believed that the Baghdad Pact was an instrument of Hashemite aggrandizement.418 Adding
to his concern was the decisive alignment between Iran and the United States through the
pact at a time when Riyadh was reluctant to forge a full-blown partnership with the West
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in order to balance its relations with Egypt.419 The possibility that the Baghdad Pact could
trigger an Iranian–Iraqi alliance was another unsettling feature of the pact for Saudi Arabia.
In spite of some reactionary measures such as accusing Iran of fomenting unrest
among Saudi Shiite laborers employed by Aramco, and a ludicrous charge that Tehran
recruited Shaban Jafari, a CIA recruit during the Operation Ajax to plot the assassination
of King Saud,420 Mohammad Reza Shah invited the Saudi king to pay a state visit to Iran
in August 1955. During the week-long visit, the two monarchs discussed a variety of
political, economic, security and military issues. They agreed on the threat of communism
and expressed willingness to join the West in combating it. At the end, the two monarchs
published a bilateral communique reiterating the friendship between the two nations and
calling for more cooperation in political, economic and security areas. Despite the
optimistic memorandum issued at the end of King Saud’s official visit to Tehran, Saudi
king did not leave Tehran without any grievance. Although King Saud was not pleased
with the unenthusiastic reception he had received in Iran, and that Iran’s claim to Bahrain
was left unresolved, King Saud’s anger emanated from the fact that Muhammad Reza Shah
did not back down on his adherence to the 1955 Baghdad Pact, which he officially joined
about two month after in October. Nevertheless, Mohammad Reza Shah agreed to support
Saudi Arabia against a claim by Abu Dhabi to the Buraimi oasis when that dispute was
brought up on Riyadh’s initiative at the United Nations in 1956. In return, King Saud
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endorsed Iran’s charge that its citizens in Bahrain, including a large merchant class, had
been mistreated by the British.421

Nasserism, 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the Sinai War
In January 1956, Saudi Arabia sought and obtained Iranian support when it brought
the issue of its claim to the Buraimi oasis to the attention of the UN Security Council. Iran
at the same time needed the Saudi support in its grievance over Britain’s treatment of
Iranians in Bahrain and other parts of the Persian Gulf region. 422 Despite the cooperation
on the issues of Buraimi oasis and the Iranians residing in Bahrain, the real test of the
Iranian-Saudi relations in this period was the 1956 Suez Crisis.
When Nasser consolidated his power at home, he espoused Third World neutralism
at the height of the Cold War. Neutralism, for Nasser, was a means to turning Egypt to a
dominant power in the wake of Anglo-French withdrawal from the region, and establishing
a Pan-Arab empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf under his leadership. Nasser
masterfully played the superpowers against one another in order to secure the highest
possible financial assistance offers. Soon, Egypt turned into a “microcosm of the East-West
competition for influence in the Third World.”423 Nasser believed that his dream of leading
the Pan-Arab world would not come true until he could do away with three obstacles. These
obstacles were the vestiges of British colonialism in Egypt, French colonial authority in
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Algeria, and eventually Israel. Nasser viewed the Israeli state dominated by citizens of
European descent in the heart of the Arab world as a return to the colonial past which posed
a serious challenge to the cause of Arab unity. Therefore, Nasser took the lead in organizing
the Arab states in opposition to Israel.424
The rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt on a wave of Arab socialist ideology was
an unprecedented threat to the conservative Saudi establishment.425 In a seemingly
unjustified reversal of policy and a clear departure from late King Abdul Aziz’s tradition,
King Saud aligned Saudi policies with Egypt and Nasser’s call for the adoption of unified
anti-colonial policies and non-alignment in the Cold War rivalries. This “questionable
alignment” has to be properly contextualized. Strengthening his position within the royal
family feud could have been a contributing factor to Saud’s decision to align himself with
Nasser, and there is enough evidence to substantiate that claim;426 however, Saud’s
decision to turn to Nasser has a broader context to it.
In order to better understand King Saud’s policy in this period, we need to consider
the sovereignty-identity dynamic in the Middle Eastern politics. This dynamic is fueled by
the strength of sub/supra-state sources of identity. Due to the lack of a rough
correspondence between identity and territory, most Middle Eastern states suffer various
degrees of legitimacy deficiency.427 Deficiency in legitimacy of the state has important
ramifications. In states as such, citizens are not willing to embrace, or readily acquiesce to
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the norms of sovereignty. The state’s weakness to serve as a source of identity makes
citizens susceptible to centrifugal sources of identity below and above the state level. This
condition blurs the lines of national interests, negatively impacts the state’s mobilization
capacity, weaves irredentism into the fabric of the states, and dramatically hinders
concerted foreign policy-making. Pan-Arabism as a supra-state source of identity had
important effect on the behavior of Arab states. According to the ideas and ideals of PanArabism, it was expected for all Arab states to fulfill the role of defending regional
autonomy from the West, promote the Palestinian cause, and cooperate with other Arab
states in pursuit of common interests. Among the perennial dilemmas that Arab states have
to face is navigating the contradiction between the global norm of sovereignty in which the
state’s interests should be a priority in foreign policy-making and the regional norms of
pan-Arabism which suggest that interests should be compatible with those of the larger
identity community. Balancing a defense of sovereignty and demonstrating tangible
respect and adherence to pan-Arab ideals and norms is a tall order, indeed.
The conservative members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia were extremely
concerned with Saud’s turn to Egypt as, they thought, it would sacrifice their power and
status for “chimerical Arab ideals.”428 Among the main reasons that the royal family
pressured King Saud to relinquish his executive power to Faisal in March 1958 was King
Saud’s preferred foreign-policy choice toward Egypt. Crown Prince Faisal’s grasp of
foreign policy surpassed that of the King on many levels. Faisal realized that mere
resistance to the pan-Arabist threat posed by Nasser would not be effective. Instead, Faisal
attempted to appease Nasser while reinforcing the country’s internal capabilities. Faisal
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proclaimed in behalf of his state sympathy with pan-Arab ideals but not at the expense of
suppressing ties with the United States, even though Nasser had called for such a
measure.429
Despite Faisal’s attempt to roll back King Saud’s foreign policy blunders, Nasser
had already made an inroad in Saudi politics.430 In May 1956, when King Saud made visit
to Aramco facilities at the same time that the US lease of the Dhahran Air Base was about
to expire, Aramco Shiite workers staged a strike featuring anti-imperialism. These strikes
turned into riots when Nasser visited Dhahran in September.431 Arguably, the discourse of
Arab nationalist struggle against Western colonialism championed by Nasser had inspired
the unrest which Saudi officials found unsettling. In an interesting coincidence, these
strikes occurred about the same time that Saudi officials had made a decision to suspend
the renewal of the Dhahran Air Base agreement.432 These strikes catalyzed a reversal in
that decision.
Shiites constituted one among several subsets of the Saudi society who had found
Nasserist ideals appealing. The pervasiveness of this influence was to the extent that Saudi
officials found strong sympathy and loyalty to Nasser and the pan-Arab cause even among
the Saudi military. In 1962, when the Yemeni revolution broke out, a number of
disenchanted Saudi pilots defected to Egypt, creating an embarrassment for the kingdom
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that further divided the King and Crown Prince.433 Interestingly enough, when Saud was
deposed from power, he took refuge in Egypt and Nasser allowed him to be active through
radio propaganda against Saudi Arabia.434 After this brief introduction to Nasserism, the
discussion moves on to how the Suez Canal crisis served as yet another instance of IranianSaudi encounters in the region.
In mid-1956, Soviet-American competition for influence in the Middle East, the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and Egyptian efforts to hasten the departure of the British and French
from the Arab world converged in the Suez Canal crisis. The Suez Crisis and the way it
unfolded had important ramifications for the region. The crisis was an end to Anglo-French
pretensions of an imperial role in the Middle East, it bolstered Nasser’s prestige in the Arab
world, and helped introduce the Soviet Union as a champion of Arab aspirations. Below, a
brief account of the crisis is provided to set the stage for an analysis of the Suez showdown,
its aftermath and what it meant for Iranian-Saudi relations.
On June 13, 1956, Britain formally terminated its long-lasting military occupation
of the Suez Canal pursuant to the agreement of October 1954. In the aftermath of the British
departure, Egypt attained full responsibility of defending this important waterway. Israel
perceived the British withdrawal from Suez Canal which had removed an important buffer
between Israel and Egypt threatening. The removal of the British buffer in light of Nasser’s
growing pressure on Israel in order to enhance his image as the Arab leader most devoted
to the Palestinian cause was alarming to the Israeli officials. On another front, the formation
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of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alignment increased the Israel’s fear of encirclement. 435 In
response, Israel intensified reprisal raids against its neighbors including Egypt.436
Frustrated by Nasser’s growing dependence on the Soviet military assistance,437
Nasser’s formal recognition of Communist China in May 1956, the United States withdrew
its financial offer to the Egyptian leader on July 20, 1956.438 This move was conceivable
due to increasing pro-Israeli sentiments in the Congress, The withdrawal was a blow to
Nasser’s prestige and his development programs, In response, Nasser retaliated by
nationalizing the Suez Canal and announced that he intended to employ the revenues from
the canal to domestic development projects.439 Almost three months of diplomatic effort to
attain Nasser’s endorsement of a multinational control of the waterway failed. This bold
move increased Nasser’s prestige even further, but also united his principal adversaries.
Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, concluded that the only option available was
the recourse to military force. Eden despised Nasser and viewed him as an “incarnation of
Hitler.”440 He was resolute to seize the opportunity and topple Nasser. Nasser’s record of
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hostile support for Algerian rebels441 and Palestinian guerrillas made it easy for Paris and
Tel Aviv to join forces with the British to retake the canal and potentially bring about
Nasser’s downfall.442
The successful tripartite military attack failed to achieve its political objectives.
Britain, France and Israel carried out the October 29 attack without prior consultation with
the United States. President Eisenhower did not believe in the utility of force against
Nasser. Furthermore, he was angered by the British, French and Israelis for bypassing the
United States in staging of the military campaign. Following the Sinai Campaign, the
United States exerted strong diplomatic and economic pressure against the belligerents.443
As the result of the conflict, Nasser did not fall and throughout the crisis enjoyed supportive
Soviet propaganda.444 Syria played a considerable role in helping Nasser as well. Syria cut
the oil pipeline from Iraq which triggered a severe oil shortage in Britain and France.
Eventually, Britain and France left the Suez Canal in December, and Israel withdrew from
Sinai and Gaza in March 1957.
In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Mohammad Reza Shah decided to remain on the sidelines
when the Arab world and many Islamic countries condemned the invasion of Egypt.445
This decision was predicated on a foundational policy rift between Iran and the Arab world.
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The Shah’s primary concern after regaining his throne in 1953 was maximizing security
and promoting economic development by aligning policies with those of the United States.
The Baghdad Pact provided a modicum of security, but the Iranian government came to
believe that strong ties with Israel would help Iran in several ways.
The assignment in Iran of two Israeli officials further enhanced the mutual
cooperation between the two countries. Meir Ezri, a Persian native, was sent by the Israeli
foreign ministry to Tehran in 1958 and remained there as minister and ambassador until
1973.446 Accompanying Meir Ezri was Jackob Nimrodi, an intelligence officer who was
originally assigned to Iran on a Mossad mission, and later returned to Persia as military
attaché and private businessman.447 These men were instrumental in translating the general
understandings between the two parties into a network of intimate cooperation. The Iranian
government believed Israel could assist Iran’s economic programs, serve to strengthen
Iran’s ties with the United States, and balance Egyptian-Soviet alliance. Establishing and
cultivating ties with Israel could preoccupy Nasser in the Arab-Israeli front for a longer
time, therefore precluding the spread of his creed to the Persian Gulf region. The Iranian
government in the 1950s was primarily concerned with the Soviet Union and the Sovietsupported leftist Iranian opposition groups such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Tudeh
Party, and the Fedayeen-e Khalq. Shah did not perceive pan-Arabism as a threat on its own
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right, but he was concerned as a medium to extend the Soviet threat to the vital Persian
Gulf region.448
The strategic value of Israel for Iran in meeting the challenges of internal
subversion and regional aggression further encouraged the cultivation of closer economic
ties as well as security and intelligence cooperation. Iran needed oil-markets following the
1954 agreement with the Consortium that replaced Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and Israel
was viewed as a potential partner in this. The opening of the Tiran Straits, as the result of
the tripartite military campaign against Egypt turned Eilat into a natural route for importing
oil to Israel and later to Europe. In 1957, Iran and Israel began oil transactions using alien
ships lest overt cooperation would harm Iran’s standing with Arab nations and foment their
hostility.
Keeping relations and transactions with Israel in the dark was an integral part of
Iran’s strategic thinking in this period. The Shah allowed the Iranian intelligence service
to supervise the dealings with Israel while sidelining the natural conduit of such dealings,
Iranian Foreign Ministry. In this period, Israel furnished Iranian military with high-tech
equipment, and trained Iranian military officers, pilots, paratroopers, and artillery men, and
the Savak personnel, yet the annals of these interactions were kept off the book.449 Fearing
Arab antagonism, during these years, even the deployment of diplomatic missions was
disguised much to the disappointment of the Israeli side. In Tel Aviv, the belief was that
Iranian full recognition of Israel could help advance the cause of the Jewish state among
hostile Arab neighbors. Despite diverging opinions, the secrecy protocol between the two
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states remained intact until few years later when the Israeli prime Minister Golda Meir
broke with this tradition, brought the relations between the two states to public, and had
the United States and Britain pressure Iran to recognize Israel de jure, but the Shah of Iran
did not back down.450
The publicity of Iranian-Israeli dealings led Egypt’s Nasser to cut diplomatic ties
with Iran and embark on an anti-Iranian propaganda.451 This was an opportunity for Nasser
to extend his influence to the Persian Gulf region. Soon, Cairo replaced Baghdad as the
main anti-Iranian Arab propaganda hub. In an address on anniversary of the Unity Day on
February 2, 1966, with the benefit of hindsight, Nasser recounted the reasons for severing
ties with Iran:
The Shah had declared … that his country recognized Israel…so a country
said to be an Islamic member of the Baghdad Pact opened all opportunities
of activity to Israel and helped it to work against the Arab homeland.
Actually Iran became in recent years a base for Israel threatening the Arab
countries…. There is a secret agreement between Iran and Israel… the two
sides studied the role of Israel in the defensive systems of …CENTO. They
also affirmed the importance of reinforcing the economic, political and
military cooperation between the two countries.452

Nasser’s pressure on the Shah and the tripartite Egyptian-Iraqi-Soviet alliance was
extremely threatening. Concerned with the weakening of Iran which could potentially
redirect Iraqi’s attention from the eastern borders to the possibility of an invasion on Israel,
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the Jewish state supported Iran by providing intelligence on the Egyptian army as Iran was
preparing for possible attacks by Egyptians or Iraqis.453 The essence of Iranian-Israeli ties
in the 1950s and 1960s was not an alliance of non-Arab states in the region against the
Arabs after all. Common threats and mutual needs were the reasons that motivated Israel
and Iran to align policies.454
Iran’s stance toward the Suez Canal Crisis which was predicated on strategic
calculations strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, the strain in the
Saudi-Iranian relations eased by Mohammad Reza Shah’s visit to Saudi Arabia in March
1957 at the invitation of King Saud. During the talks, King Saud, yet again, protested the
Baghdad Pact, arguing that Britain, a signatory of the Pact, had attacked an Arab country.
However, this time around, King Saud did not overly condemn the pact, rather he raised
the possibility of improved relations with Iraq, another signatory of the pact. The heads of
state also discussed the Shah’s suggestion of a Saudi-Iranian Defense Pact, aimed
particularly at detaching Saudi Arabia from Egypt and Syria and at improving the standing
of the Baghdad Pact in the Arab world. King Saud promised to study the proposal.
The two monarchs also discussed the Saudi-British relations which had been
damaged both by the dispute over the Buraimi oasis and by the Suez crisis. With the Shah’s
good offices, King Saud acknowledged the British interests in the region and hinted that
he would resume relations with Britain if he is approached with a concrete proposal
regarding the Buraimi oasis. Other Issues such the future of a number of islands in the
Persian Gulf, peace and security in the Middle East, the Palestinian question and
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cooperation among Muslim nations were discussed in this meeting. The two leaders
released a joint communiqué at the conclusion of the visit and both attested to the
unparalleled success of their meeting.
Saudi-Iranian political relations in the aftermath of the Shah’s visit to Saudi Arabia
witnessed a remarkable improvement. In the closing years of the 1950s, political
cooperation and identical political views began to evolve around the critical issues of the
era including the Lebanese crisis of 1958, Soviet attempts to infiltrate the Middle East,
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolutionary thrusts in the region, and the 1958 replacement of the
monarchical system in Iraq with a revolutionary republican regime. One of the many
regional consequences of the overthrow of the monarchical system in Iraq in 1958 was the
fall of the Baghdad Pact in 1959 when the revolutionary republican regime decided to
withdraw from that. The demise of the pact, for the reasons mentioned, was more palatable
to the Saudis than Iranians, yet it was not long before Saudis learned that there were some
intrinsic merit to the Baghdad Pact they had adamantly opposed.
For all the differences Saudis had with the monarchical regime in Iraq, a modus
vivendi had characterized the relations between the two. The coup orchestrated by General
Abdul Karim Qasim was a total overhaul in the Iraqi Cold War orientation. Riyadh
perceived Iraq with its new pro-Soviet tendencies nationalist aspirations throughout the
Arab world far more dangerous than the Baghdad Pact. Qasim’s nationalist vision was a
call for removal Arab monarchies, and Saudi monarchy was no exception. He also believed
that Saudi kingdom had to be divided into smaller entities.455 The demise of the Baghdad
Pact helped Iranians to placate some of the regional concerns in Riyadh and created a better
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ground for the alignment of policies between the two states which the Saudi monarchy
needed in face of a new host of threats in its neighborhood.
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CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENT OF AN IRANIAN-SAUDI ALIGNMENT: CAUTIOUS AND
CURTAILED (1962-1979)
The strength of Saudi-Iranian relations was put to another test on July 24, 1960,
when the Shah made a confusing statement about an extension of the de facto recognition
he had given to Israel in 1950.456 In response to a question by a foreign correspondent about
whether Iran had decided to recognize Israel, Shah stated that “Iran [had] recognized Israel
years ago.”457 Nader Entessar attributed the recognition extended to the Jewish state by
Iran as a counterbalance to the perceived Arab threat to Iran’s southern frontier.458
However, this analysis is challenged by the realities on the ground at the time. This
controversial move by the head of the Iranian state needs to be viewed in the framework of
regional developments beginning in 1958. The developments of 1958 including the
formation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria in February, the collapse of
Iraq’s pro-Western monarchy in July, and the subsequent collapse of the Baghdad Pact
augmented Iran’s concern over ramifications of the increasingly threatening expansionist
rhetoric and policies pursued by Cairo. The growing concern over these developments
reinforced Shah’s decision to enhance Israeli-Iranian relations further. For other pragmatic
reasons such as the prospect of receiving support by the American Jews having influence
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in the Congress, administration, media, and business community, Mohammad Reza Shah
sought closer ties with Israel.
This move roused the anger of Egyptian President Nasser and other Arab League
members, calling for cutting diplomatic relations with Iran. In Nasser’s view, IsraeliIranian entente was yet another manifestation of a collusion between the Shah of Iran with
Western imperialism and Jewish Zionism at the expense of the Arab cause.459 President
Nasser denounced the alleged recognition and labelled the Iranian leaders as “colleagues
of colonialists.” Echoing long-standing grievances against Iran, Nasser accused Iran of
assuming “hostile attitudes” toward Egypt, the Arab nations and Arab nationalism. In an
attempt to discredit the Shah in the eyes of the Arab world, Nasser and Egyptian
propaganda sought to exploit religious sentiments against the Iranian regime. Accordingly,
Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout of al-Azhar University dispatch a telegram to the Shah
explaining the repercussions of his move to extend recognition to Israel. Sheikh Shaltout
wrote:
[the recognition of ] the Israeli gang has hurt our sentiment as well as the
feelings of ulema in al-Azhar. We believe that the feelings of all Muslims
in East and West have been equally injured. We consider this action
contrary to the religious and cultural measures which we have taken for
strengthening the brotherly relations among all Muslim peoples and which
you have condoned. We should therefore hope you will reconsider this
grave decision for the purpose of Muslim unity.460
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In response, Iran prudently responded back to the Sheikh of al-Azhar. In a reply,
the Shah explained that Iran had not extended the de facto recognition of Israel in 1952,
and that President Nasser’s claim that Iran had recognized the Jewish state de jure was
unfounded. Shah maintained that the unfoundedness of Nasser’s claim demonstrated that
he was trying to distract the public from Egypt’s myriad of problems. 461 Iranian paper,
Ettela’at, elevated the hostile rhetoric against Egypt by asserting that Cairo aimed at
subjugating other Arab states in order to access the vast Arab oil resources in the Persian
Gulf for financing the propaganda apparatus of the Egyptian regime. Ettela’at continued
that Egypt’s anti-Iran propaganda was an attempt to undermine the friendly relations
between Iran and the Arab nations in the region. The editorial made the case that the Nasser
tried to “colonize the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms,” but he found the amicable relations
between Iran and these states as an impediment and “a thorn in [his] eyes.”462
Egypt began to utilize the Arab League and its influence in its campaign against
Iran. According to an editorial by Ettela’at, Abd al-Khaliq Hassounah, Secretary General
of the Arab League, had warned the Persian Gulf Arab rulers of the Iranian alleged
colonizing ambitions in the region. Accordingly, Hassounah made a case for the Arab
Sheikhdoms that the influence of Iran in the Persian Gulf was detrimental to the Arab
Nation and that it was only a matter of time before Iran took the opportune moment to rise
against the Arabs. He portrayed Iran as the enemy of Islam and Arabism and assured that
the Egyptian Nasser had all the intentions to stay by the Arab Sheikhdoms in their eventual
war with Iran. The editorial continues:
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These are real accounts indicative of the fire that the enemy is building for
the destruction of part of our national heritage. These are examples of the
intrigues against the Iranians and Iranianism. These form a prelude to the
destruction of Iran’s influence in the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, for the
expulsion of Iranian inhabitants from the Persian Gulf islands and for the
extension of Egyptian control over the entire Persian Gulf.463
King Saud never joined the anti-Iranian campaign. Nevertheless, in an
attempt to respond to such an alarming circumstance, Iran ordered its ambassadors
to various Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, to explain the situation and
clarify Iran’s position directly to the Arab League by promising not to recognize
Israel de jure or to exchange envoys.
In December 1961, Ben-Gurion visited Tehran and met with prominent
officials as the first Israeli prime minister to have ever done so. Ben-Gurion
described relations between the two sides informal, “but not hidden,” and based on
“mutual benefit.”464 These hesitant initial steps gained significant momentum after
the 1963 White Revolution,465 but they remained informal. Shah espoused an
ideology predicated on nationalism, westernization, secularization, and edging
closer to the West. On January 28 and March 21, 1963, Shah emphasized the spirit
of his revolutionary reforms in an address to the nation:
With the God’s will and the diligence of all Iranians, we will make
a country that would rival with the most developed countries in the
world. We will make a country that would host the land of the free,
where the Iranian talents can thrive in a fertile ground free from the
463

Ettela’at, Dec. 22, 1964.

B. Gilad, “Paras,” Ha-Miazrah ha-Hadash 4/4, 1953. Seen in "Israeli Relations with Iran,”
Encyclopedia Iranica, retrieved on 11/2/2017. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/israel-i-relations-withiran
464

465

White Revolution refers to series of economic and social reforms introduced by Mohammad Reza Shah.
For a brief overview, refer to Gholamreza Afkhami, “Moghaddame e bar enghelabe sefid,” [An
Introduction to the White Revolution] Iran Nameh, vol. 30, no. 1 (Spring 2015)

168

corruption of power, and that the is the secret to the longevity of the
nation. Our society does will not bear any disappointment,
corruption, destruction, laxity and evasion from one’s duties. The
future of our society will be defined by social justice, equitable
distribution of wealth, and honorable vocations in accordance to the
rule of law and the necessity of providing a basic level of sustenance
for all. I can vividly see this prosperous society.466
The vision that Shah had developed for the future of the Iranian society could not
have been realized without any assistance. Accordingly, clearly for instrumentalist
purposes, Shah turned toward Israel and sought close cooperation with Israelis. Not
only this ideology permitted but also encouraged increasingly greater IranianIsraeli cooperation.
Shah viewed himself as a benevolent leader following in the footsteps of
Cyrus the Great; hence, it was not difficult for him to transcend the religious
differences and establish a friendship with the Jewish States. Israeli officials, on the
other hand, reinforced Shah’s self-ascribed vision persistently by making flattering
comparisons between the Shah and Cyrus the Great in their joint-meetings. The
strengthening of ties since the early 1960s also corresponded with Ben-Gurion’s
“periphery concept,” which encouraged seeking friendship with “the neighbors of
the neighbors.” In the list of the countries that could contribute to that vision, Iran
was perceived especially important due to its strategic location, size, and economic
potential.
In this tense period, Saudi Arabia managed to maintain good relations with Iran
without compromising its position in the Arab world. Once this episode was over, the
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Kingdom resumed normal contacts with Iran and in 1962, Iran appointed its eighth
ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Iran used the opportunity of the ambassadorial exchange to
recognize Saudi Arabia as an oasis of stability in the region. Iran’s Prime Minister Ali
Amini on April 11, 1962 said, “The Arab countries seem to be getting more and more
unstable with the exception of Saudi Arabia.”467 On this positive note, Iran and Saudi
Arabia entered a new era in their relations which was characterized by cautious cooperation
between the two states. This period began with the ascendance of Crown Prince Faisal to
the Saudi throne in November 1964 and lasted through 1979.

Factors Capturing the Essence of the Period 1962-1979
Iran and Saudi Arabia experienced relatively amicable relations from 1962
through 1979. Such amicability in spite of a variety of factors which could potentially
distance the two states shapes the puzzle of the Iranian-Saudi relations in this period.
Among the factors which could have negatively impacted Iranian-Saudi relations, one
can note Iran’s controversial de facto recognition of Israel and continued ties between the
two states in the ensuing years, Iranian-Arab territorial disputes, change in Saudi
leadership with the assassination of King Faisal and the ascendance to the throne by
Crown Prince Khalid, withdrawal of Britain from the region and a power vacuum created
thereof, Iran’s demonstrable regional assertiveness and its rapid military build-up,
contention over the sovereignty of Bahrain, etc.
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Two factors convinced Iran and Saudi Arabia that pursuing cautious political ties,
in spite of disagreements and differences, was vital to their interests. These factors are
Egyptian President Nasser and his pan-Arab ideology, and cooperative norms propagated
by the Nixon Doctrine. Egyptian Nasserism and Nixonian Twin-Pillar policy catalyzed
relatively close ties between the two states in the 1960s and 1970s respectively.
After the overthrow of Egypt's pro-Western monarchy in 1952 and the emergence
of a radical nationalist regime under the leadership of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser,
Egyptian foreign policy took a decidedly pan-Arabist turn. Increasingly, the new
Egyptian government saw itself as the defender of Arab causes and promoter of Arab
unity in the Middle East. Nasser's activist foreign policy propelled the country into a
leading position in the nascent non-aligned movement. Among various strategically
important regions, Nasser had specifically honed in on the Persian Gulf region where the
British had heavy political and military presence. In addition, Nasser was particularly
opposed to the formation of the Baghdad Pact, which was designed to promote Western
interests by offering a counterweight to the Soviet threat and the challenge of radical
nationalism.
Nasser perceived Iran’s close ties with Israel and the West as an indication that
Iran was anathema to the Arab cause he was promoting. In his strategic thinking.
Therefore, Nasser found utility in countering any improvement in relations between Iran
and its neighboring Arab states. He launched a campaign from Cairo to refer to the
Persian Gulf and the oil-rich Khuzestan province as the “Arabian Gulf,” and “Arabistan”
respectively. In another attempt to poison the Iranian-Arab relations, the Egyptian
government drew parallel between Iranian immigration to the Persian Gulf states and the
171

Zionists’ immigration to Palestine.468 In spite of this bitter rhetoric, Nasser’s opposition
to Western pacts and monarchical regimes,469 and his enthusiasm for non-alignment
during the Cold War unlike the Shah’s reluctance of that policy choice, Iran’s real
concern with regard to Nasser and his pan-Arabist ideology rested elsewhere. The Iranian
government’s concern was about Arab radicalism functioning as a medium for Soviet
interventionist policies.
Unlike Iran that perceived the Egyptian growing influence in the region primarily
through pure Cold War geopolitical considerations, Saudi Arabia had more reasons to feel
apprehensive of Nasser’s eastward move and the ideological narrative he championed.
Nasser’s supra-state identity of pan-Arabism was a serious challenge for those polities in
the Middle East where there was an absence of any rough correspondence between identity
and territory. These are the polities that typically face legitimacy deficiency and massive
upward pressure on the state from centrifugal forces within society that refuse to readily
acquiesce to the state sovereignty. Saudi Arabia represents one of such polities. Exposure
to Nasser’s pan-Arabism as a strong supra-state source of identity placed Saudi rulers in a
difficult dilemma. The pan-Arab ideals normatively pressured Arab states to defend the
notion of regional autonomy from the West, promote the cause of the Palestine and
cooperate with other Arab states for common interests. Adherence to these ideals are
anathema to the sovereign status and independent foreign policy-making of the state, yet
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walking away from those ideals would cost further deepening of the legitimacy crisis.470
Saudi Arabia, unlike Iran, was extremely permeable to Nasserism as a trans-state ideology.
This could shake the foundations of any state as young as Saudi Arabia. Initially, Saudis
tried to appease Nasser, but as Nasserism gain further strength and its threat to the
foundation of the Saudi state grew in intensity, Saudi officials shifted from bandwagoning
to balancing, a policy move that brought about Iranian-Saudi cooperation on several fronts
in this period.
The other factor that helped Saudi-Iranian relations continue with its remarkable
growth into 1970s was the consolidating effect of the cooperative norms that the 1969
Nixon Doctrine set forth. During the latter half of the 1960s, Iran and Saudi Arabia learned
how to cooperate in certain areas without letting their disagreements and rivalry disrupt
their relationship. The Nixon Doctrine’s Twin Pillar policy further solidified the IranianSaudi relations. Following Britain’s decision to withdraw from the region, Nixon
administration promoted Iran, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, as guardians of regional
security and as bulwarks against Soviet expansionism.471 This policy involved the
provision of military armaments to these two key allies with the aim of achieving regional
security.472
Understanding the context in which the United States introduced the Nixon
Doctrine is essential to better understanding of the roles Iran and Saudi Arabia were
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assigned accordingly. When Richard Nixon took office in early 1969 after running a
campaign on the promise of “peace with honor,” the signs indicating the failure of the
United States involvement in the Vietnam War were abundant. With thousands of US
soldiers having lost their lives and countless anti-war protests going on around the country,
Washington realized that the prospect of victory in Vietnam was not promising. The
Vietnam syndrome warranted a novel approach in fulfilling American commitments
around the globe. In a statement that President Nixon made during a stopover in Guam, the
Asian allies of the United States were encouraged to take on their own defense, except for
the threats involving nuclear weapons. In a report to Congress on February 25, 1971,
President Nixon spelled out his doctrine:
It is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security and
development around the globe is primarily America’s concern. The defense
and progress of other countries must be first their responsibility and second
a regional responsibility.473

According to the doctrine, the United States pledged to provide its allies with
massive aid and armaments so that they could more actively partake in regional security
tasks vital to the United States. In his report to the Congress in 1971, President Nixon
explained the function of “security assistance” as such:
By fostering local initiative and self-sufficiency, security assistance enables
us…to reduce our direct military involvement abroad …[and] lessen the
need for and likelihood of the engagement of American forces in future
local conflicts. Thus, it will ease the burden of the United States. But at the
same time it signals to the world that the United States continues to help
and support its allies….[America will assist] friends and allies who are
shouldering the burden of their own and regional security.474
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The United States allies in the Persian Gulf region were pro-American regimes of
Iran and Saudi Arabia. These two states constituted the two pillars of Nixon doctrine’s
twin-pillar policy. The policy was effective because the roles assigned to Iran and Saudi
Arabia were consonant with their self-image as status-quo powers in the region.475 These
identical roles assigned to both states increasingly reinforced an already expanding
alignment of policies between the two.
The United States, in accordance with the Twin-Pillar doctrine, empowered both
Iran and Saudi Arabia with sophisticated military hardware and training assistance.476
Between the two pillars, the US relied more on Iran than Saudi Arabia given its military
might and stability. Kissinger writes in his White House Years:
There was no possibility of any American military forces to the Indian
Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress
would have tolerated no such commitment; the public would not have
supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to play this role. The vacuum left
by British withdrawal, now menaced by Soviet intrusion and radical
momentum, would be filled by a local power friendly to us. Iraq would be
discouraged from adventures against the Emirates in the lower Gulf, and
against Jordan and Saudi Arabia. A strong Iran could help damp India’s
temptations to conclude its conquest of Pakistan. And all of this was
achievable without any American resources, since the Shah was willing to
pay for the equipment of his oil revenues.477
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According to the Nixon’s doctrine, Iran benefited from almost unlimited access to the US
weaponry with its status as the “gendarme of the Persian Gulf,”478 rising to the extent that
at the invitation of Sultan Qabus, Iranian troops defused a Marxist separatist uprising in
Oman’s Dhofar province in 1973.479 Kayhan, a prominent Iranian press outlet, captured the
essence of Iranian military intervention in Oman in an editorial on February 4, 1974 titled
“In Defense of the Persian Gulf” as such:
The announcement that Iranian troops have scored military successes in
Oman proves this country’s determination to be as good as its word in aiding
its neighbors to preserve their independence and territorial integrity. Iranian
troops have been dispatched to Oman at the invitation of the Omani
government. Their participation in Oman’s efforts to frustrate attempts
against its very existence is in accordance with Iran’s declared policy of
resisting subversive activities in this region. Again and again, Iran has made
it plain it shall not tolerate plots to turn the Persian Gulf region into
backwater of this or that colonial or neo-colonial empire. And yet, the
rebellion in Oman is clearly fostered, aided and abetted by hegemonic
powers dreaming of gaining control of the Straits of Hormuz, the key to the
Persian Gulf. Everyone knows that keeping the Persian Gulf secure and free
for international navigation is a matter of life and death to Iran. Everyone
knows that Iran shall not allow this region’s vast resources to fall into hands
of this or that power bloc so that they can be used as pawns in international
power chess. Iranian soldiers have fought valiantly, demonstrating their
resolve and ability to help a friendly country in need of support against
international conspiracies.480
Following the Iranian assistance to the Omani government, Oman’s new ambassador to the
Imperial Court, Ismael al-Rasasi expressed gratitude on behalf of his nation upon his arrival
in Tehran on February 5, 1974. He pointed out to the Pars News Agency at the Omani
Embassy:
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Iran’s assistance to Oman has had great positive effects on the establishment
and preservation of security [emphasis added] in this region and that Oman
will always be thankful for this assistance which is a manifestation of
friendly and correligious ties. The Omani nation joins me in expressing their
thanks.481
It is interesting how the Nixon Doctrine tamed Saudi’s apprehension over Iran’s
growing regional power and influence due to Washington’s military aid to Iran and the
Shah’s regional aspirations. Perhaps, Saudi’s 69 percent higher fiscal revenues in 1971
compared to Iran had made King Faisal confident that Saudis could dash for parity once
the need emerged,482 nevertheless, Iran was never perceived as a threat in Riyadh under
Faisal.
The rest of the chapter examines the highlights of the Iranian-Saudi relations from
1962 through 1979 in order to make the case for how the threat of Nasserism in the 1960s
and then Nixon’s Doctrine in the 1970s helped Iran and Saudi Arabia transcend their
seemingly irreconcilable differences, and cooperate on many levels.

Key Features of King Faisal’s Reign 1964-1975
Upon his ascent to the throne, King Faisal was arguably the most experienced living
Arab leader. Faisal had years of experience partaking in wars, governing as the viceroy of
Hijaz, and interacting with world leaders in various capacities. The first obligation that he
undertook after ascending to the throne was restoring order to the royal family, which was

481

New Oman Ambassador Views Relations with Iran, Tehran Domestic Service, February 5, 1974. FBISMEA-74-031, Feb. 1, 1974.
482

Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 90.

177

weakened due to prolonged family in-fighting.483 Other outstanding features of King
Faisal’s rule which distinguished his era from that of his predecessor were “increased
centralization of power, greater internal stability, and clearer policy direction.”484 As the
result, the distribution of power within the monarchy became more harmonious and key
foreign policy decisions eventually altered the image of the kingdom permanently.
During King Faisal’s reign, Saudi oil revenues skyrocketed causing a GDP growth
from 10.4 billion in 1965 to 164.5 billion in 1975.485 This allowed the Saudi state to
consolidate the redistributive role of the central government. During the reign of King
Abdul Aziz, access to foreign subsidies and fund helped the founder of the Saudi Kingdom
reward allegiances. Within almost a decade, under Faisal, the massive oil revenue surplus
enabled the state not only to secure allegiance of its citizens, but also transform many
aspects of their lives. With the oil money, King Faisal initiated his modernization projects
by importing technological expertise and heavily investing in developing material
infrastructure and education. During his reign, King Faisal consolidated the Saudi state by
“merg[ing] important branches of the royal lineage with state machinery,” and successfully
countering the discourse of constitutional monarchy, Arab nationalism, and socialism
propagated by his deposed brother, Talal ibn Abd al-Aziz and other Free Princes.486 Under
Faisal’s patronage and his bureaucratic reforms, major senior ulama were formally coopted and became state functionaries. Concessions to the ulama were made in return for
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religious decrees granting authenticity and legitimacy to almost every aspect of his social
and economic reform.487 Not only did the success of Saudi renaissance figure overshadow
the tumultuous years of King Saud’s reign, but also a historical amnesia regarding this era
was encouraged.488
King Faisal rejected Arab nationalism in its both Nasserite and Baathist versions.
Nasser’s pan-Arabism, and the Ba’athi call for “unity, freedom and socialism” under the
banner of a single Arab nation, in Faisal’s viewpoint, were direct threats to the ruling
family. The August 1967 humiliation of the Arab leaders was a big blow to Nasser’s
leadership. Even though his popularity did not abate in the Arab world, but he lost much
of his bargaining power with other Arab states. However, around the same time, Iraqi and
Syrian Ba’athism emerged. Faisal rightfully perceived Arab nationalism in its Ba’thist
version as yet another threat to the legitimacy of Al-Saud rule. The Ba’athist discourse of
Arab unity which was fundamentally predicated on secular Arab culture and socialism
was clearly against Saudi Arabia’s raison d'etre. While in the 1950s and early 1960s
Cairo had been the center for anti-Saudi activities, in the late 1960s, Baghdad became the
hub for oppositionists to Saudi rule. Not only were Saudi Ba’athists allowed to broadcast
their anti-Saudi propaganda from Baghdad, but also they published a journal — popular
among Ba’athists and leftists — titled Sawt al-Talia’s.489
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To counter the pressure of Arab nationalism, King Faisal turned to Islam and
non-Arab Muslim countries.490 The architect of lining religion to foreign policy was King
Faisal’s son and Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal who believed that “by
promoting universal Islamic solidarity, the House of Saud [could] escape the specter of
pan-Arabism that had haunted it since the 1950s.”491 In this pursuit, he began to support
Muslim countries in Africa and Asia. In 1974, he contributed 10.2 million dollars to the
Islamic Solidarity Fund, and catalyzed the establishment of Islamic Development
Bank.492 With these measures, Saudi Arabia gradually became the symbol of Islamic
politics defying the pervasively negative image of the country in the Muslim world in
preceding decades.
Aware of the Saudi’s vulnerability to internal and external threats, King Faisal
secured the military protection of the United States as a reliable extra-regional, non-Arab
guarantee for the security of Saudi Arabia.493 In this pursuit, relying on its emerging oil
wealth, Saudi Arabia ventured into the world of petro-politics to balance various tactics
to survive and prosper. With a novel pro-business slant, Faisal tied the Western oilappetite to the necessity of balancing the threats posing the kingdom. This was not an
easy order considering the Cold War contingencies. Before Faisal’s rise to power, King
Saud’s foreign policy blunders and attitude toward the United States weakened the Saudi
appeal to keeping the US interested and involved in Saudi politics; however, one cannot
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neglect the Cold War developments such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, Cuban missile crisis, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution which had
consumed the US foreign policy-makers to the extent that they did not deem the Middle
East as a high-profile policy arena until the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts. These
two conflicts restored the status of the Middle East in the American strategic thinking. In
this context, building upon an “institutional memory buttressing the [partiality] of the AlSaud ...to the United States,” American-Saudi ties reemerged in full force.494
During his reign, King Faisal securely guided the Saudi state through some
tumultuous years characterized by internal and external threats to the Saudi rule. Despite
upheavals, dissidence, and terror plots at home; the Nasserite, Arab nationalist, Ba’athist,
socialist and communist threats from the outside; and the difficulty of navigating ArabIsraeli conflict, Faisal managed to consolidate the Saudi state of 1932, introduce and
carry out important modernization projects, and bring Saudi Arabia an unprecedented
recognition in both Arab and Islamic world.

Iranian-Saudi Encounters during King Faisal’s Reign
The Shah of Iran had prior encounters with Faisal and thought highly of the new
King’s competence as a statesman. In December 1965, Mohammad Reza Shah hosted King
Faisal in Tehran.495 The Shah was eager to cooperate with the King’s vision for the Muslim
world to fight communism. In this meeting, the two monarchs affirmed their agreement on
practical concerns in the Persian Gulf region such as Soviet ambitions in the region,
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Nasser’s moves in the Middle East, the matter of oil, and the situation in North Yemen.
After his successful visit to Iran, King Faisal paid similar visits to Jordan, Sudan, and
Pakistan. Iran described King Faisal’s visit to Iran and those subsequent ones as “a step to
prepare the grounds for the unity of Islamic countries.”
During King Faisal’s visit to Iran, the two sides signed a cultural agreement which
served as a foundation of cultural cooperation in the ensuing years. Accordingly, Iran and
Saudi Arabia agreed to closely collaborate in exchanging scholarship students, facilitating
the meeting of cultural figures and consortiums, and conducting joint scientific and cultural
projects.496 In addition to mutual understanding in the matters of low politics, in the years
to follow, Iran collaborated with Saudi Arabia in the Muslim World League and helped
establish Organization for Islamic Conference in 1969.497 The idea of the Organization of
Islamic Conference stemmed from King Faisal’s vision that such an organization would
widen the scope of regional politics to include non-Arab Muslim states to dilute Egypt’
influence in the region.498
Maintaining ties with Saudi Arabia was arguably important for the Shah of Iran.
After King Faisal’s visit with the Shah, Iran tried to allay Saudi’s concern over IranianIsraeli ties by publicly supporting Saudi Arabia. The highest point of such an effort was in
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June 1966 when the Iranian press criticized the mayor of New York City for his “rudeness”
towards King Faisal during his June 1966 visit to the United States. Mayor John Lindsay
was supposed to host King Faisal but he cancelled the dinner party after Faisal publicly
attacked Zionism during a Washington press meeting. This position by the Iranians
encouraged the Saudi Foreign Minister to pay an official five-day visit to Tehran. At the
formal airport reception on June 21, 1966, Seyyed Omar al-Saggaf, the Saudi Foreign
Minister, said that the Iranian-Saudi friendship was a perfect example of Islamic
brotherhood and neighborly relations.499 In an interview, Saggaf identifies “friendship with
Iran [as] the cornerstone [of the kingdom’s] foreign policy.”500 These developments
reinforced Iranian-Saudi partnership further.
The strategic importance of this partnership was to the extent that the Shah of Iran
introduced an unprecedented rhetoric that fit King Faisal’s vision of Islamic unity.
Mohammad Reza Shah allegedly maintained that neither could theological differences
undermine the Iranian-Saudi partnership nor Iranian-espoused Shiism was meant to
overshadow the Saudi role in the Islamic world.501 Aside from the connections at the
personal level, geopolitically, the snapshot of the 1960s demonstrates that Riyadh and
Tehran, in spite of ebbs and flows, sought to establish closer ties in order to coordinate
their oil policies within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), curb
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Nasser’s moves in the region, and collaborate to maintain the regional peace and
security.502

1967 Arab-Israeli War
During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel crushed its Arab neighbors and seized parts
of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian territories. The seemingly desirable outcome of the
conflict ensured the Iranian government that Israel remained strong enough to balance the
Arabs who were susceptible to the Soviet influence. In other words, Israel’s weakness
could have meant the reinvigoration of the Soviet threat to Iran. However, these
developments proved to be more complicated for Iran. Even though Iran benefited from
Israel’s balancing weight, it was also wary of Israel’s rise to regional predominance which
could have challenged “Iran’s quest for preeminence or its strategic significance in
Washington.”503 Iran needed to take a stance on Israel’s aggressive posture and its refusal
to return seized Arab territories. This was a tough call as both warring factions looked
forward to an Iranian response favorable to their own objectives. Tel Aviv expected that
its show of force during the war would prompt Iran to recognize the Jewish State de jure,
which Iran had refused to do so. The Shah refused to honor Israel’s wishes and instead
stated that “any occupation of territory by force of arms shall not be recognized. A
permanent solution for the existing differences between Arab states and Israel must be
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found within the framework of the UN charter.”504 Iran supported UNSC Resolution 242
calling for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the [occupied] territories, and
privately pressured Israel to comply with the resolution.505 Iran was not willing to
demonstrate any sign of appreciation for Israel’s rise to power which made Tel Aviv
suspicious of Shah’s intentions.506
This was a “substantive shift” in Iranian attitude toward Israel.507 Added to the
geopolitical considerations informing the Iranian government’s reluctance to side with
Israel, one has to take into consideration the domestic dynamics encouraging Iran’s
unprecedented move. Iranian government's decision to turn its back on Israel and side with
the Arab world could be seen as a pragmatic response to the strengthening of the domestic
anti-Israeli rhetoric throughout the 1960s, particularly among the clergy and the anti-Shah
and anti-Western elements. Most prominent among these spokesmen was Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, who, in a speech on June 3, 1963, asserted, “[Israel wishes] to seize
your economy, to destroy your trade and agriculture, to appropriate your wealth.” He
continued that Israel wished to make Iran bereft of the Quran and ulama. 508 Therefore,
Shah’s anti-Israeli posture alleviated some of the pressure that the opposition front put on
the government in this regard.
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Even though King Faisal was not utterly satisfied with Iran’s response to the SixDay War, mutual understanding between the two monarchs about their limitations helped
the two countries conduct their bilateral relations cautiously. In this regard, Shah’s open
condemnation of Israel’s occupation of Arab lands and his call for immediate withdrawal
of Israeli forces from occupied territories,509 was enough for King Faisal to pay a visit to
Iran in December 1967. In a speech to the Iranian parliament, King Faisal emphasized
Islam as the binding element between the two nations which had helped the Iranian-Saudi
bond emerge from this turbulent phase of relations intact. Saudi King particularly directed
his speech to the Shah, who was present at the Parliament Hall, saying, “Now is the time
for more cooperation and coordination between the two countries.” King Faisal referred to
Iranian and Saudis as brothers in faith who had shared interests in the region.510 The visit
served its purpose, and the monarchs agreed that their Foreign Ministers would meet
occasionally to exchange views. King Faisal also invited the Shah to visit Saudi Arabia the
following year.

1962-1969 Yemeni War
The partnership between the two states in the 1960s was beyond rhetoric. On
September 19, 1962, a military coup in North Yemen — supported by Egyptian Nasser —
overthrew the Imamate and replaced it with a republican system hostile to Saudi Arabia.
Iran stood by Saudi Arabia and withheld recognition of the new regime. On November 20,
1962, Shah in an interview with the chief editor of Foreign Reports Bulletin expressed his
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worries over the Egyptian intervention in Yemen, calling it an attempt to gain control of
the Arabian Peninsula’s oil reserves.511 Later, when Nasser intervened militarily in North
Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iran extended political and military assistance to the ex-Imam of
Yemen, who was fighting to regain his throne. On August 24, 1965, President Nasser
pledged to King Faisal that he would withdraw Egyptian troops from Yemen by November
1966.512
In the aftermath of Nasser’s defeat in 1967, the rise to power of a socialist regime
in south Yemen and the prospect of unification of the two Yemens made King Faisal
apprehensive of the potential threats to the regional position and stability of Saudi Arabia.
When the leftist regime of People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) gained further
strength by co-opting Ba’athist and communist groups, it called for the liberation of the
Arabian Peninsula. This call was followed by an attack on the Saudi territory in 1969. In
an unprecedented move, King Faisal turned to Iran for help, and Mohammad Reza Shah
obliged. Relying on its close ties with the Johnson administration, the Shah of Iran urged
the United States to provide military assistance to Riyadh.513
By the mid-1960s, Egypt's military involvement in Yemen had backfired and
Nasser’s pan-Arabism had begun to lose its enchantment in the region’s conservative
Sheikhdoms. At home, Nasser’s Yemeni quagmire had become increasingly unpopular,
and by 1966, Nasser was struggling to extricate himself from Yemen without losing

511

FRB, 28 November, 1962.

512

Gregory Gause, Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (Columbia
University Press, 1990) 68.
513

Alinaqi Alikhani, yad dasht ha-yi asaddollah alam, [The Diaries of Alam], vol. 1, 1968–1969 (Tehran:
entesharat maziar va moin, 1998), 298.

187

prestige among the Arabs of the Persian Gulf. Ironically, it was the June 1967 Arab-Israeli
war that provided the outlet for Nasser to end Egypt's military involvement in the Arabian
Peninsula. Exhausted by the futile military engagement in Yemen and devastated by the
swift military defeat of Egypt in the June 1967 war, Nasser began to reassess Cairo's
ambitious goals in the Arab world. This reassessment apparently entailed a shift in Nasser's
hostile rhetoric against the Shah, and a drop of the “Iranian threat” narrative that had
informed Egypt's pre-1967 policy in the Persian Gulf. As a consequence, a rapprochement
began to develop between Iran and Egypt.

Territorial Disputes in Anticipation of the British Withdrawal from the Region
On January 16, 1968 Britain’s Labor government headed by Prime Minister Harold
Wilson and his Defense Secretary, Denis Healey announced that there would be a total
withdrawal of British forces stationed east of Suez by the end of 1971.514 The British
decision marked the end of more than a century and a half of British dominance in the
Persian Gulf and the opening of a new chapter in its history. For the first time in the modern
era, the Persian Gulf states had to assume responsibility for the security of the region.
However, there were strong signs indicative of the British decline as early as 1940s. The
fall of Singapore to the Japanese on February 15, 1942 was detrimental to the British
Empire, its image and influence after World War II.515 Then, with Indian independence in
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1947, there was a gradual draw-down of the military presence “East of Suez,” which
ensured the eventual collapse of the empire.516 The Suez Crisis and associated diplomatic
and military confrontation in November 1956 ending in Egypt taking full control of the
canal marginalized the economic and military influence of Britain over the region, and
limited its control over the bases in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.517 These
developments led London to reassess the British commitments in the region.
Britain desired to leave behind a stable regional structure after withdrawal.518
Therefore, on January 9, 1968, during his trip to the Persian Gulf to announce the pending
British withdrawal, Foreign Secretary Goronwy Roberts is reported to have said that British
policy was to encourage mutual co-operation among the Persian Gulf states in matters of
defense.519 Iran at the time was considering a regional pact to replace CENTO that would
include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan.520 Iran was not opposed to the notion of
regional cooperation, but this excluded any defense and regional security proposal that
included Bahrain. Iran signaled that it is determined and prepared to protect its own
regional interests once the British withdrawal was complete. Iranian Prime Minister, AmirAbbas Hoveida asserted, “the Imperial Iranian Government can undoubtedly protect its
interests and rights in the Persian Gulf without allowing outside powers to interfere.” He
continued that Iran had “... no problems with the Arabs unless they create some … [or]
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think that they should be heirs to British colonialism.”521 In an interview with A.M. Rendel
of the Times in May 1968, the Shah reinforced the same stance:
As regards the Arab countries, we really do not have any problems with
them unless they create one. The only difficulty is that certain of these Arab
countries that presently exist or are about to be created, believe that they
must become the successors and heirs of Britain ancient imperialism. If they
want to follow this path, we will have out difficulties. Otherwise, we do not
have any problems between us.522
In this way, Iran set the tone of the early years leading up to the British withdrawal
from the region. Iranian government was of the opinion that any long-term regional
arrangements are contingent upon the settlement of territorial disputes. 523 Iranian-Arab
territorial claims over Bahrain and the Hormuz islands were the most notable of such
disputes. Other disputed issues that Iranians were concerned about were the formation of
the federation of Arab emirates and the maritime dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
These disputes dominated the Persian Gulf agenda in the late 1960s.
During the first two months of 1968, all the territorial disputes between Iran and
the lower Gulf Arabs were brought to the fore. On January 15, shortly before the Shah was
due to pay an official visit to Saudi Arabia, the Emir of Bahrain was formally received by
King Faisal during the time when the long-standing claims to Bahrain was the dominant
theme of the Iranian press. During the visit, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain decided to build a
causeway bridging the two countries.524 They also issued a joint communiqué emphasizing
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the strong historical bonds between the peoples of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Saudi
Arabia’s full support for the government of Bahrain, and the prospect of further economic
cooperation.525 King Faisal assured Shaikh Eisa that, “any attack on Bahrain would be
treated as one on Saudi Arabia and met with all his country’s resources.”526 Soon after
Sheikh Eisa’s departure, Saudis began preparation for the Shah’s arrival only to hear from
the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, that Shah had decided to cancel his official
visit to the kingdom.527 Shah’s decision to cancel the visit was to protest Shaikh Eisa’s
visit, his reception as a head of state, and the language of the resulting communiqué.528 Dr.
Abbas Ali Khal’atbary, the Iranian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, revealed to a
correspondent from Christian Science Monitor, that the reason for the cancellation was that
the Shah’s visit to Saudi Arabia could have been interpreted as the Iranian “tacit approval”
of the Saudi’s recognition of Bahrain as an autonomous entity.529
The Iranian-Saudi rift was an opportunity for Egypt to pursue its revolutionary
policies in the Persian Gulf region. Following the cancellation of the scheduled visit, AlAhram praised Saudi’s strong and due support of the independence of the Persian Gulf
sheikhdoms and the Arab character of “Gulf.” The characterization of the Saudi-Bahraini
talks and agreements by the Egyptian paper is interesting. Al-Ahram wrote:
An agreement had been reached between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain for the
construction of the 12-mile bridge as part of the defense arrangements
which the two countries will take after the withdrawal of British forces from
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the area before 1971. The bridge building aims at thwarting any attempt by
Iran against Bahrain.530
Meanwhile, another disagreement flared up. Iran and Saudi Arabia had differences
over offshore oil in the mid-Persian Gulf dating back to the early 1960s. In January, 1969,
the two sides were exchanging accusations that their respective oil companies were drilling
in the disputed waters.531 The two sides agreed on halting the drilling until a meeting could
be held to negotiate the dispute. However, the arrangement collapsed when, on February
1, an Iranian gunboat drove an ARAMCO drilling rig — allegedly sent to drill in an
offshore concession leased by Saudi Arabia to the oil company532 — out of the waters
claimed by Iran. Apparently, Tehran had not ordered the seizure of the rig and the admiral
in charge of the gunboat conducted the operation on his own discretion. King Faisal called
the incident an “act of piracy.” Even though, the US ambassador in Tehran was asked to
mediate and ease the tension, Shah’s order to release the rig put an end to further escalation
of matter. This incident only added to the mistrust between the two states.
A third development in early 1968 brought territorial issues to the attention of the
Iranian government. On January 22, the Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid Al-Maktoum, met
with the Ruler of Abu Dhabi to discuss a federation of Arab emirates. Al-Maktoum had
subsequent meetings with the rulers of Bahrain and Qatar regarding the matter.533 On
February 18, Abu Dhabi and Dubai signed a union agreement, and a conference in Dubai
brought the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar as well as those of the Trucial States to discuss the
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idea.534 On February 27, the participants signed an agreement on the creation of a Supreme
Council to coordinate a unified foreign and defense policy among them. Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait welcomed the initiative; however, the inclusion of Bahrain, Sharjah and Ras alKhaimah in the document — which was only a declaration of intent — provoked the anger
of the Iranian government. In response, on July 8, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs
released a communique asserting that “the creation of the so-called confederation of the
Persian Gulf emirates embracing the Bahrain islands is absolutely unacceptable to Iran.”535
In addition, on April 1, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the official Iranian
position by saying, “the British Government cannot bequeath to others territories that it has
… severed from Iran by force and trickery. The Imperial Government reserves all rights in
the Persian Gulf and will in no circumstances tolerate this historical injustice and
imposition.”536
These three developments strained the Saudi-Iranian relations; however, Iran
seemed willing to resolve the regional territorial issues with Saudi Arabia. An indication
of such willingness was the Shah’s remark on the importance of good relations with Saudi
Arabia which “... could become the nucleus for stability and progress in the Persian
Gulf.”537 In spite of all the tensions, Shah viewed King Faisal as the only Arab leader who
could balance Nasser, therefore, a resumption of amicable relations with Saudi Arabia was
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important for the Iranian government. Saudi Arabia demonstrated similar attitude with
King Faisal telling Washington that he hoped the problems between the two countries could
be managed through direct discussions. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in response asked
Meyer, the US ambassador to Iran, to convey the King’s opinion to the Shah.
The controversy over Bahrain entered an unprecedented phase with Iran beginning
to signal fading lack of interest in the island as early as February 1968.538 In a meeting with
the American national security advisor, Walt Rostow, the Shah said that he “... would not
use force to gain Bahrain,” adding that, “... pearl and oil industries are no longer [a] great
prize ... [and that the] island is infested with Arab nationalist trouble-makers.” However,
he stressed that Iran’s old claim could not be dismissed without some honorable
justification.539 In mid-March, the US ambassador to Iran proposed a formula for the
Bahrain question. Concerned with the prospect of Shah’s unilateral action which would
have caused permanent feud across the Persian Gulf, Meyer argued that Shah could
relinquish Iran’s claim to Bahrain in exchange for Tunbs and Abu Musa islands. He also
recommended that Bahrain stay out of the proposed Arab federation. 540 The British,
however, were opposed to the deal.541
In an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyasah in early May, King Faisal
publicly invited the Shah to pay a visit to Saudi Arabia. King Faisal assured Iran that no
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Arab state in the region would take any action against Iran’s interests. King Faisal’s
statement was received positively by the Iranian press and four days later the Shah
responded by announcing that he would go to Saudi Arabia at the first opportunity.
Following this exchange, Maroof Al-Dawalibi, an advisor to King Faisal, met with the
Shah to discuss Iran’s claim to Bahrain but much to his surprise, the Shah made a
commitment to Saudi Arabia that he intended to drop the claim on Bahrain. On his way
back, Dawalibi stopped in Manama to placate Bahrain’s fears of Iranian intentions.542 The
decision to inform the Saudi government of Iran’s official position on Bahrain in May 1968
is a strong indication of the Saudi Arabia’s weight in Shah’s strategic decision. On June 3,
1968, Shah made a stopover in Jeddah on his way to Ethiopia. In this short symbolic visit,
the two monarchs agreed upon a new date, in November, for the Shah to make a formal
visit to Saudi Arabia. This time the visit took place on schedule between 9 to 14 November.
This meeting gave special emphasis to the Palestine question, their rights and their
claims.543 The atmosphere was friendlier than expected, with the Shah calling King Faisal
“Amir al-Muminin.”544
With the promising prospect of a resolution to the dispute over Bahrain, the terms
of a possible compromise over the Persian Gulf offshore oil began to emerge. In March,
the president of ARAMCO, Thomas Barger, had presented a proposal for the resolution of
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the Saudi-Iranian oil dispute to the US government. Berger had suggested that a
geographical or economic division of the disputed area might be the solution. At this stage,
a response came from Washington that encapsulated the Johnson administration’s attitude
toward the Persian Gulf. The State Department believed that it would not be desirable to
mention the Barger proposal to the Shah. Also in a memorandum, the State Department
made it clear that the US should stay out of internal Gulf affairs [and suffice to] ...
reminding both [Faisal and the Shah] that the best way to keep Nasser and the Russians out
is to work together.”545
On July 29, Iranian-Saudi negotiations on the Persian Gulf oil dispute were resumed
in Taif, Saudi Arabia. The two states agreed in principle on equal division of “oil in place”
and a new median line, a solution along the lines of Barger’s recommendations. In order to
conclude the agreement, King Faisal sent Muhammad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Minister of Oil
and Petroleum, to Tehran in August, hoping that the two states could move on from the
dispute and instead “... focus on other essential matters.”546 When Yamani arrived for the
talks, the Iranian negotiators had changed their position, arguing for a division of
“recoverable oil” or proven oil reserves and not the “oil in place.” 547 Yamani objected to
the proposal, citing technical difficulties. The negotiation deadlock was overcome when
Yamani met with the Shah, the day after. Aware of the Saudis’ stronger legal case and the
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need for preserving the stability in Saudi-Iranian relations, Shah endorsed the mutual
understanding reached in Taif.548
On the federation, the Shah clarified his position in an interview in May with the
Kuwaiti journal Al-Ra’y al-Amm. In this interview, Shah expressed that he had no
opposition to the formation of the Arab federation, “... as long as historical and territorial
rights are observed in its foundation.” Shah expressed his concern that “the federation
could inherit the old British colonial policy, which opposes the interests of Iran.”549 Tehran
Radio continued to speak of the federation as an unacceptable British plot to maintain its
imperialist policy.550 In spite of the concerns expressed by the Iranian government, a
meeting of Persian Gulf rulers was eventually convened on July 8 and an agreement on the
functions of federal institutions was issued.551 Iranian Foreign Minister opposed to the
results of the convention, referred to the federation as a “manifestation of colonialism,”
and indicated that the inclusion of Bahrain in the federation was unacceptable. 552 Iranian
government’s rhetoric against the federation, however, was never paired with any
subversive attempt. In fact, in spite of a hardline rhetoric toward these developments in the
Persian Gulf region,553 demonstrations throughout Iran in support of the claim to
Bahrain,554 and the Iranian press protesting any insinuations of independent Bahraini
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sovereignty by outsiders,555 a private deal on Bahrain was being prepared. The United
States continued with its policy of refraining from any involvement in the region’s disputes,
allowing the British to take the lead.556
On November 9, 1968, Shah paid his promised state visit to Saudi Arabia. The
speculations prior the visit dwelt on discussion on Bahrain, Hormuz islands, and the
Federation of Arab Emirates between the two kings;557 however, the joint communique
issued at the end of the meeting made no reference to the Persian Gulf territorial disputes.
Interestingly, the Western press, unlike their Iranian counterparts, reported that the Shah,
in his meeting with King Faisal, had dropped the Iranian claim on Bahrain.558
At the press conference in New Delhi, on January 4, 1969, Shah announced that
Iran was not willing to use force to regain what rightfully belonged to it rather “it
[preferred] to see the Bahraini people make their own free choice.” 559 This statement was
promising to the settlement of Arab-Iranian dispute; however, the procedural difficulties
remained in place. Throughout 1969 and the early 1970, a tripartite approach led by Iranian,
British and the United Nations officials sought practical ways to implement the Shah’s
commitment to resolving the Bahrain question. In May 1970, trying to normalize relations
with Bahrain, Iran sent to Bahrain a mission led by the Foreign Ministry’s political under-
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secretary, Manuchehr Zelli.560 This visit was an indication of Iran’s willingness to
eventually bring the dispute over Bahrain to a peaceful end.561 On March 29, 1970,
Ardeshir Zahedi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the nation’s representatives in
an attempt to justify the decision on Bahrain. An excerpt of his address follows:
I want to use the opportunity to brief you on the government’s attempts in
recent months to bring the issue of Bahrain to a legal and acceptable
settlement. The separation of Bahrain from Iran was a British imperialist
plot and for the past 150 years, Britain has prevented the annexation of
Bahrain to the Iranian territory. During this period, Iran never dropped its
legitimate claim over Bahrain. In fact, Iran has tried any possible bilateral
relations and international channels to defend and preserve its legal rights
in Bahrain. Iran exhausted all possibilities offered by the League of Nations
and then the United Nations; however, the controversy persisted. We are
about to enter a new era and the future of the Persian Gulf necessitates the
resolution of the issue once and for all. In 1971, Britain will leave the
Persian Gulf, meaning that we can use our army to capture the island;
however, we need to bear in mind that Bahrain’s demographic composition
might have gone through an immense change throughout all these years.
The inhabitants of Bahrain might hold wishes that we are not aware of.
Accordingly, Shahanshah Aryamehr has wisely decided to appeal to the
Iranian aversion to the use of force for conquest. We will not use force to
regain Bahrain against the will of its inhabitants. Shahanshah believes that
there is no merit in the conquest of a territory whose people are against us.
In this pursuit, we have decided to assign the United Nations, the sole arbiter
of international disputes, to conduct a survey of the will and wishes of the
Bahraini inhabitants. We believe that this approach will help the royal
government in the attainment of its sublime objectives being the
preservation of security and stability in the region.562
The great powers, despite their interests in the outcome of regional disputes in these
years, played only a secondary role in resolving these issues. In fact, progress in the
disputes resolution seemed to occur when Iran took diplomatic initiatives at a regional
and/or a bilateral level. Of course, the British and American initiatives came to assist Iran
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after the Shah had agreed on a particular course of action. Considering the permissive
geopolitical context of the region in this decade resulting from pending British withdrawal
and unwillingness of the United States to intervene excessively in regional affairs, Iran,
relying on its unique military might in the region, could have determined the outcome of
events unilaterally; however, contrary to its public statements, Iran did not pursue its
interests without reference to neighboring states. In particular, Iran was interested in
maintaining normalcy in its relations with Saudi Arabia.
This attempt on the part of Iran did not go unnoticed, and was reciprocated by Saudi
Arabia. The pinnacle of these mutual efforts was the 1969 meeting between King Faisal
and the Shah in the Moroccan capital, Rabat. The occasion was the first Islamic Summit
and the celebration of the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC). The Shah and King Faisal entered together and received a standing ovation from an
audience that included kings and presidents of the Islamic world. This positive initiative
and the ability to overcome setbacks set the stage for continued constructive political
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran during the 1970s.

1973 Iranian-Saudi Coordination Against Iraqi Seizure of Kuwaiti Outposts
The regional equilibrium created as the result of the roles Iran and Saudi Arabia
were assigned by the Nixon Doctrine and the benefits they had received for acting as the
US surrogates in the region effectively deterred ambitious, and revisionist policies in the
region for a whole decade. The containment of Iraq’s expansionary appetite for Kuwait in
this period is arguably the most important achievement of the alignment between Iran and
Saudi Arabia at the regional level. Iraq during the military regime of General Abdel-Karim
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Qasim had rhetorically claimed that Kuwait was part of the southern Basra province in
Iraq. After the Ba’thist coup in February 1963, this rhetoric became stronger and in 1973
turned into an offensive action when Iraq — bolstered by the 1972 friendship treaty with
the Soviet Union — occupied Kuwaiti border outposts and demanded control over the
Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan. The fact that Iraq retreated from its position and
did not attack Kuwait at that stage was for the support and assurance that Kuwait received
from Saudi Arabia and Iran.563 Another account by Naddav Safran attributes Iraqi
withdrawal to the prospect of Iranian-Saudi joint retaliatory measures.564 For the rest of the
decade, Iraq succumbed to the regional order normatively buttressed by the tacit alignment
of roles and policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In compliance to that order, Iraq
consented to delineate the Shatt al-Arab according to Iranian demands stipulated in the
1975 Algiers Agreement. Aware of the military disparity between Iraq and the two regional
powerhouses, and the fact that the revolutionary Arab socialist ideology espoused by the
Ba’thist regime had no appeal to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf,565 Iraq acquiesced to
the regional order and never tried to upset the Saudi-Iranian lead.566
This regional consensus was unachievable without the permissive/encouraging
context that resulted from the Twin Pillars doctrine of Nixon administration. Richard
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Haass567 finds the “large degree of commonality of interests and purpose” between Iran
and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s impressive. He believes that despite all differences between
the two states over oil policies, Iran and Saudi Arabia helped OPEC survive a rough period
of massive changes in the international oil economy. “Massive importation of arms and
mutual military development did not bring about deep hostility or conflict between the two
countries,” and “the absence of formal machinery for the promotion of regional security
did not preclude coordination and tacit cooperation,” Haass continues.568 However,
Richard Hass’s analysis might not capture the whole truth of the Iranian-Saudi cooperation
in the aftermath of Yom Kippur War, this time against the American interests.

1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War and Oil Embargo
While Saudis had managed to stay out of 1948 war that led to the creation of Israel
and then again 1956 Suez crisis, the 1967 war “upset the territorial and psychological
balance of the Arab world” to the extent that Saudis were dragged to the central stage of
the struggle between Arabs and Israelis. With Israelis attaining the control of Jerusalem,
the third holiest site in Islam, Saudis — self-proclaiming guardian of Islam — had to
assume a strong stance against Israel in the name of Islam. King Faisal’s primary concern
with this circumstance was more political than religious. The real anxiety for the Saudis
was the undesirable outcome of strengthening Arab radicalism in the region in response to
the Arab-Israeli struggle. This anxiety was predicated on the experience Saudis had in the
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1950s and 1960s when the radical regimes targeted Saudi Arabia by a series of sabotage
bombing. The Saudis’ apprehension was exacerbated by the political leadership vacuum
created as the result of the Six Day War. This was an opportunity for the Palestinians to
emerge and declare “vengeance on Arab regimes tepid in support of their cause.” This fear
was warranted as Saudi Arabia was a special and easy target for Palestinians. On May 30,
1969, a section of the Tapline that carried a huge amount of oil a year to Mediterranean
ports was allegedly blown up by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, giving
more credence to the Saudis’ threat perception. Saudis’ apprehension of the Palestinian
vengeance was further corroborated by the publicity PLO’s acts of sabotage and massacre
around the world received. 569
The Israeli stunning victory against a coalition of Arab states in 1967 was
humiliating and demoralizing for the Arab world. Although, the Johnson administration
catalyzed the ceasefire process, but later in November 1967, accepted the British
initiative which led to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This
resolution provided for the permanency of the Jewish state, yet did not succeed in putting
an end to hostilities.570 After Nasser died in September 28, 1970, Anwar Sadat succeeded
him. The Egyptian succession coincided with the overthrow of Shukri al-Quwatli’s rule
in Syria by Hafez al-Asad. These two leaders entered an alliance leading to the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israeli-occupied
territory, attempting to push back Israel from the Sinai and Golan Heights. With the

569

Sandra Mackey, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987)
320-321.
570

Kechichian, Faysal, 147.

203

element of surprise, the Egyptian-Syrian alliance made impressive advances. Once the
Israeli forces recovered the surprising attack, they managed to outmaneuver the Arabs.
Yet again, Israel was victorious but at very high cost and casualties.
In response to the American involvement in the Yom Kippur War, OAPEC
announced a crippling oil embargo against Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and the United States. As much as Saudis were concerned, this move was a
dissent from Saudi government rhetoric that the kingdom would not utilize its oil resource
as a weapon in Arab-Israeli conflict.571 In fact, as late as July 1972, King Faisal had
categorically opposed the idea of weaponizing oil against the United States:
I recall that such a suggestion was made by some at Rabat Conference, but
it was opposed by Gamal Abdul Naser on the grounds that it would affect
the economies of the Arab countries and interfere with their ability to
support Arab staying power; at the same such a measure would not affect
America because America does not need any of our oil or other Arab Gulf
oil before 1985. Therefore, my opinion is that this proposal should be ruled
out, and I see no benefit in reviving its discussion at this point.572
With a shift in rhetoric, King Faisal warned the United States in August that “he
[could] not continue to maintain the shipment of oil if the United States continued its
cordial relations with Israel,”573 but neither Europe nor America took King Faisal’s
warning seriously.574 At first, Saudi Arabia did not spearhead the drive for the oil embargo,
and delayed its commitment to the initiative with the hope to ride out conflict without
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having to play the oil card.575 Ultimately, Saudi Arabia acquiesced to the pressures and
responded to the call by the Palestinian Liberation Organization urging oil-producing Arab
states to weaponize their oil wealth.576 This was an interesting development which could
be explained by rhetorical attachment of Saudi Arabia to Arab solidarism, not to mention
that the conservative Saudi society and its delicate stability warranted such a pragmatist
move.577
Subsequently, ten Arab oil ministers met in Kuwait on October 17 and agreed to
reduce oil production by five per cent every month until the Middle East conflict was
resolved. They also agreed to raise oil prices by 17 per cent which came on top of 11.9
percent price increase by OPEC in July. A day after, Saudi Arabia went a step further by
announcing a ten per cent reduction in oil production, with a complete ban on petroleum
shipment to the United States.578 Riyadh declared that it would cease oil supplies to all
countries that had adopted a pro-Israeli stance.579
Saudi Arabia initially delayed the full enforcement of the embargo in order to avoid
further antagonizing the United States,580 but once the embargo was fully enforced, the 70
percent rise in oil prices shocked the international community. 581 The crisis caused by the
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oil embargo created a major rift within NATO in the height of the Cold War. Some
European nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the United States
foreign policy in the Middle East to avoid being targeted by the boycott. To address the
crisis, the Nixon Administration began multilateral negotiations with the combatants. They
arranged for Israel to pull back from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The
promise of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria was enough to convince Arab
oil producers to lift the embargo in March 1974. The embargo occurred at a time of rising
petroleum consumption by industrialized countries and coincided with a sharp increase in
oil imports by the world's largest oil consumer, the United States.
The Saudi decision to use the oil weapon played a key role in “catapult[ing] Saudi
Arabia to the center of Arab politics after the 1973 war.”582 Saudi Arabia’s image in the
Muslim and Arab world was altered beyond recognition. Faisal and Saudi Arabia became
symbols of defiance in the eyes of many Muslims. The oil embargo “underscored the
Kingdom’s pivotal position within oil producing countries, brought it into open
confrontation with the United States for the first time, and thrust upon it an unprecedented
leadership role in the Arab World.”583 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia became the critical player
in international oil diplomacy.584 Domestically, the dramatic increase in oil prices brought
Saudi Arabia an unprecedented affluence, which helped facilitate King Faisal’s
modernization projects which had started in the late 1960s, strengthen the ability of the
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regime to extend services, and enforce state control over the population. 585 The dramatic
increase in oil revenues allowed Faisal to launch his economic transformation and increase
his government spending on infrastructure. From 1972 through 1973, Saudi GDP rose from
40.5 billion to an unprecedented level of 99.3 billion Riyals.586 Due to an increase in oil
revenues and Faisal’s management of such unprecedented affluence, his reign is recalled
in popular imagination as Al-Nahda which means renaissance. Faisal expanded education
and health services, improved transportation and communication facilities, implemented
bedouin sedentarization schemes and, most importantly, enhanced Saudi military
capabilities.587
Initially, the OAPEC initiative excluded Iran, perhaps due to the Shah’s decision to
maintain relations with Israel. In November, Prince Fahd made a visit to the Shah of Iran.
The aim of the visit was to get Iran onboard with the embargo but the Shah — committed
to project neutrality — refused to oblige.588 Shah was determined to keep neutrality and by
doing so solidify Iran’s position in the region by balancing Iran’s relations between the
warring factions, the policy that disappointed Israel as well.589 However, trying to balance
his position, Shah agreed to help the Arab front with medical aid and providing crude oil
to Egypt.590 Interestingly, after the war, Iran provided oil to US military bases and aided
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US peacemaking efforts by selling oil to Israel making it easier to return oil-rich portions
of Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Shah was critical of the OAPEC embargo. He believed that
“playing with the oil weapon is extremely dangerous.” He recommended that the Arabs
“drop the embargo because it [was] depriv[ing] the world of… something vital.”591
Despite repudiating the oil embargo, Shah had signaled in November that he
advocates the rise in oil prices. In an interview with Oriana Falacci, the Shah of Iran —
protesting the strategy by the West to buy crude oil and sell it back in other forms at much
higher prices — said, “Of course [the price of oil] is going to rise.”592 In December 1973,
with the Arab embargo still in place, the Shah used his influence in OPEC to impose a
drastic increase in OPEC’s posted price from 5.11 per barrel to 11.65,593 making a
remarkable case of policy convergence between Iran and Saudi Arabia in that decade. This
convergence of policies was strained and tainted as soon as the United States employed its
clout on the Saudis.
Once approached and influenced by the United States, Saudis began to protest the
latest oil price hike, even though it meant massive influx of oil revenue into the Saudi
economy. As soon as, the US Secretary of the Treasury, George Shultz called for the
reduction of oil prices and specifically mentioning the 5-dollar price tag as “just,” Saudi
officials reverberated the same concerns and figures. In an interview, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki
Yamani said, “the oil price hike in the Persian Gulf region should be logical not as to
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destroy the economy of the consuming nations.”594 The Shah of Iran, nevertheless, was
steadfast and stood by his decision adamantly. He said:
What is a just price of oil? US Secretary of Treasure, George Shultz has
apparently no doubt about the answer. He has come out with a call for the
reduction of oil prices, mentioning the figure of 5 dollars per barrel of crude.
Shultz is entitled to his opinion just like everyone else. But the whole thing
cannot stop there. If the consuming countries were to be allowed to arrogate
to themselves the right to dictate oil prices to OPEC members, some
measures of reciprocity would, no doubt, be justified. Would Secretary
Shultz or any of his counterparts in the OECD countries allow us to decide
prices of their goods? Incidentally, the magical figure of $5 reportedly
mentioned by Shultz does not seem to have emerged out of thin air. Where
did it come from? What analysis is it based on? But what is especially
interesting is that Saudi Arabia’s oil minister is reported to have mentioned
the same figure in some of his discourses recently. The Shaykh has made
no secret about his opposition to the price decided by OPEC in Tehran. He
is a 5-dollar-a-barrel man. Who inspired who? It would be interesting to
know. That the Shaykh and Shultz are on the same wavelength cannot be
accidental unless we believe in the telepathy of love.595
In this period, aside from abovementioned differences, close but not necessarily
deliberate Iranian-Saudi relations transformed OPEC into an effective international cartel
with huge leverage on the direction of the world economy.596 According to Kissinger, such
alignment of policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia with such massive repercussions
could not have been achieved outside the permissive context of the Twin-Pillars
Doctrine.597 Ironically, however, the resulting recession caused by Iranian-Saudi
involvement in the oil embargo did not cause the unraveling of the twin-pillars strategy. If
anything, the strategic value of oil increased the desire of the US to maintain its geopolitical
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presence in the region and this ironically served to strengthen the commitment of the US
towards Persian Gulf security.
Even though the cooperative norms propagated by the Nixon Doctrine contributed
to the alignment of policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is important to avoid
exaggerating the role this permissive context bore. Such a bold and unprecedented move
by the pro-American governments in Tehran and Riyadh against the United States interests
in the height of the Cold War cannot be discounted to the continuation of Iranian-Saudi
rapprochement beginning in the mid-1960s. In other words, the alignment of policies
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in this decade was neither encouraged by a sudden outburst
of pan-Islamist consciousness, nor created by the identical task of guaranteeing the statusquo assigned to Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The core to such a coincidental alignment of policies in 1973 was a pragmatic turn
by the rulers in both countries in response to a host of threats to their rules. The rulers in
both states found maneuvering around the global Islamic sentiments to the best of their
interests, as both faced a host of growing domestic pressures on the state. Shah in Iran was
pressured by a resurgent indigenous Islamic political culture, and King Faisal was
challenged by the spread of Islamism, Ba’thist and Nasserite versions of Arab
nationalism.598 Both states pragmatically used the opportunity of rallying around the cause
of the Palestinians, even at the cost of alienating the United States, in order to make a
gesture in response to the challenges they were facing. The tone and language that Shah
employed in an interview with Al-Ahram on January 30, 1974 are telling. The Shah
reiterated his position by saying:
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Following the war between the Arabs and Israelis, it became clear to what
extent the enemy [emphasis added] was taken by surprise, and the world
also understood that the previous situation could not continue, because no
country is prepared to accept the continued occupation of its territories. Our
views … are unalterable, and it is our opinion that Israel should evacuate
the Arab territories on the basis of the UN resolutions of 1967. We reject
the occupation of territories by the use of force.599

These precautionary measures by the Iranian and Saudi rulers, nevertheless, brought the
two states an unprecedented amount of wealth and influence.
Prior the oil embargo, King Faisal had been rhetorically promoting Saudi Arabia as
guardian of Islam and supporter of Muslim causes. The 1973 Saudi Arabia’s weaponization
of its’ only vital resource for the Palestinian cause enhanced Saudi Arabia’s Islamic
credentials and influence in the Arab world, even though King Faisal was reluctant to be
lumped with the hardline Arab forces in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Not only did this
unfortunate circumstance conflict with the Saudi Arabia’s need for maintaining its special
relationship with the United States, but also the massive wealth and political influence that
Saudi Arabia garnered in this period brought about other complications for the Saudi
regime. Saudi Arabia moved to the center of regional developments at the height of the
Cold War, exposing more than ever the vulnerability of the Saudi regime and the structural
difficulties that prevented Saudi Arabia to provide for its own security. The solution, the
Saudi leadership believed, was the continuous and unabated US protective patronage
against internal and external threats. Saudi sovereignty over the holiest Islamic sites made
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this partnership problematic,600 with repercussions that would emerge in the following
decades, specifically in Iranian-Saudi relations after the 1979 revolution.

Iran-Iraq Border Dispute/ 1975 Algiers Agreement
With the 1968 Iraqi revolution and the developments emerging in its aftermath,
attempts were made to settle the outstanding disputes with Iran. An official Iranian
delegation arrived in Baghdad in February 1969 to negotiate a new protocol for an
alternative treaty to that of 1937; however, the proposal was turned down by the defiant
Iraqi side. In response, Iran resumed navigation in the disputed zones of Shatt al-Arab. This
measure had the Iraqi government summon the Iranian ambassador to hand him a letter of
protest which the ambassador found threatening and insulting to Iran’s honor and
sovereignty. This resulted in the unilateral cancellation by the Iranian government of the
Boundary treaty of 1937. Iranian government took on provocative measures and began to
deploy troops along the length of the entire boundary with Iraq. Iranian vessels continued
to navigate Shatt al-Arab with the protection by Iranian gunboats and warplanes flying
overhead in violation of the established laws.601 With the intensification of propaganda
war, relations between the two states reached crisis proportions.
Tensions in Iraqi-Iranian relations continued especially with the Iraqi stance on
Iranian occupation of the three Persian Gulf islands at the end of 1971. The Iraqi
government severed diplomatic relations with Iran and filed, along with Libya, Algeria and
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South Yemen, a joint complaint to the United Nations Security Council against Iran’s
“expansionist” measures in the region. The situation remained volatile with border clashes
in 1974 bringing the two countries on the brink of full-fledged confrontation.602 These
clashes received widespread coverage around the world.603 As the matter grew in gravity,
the Iranian security language shifted dramatically within few days. While on February 13,
1974, the Iranian government had announced following the border skirmishes that “Iran
[did] not look any opportunity as an opportunity for aggression, because a peace-loving
Iran exert[ed] all its efforts to eliminate tension and expose policies implemented by proxy
in the region,”604 on February 16, in a commentary on Iraqi aggression, the Iranian
government asserted that “as a responsible country which has undertaken to preserve peace,
Iran does not reply to aggression with aggression but by crushing the attacking troops.”605
For so long, Iraq was preoccupied by Iran’s destabilizing support of Iraqi Kurdish
resistance. Therefore, a settlement of the Iranian support for the Iraqi Kurds could possibly
be part of a resolution to Iranian-Iraqi territorial disputes. With that in mind, in September
1974, Saudi intelligence chief Kamal Adham along with a prominent Saudi prince
representing King Faisal, and Egyptian representative Muhammad Ashraf Marwan,
traveled to Tehran to explore ways to resolve the Iran–Iraq border dispute and control the
regional arms race. The Shah believed the Egyptian–Saudi efforts would fail to bring Iraq
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out of the Soviet fold. Yet, he agreed to halt support for Iraqi Kurds in return for a resolution
of the dispute with Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab.
During the OPEC summit conference in Algiers in March 1975, Algerian President
Hawari Boumediene initiated a historical initiative for resolving Iranian-Iraqi disputes built
upon the tacit approval that the Shah gave to Saudi-Egyptian representatives regarding
Iranian support for the Iraqi Kurds. On March 6, 1975, he managed to get Saddam Hussein
and the Shah to sign the Algiers Agreements. The agreement was predicated on the
principle of good neighborliness and implementation of the principles of the inviolability
of national soil, common borders and non-interference in the internal affairs of both sides.
Regarding the Shatt al-Arab dispute, per the stipulation of the Algiers Agreement, the
waterway was demarcated according to the Thalweg line.606 Such demarcation of the water
boundary between the two states granted Iran the better portion of the disputed waterway.
Algiers Treaty revived the traditional bonds between Iran and Iraq. These bonds
with the mediatory efforts that Saudi Arabia brought to the resolution of the Iranian-Iraqi
territorial disputes strengthened, in Washington’s view, the prospect of a collective
regional security arrangement around the Iranian axis, but neither Saudi Arabia nor Iraq
were willing to concede the central role to Iran. The Algiers Treaty would certainly have
been a genuine historical step toward ending the prevailing problems and the ancient
disputes between the two neighbors. The two states could have enjoyed the solid
foundation that the treaty offered for cooperation and mutual understanding to spread
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bilateral relations; however, the revolutionary climate in Iran precluded further
development of those ties.

Iranian-Saudi Relations during King Khalid Reign
On March 25, 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by his half-brother’s son. In a
historical move, Iran declared a week of mourning and the Shah paid a visit to the Kingdom
on 28-29 April 1975 to extend his condolences to the new Saudi monarch, King Khalid.
The two monarchs conducted fruitful discussions regarding bilateral matters, international
issues and matters of concern to the whole Islamic world. The two countries also agreed
that the security and stability of the Middle East could not be obtained without Israel’s
withdrawal from all Arab territories and the restoration of Palestinian rights. At the end of
his visit, the Shah extended an invitation to King Khalid to visit Iran.607 Below, major
characteristics and hallmarks of King Khalid’s reign are presented.

Hallmarks of King Khalid Reign
After ascending to the throne, King Khalid named his half-brother, Fahd as Crown
Prince. Soon after the appointment, Crown Prince Fahd assumed most of the typical
decision-making responsibilities of a King while King Khalid was more a ceremonial
figure due to his deteriorating health.608 Even though such division of tasks between the
king and the crown prince might be reminiscent of King Saud’s period of reign, the Saudi
ruling family did not go through any infighting in this period. Indeed, the politics of ruling
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family during King Khalid reign enjoyed the stability that King Faisal's institutionalized
division of tasks and ministerial jobs among senior princes had brought to the Saudi court.
It was in this period that the so-called Sudairi Seven609 became more consolidated as a
political force among the Saudi ruling group.
Despite relative stability in the court of Al-Saud, King Khalid’s period of reign
(1975-1988) was raucous. In this period, the contradiction between Saudi Arabia’s Islamic
rhetoric and increasing materialist tendencies within the Saudi society began to unfold and
paved the way for the return of the Ikhwan. While Islamic worldview and foreign policy
bolstered Saudi’s position both internally and externally, they exposed the kingdom to
criticism with the slightest deviation from what was deemed as the Islamic ideal. During
the annual pilgrimage season on November 20, 1979, the siege of the mosque in Mecca by
Juhayman al-Utaybi and Muhammad al-Qahtani was the strongest manifestation of that
underlying tension in Saudi Arabia. Prior the siege, Juhayman had preached strongly
against relations with “infidel powers,” materialism and corruption. He was a strong voice
in delineating the appropriate relations between ulama and power. The accusatory rhetoric
that Juhayman espoused against the Saudi ruling family had strong resemblance to that of
Ikhwan against Abdul Aziz in the late 1920s. “Religious and moral laxity and degeneration
of the Saudi rulers” were among the charges made against the ruling family.610 In response,
King Khalid had Shaikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz issue a fatwa in support of the ruling family
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and the use of military force in and around the holy sites. In a matter of two weeks, Saudi
forces crushed the neo-Ikhwanian rebellion, killed al-Qahtani, arrested Juhayman and some
170 of his followers.
King Khalid had to face the outcome of other social tensions that were created
during the reign of King Faisal including the unrest in the Eastern Province where the
majority of Saudi Shiite lived. Discrimination against Shiites on theological, economic and
social levels611 gave rise to grievances strong enough to foment unrest in the Eastern
Province where the oil industry was based. These grievances exacerbated by the success of
the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the anti-Saudi rhetoric of the post-revolutionary Iranian
leadership, turning some Shiite activists into “Muslim rebels.”612
King Khalid’s period of reign was contemporaneous to major regional events with
serious repercussions for the Saudi domestic scene. Notable events in this regard were the
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran which inspired Islamic activism in several Arab countries
including Saudi Arabia, scathing criticism of the Saudi-American relations by the postrevolutionary Iranian leadership, Soviets invasion of Afghanistan which made Saudi ruler
more apprehensive than before of communist threat, and the Iran-Iraq war which brought
a large-scale regional conflict to Saudi borders.
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Iranian-Saudi anti-Communist Collaboration within the Framework of Safari Club
In the years to follow, Iran and Saudi Arabia under King Khalid collaboratively
assisted the United States conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The support
Egypt received from Iran and Saudi Arabia helped Anwar Sadat break with radical Arab
states which culminated in the conclusion of the Sinai Agreements in 1974, 1975 and
eventually the 1979 Camp David Accords. By the end of the negotiation process, Saudi
Arabia and Iran had withdrawn from the forefront of efforts to lead Egypt into the Western
hemisphere, allowing the US to take credit for their past efforts.
In 1976, Iran and Saudi Arabia joined Morocco, Egypt, Israel and France to form
the so-called Safari Club. The club was an elite intelligence force, meant to thwart leftist
governments and support anti-communist regimes. The formation of the club was
contemporaneous with the United States reluctance to get dragged into conflict zones;
however, the group maintained an informal connection with the CIA. The United States
government deemed the formation and maintenance of the Club vital to the American
interests, specifically in the aftermath of interesting events in U.S. domestic politics which
had disrupted the government’s modus operandi. The US Congress had passed the War
Powers Resolution in 1973 and the Clerk Amendment in 1976 in reaction to the Executive
branch’s involvement in decades of covert military actions.613 These Congressional moves
came at the heels of the revelations by the Rockefeller Commission and the Church
Committee regarding the government’s utilization of CIA and FBI in illegal operations.
Therefore, Kissinger avidly advocated supporting the Club without partaking in it so that
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it would effectively fulfill American objectives by proxy. He firmly believed that America
should “get others to do what [it] want[s] done, while avoiding the ... blame if the operation
fails.”614 Prince Turki Al-Faisal who served as the head of the Saudi intelligence service in
those crucial years captured the essence of the time in his 2002 speech at the Georgetown
University. Turki al-Faisal said, “Your intelligence community was literally tied up by
Congress. It could not do anything…. In order to compensate for that, a group of countries
got together … and established what was called the Safari Club. The principal aim of this
club was that we would share information with each other and help each other in countering
Soviet influence worldwide, and especially in Africa.615
The club’s notable accomplishments, among others, are successful military
intervention in Zaire in response to an invasion from Angola, providing arms to Somalia
in its conflict with Ethiopia during 1977-1978, and contributing to the initiation of peace
negotiation between Egypt and Israel. The club was heavily funded by Saudi Arabia and
Iran, and the heads of the intelligence apparatus in both states kept close contact to
coordinate the effort. Iranian-Saudi collaboration within the Safari Club framework
continued until 1979 Iranian revolution.616
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Saudi’s Perception of the Tumultuous Year Leading to the Islamic Revolution in Iran
Shah insisted on the Iranian role in the preservation of the Persian Gulf security as late
as March 1978 in spite of the events unfolding in Iran. In an interview with London BBC,
when asked by Richard Kershaw if Iran was prepared to intervene in the Persian Gulf
region to counter further radicalization of the Arab world and eventual emergence of leftwing regimes, Shah responded, “Certainly, this is our duty.”617 In spite of that posture, it
was Iran that was undergoing the most radical of a shift in the region. The recurrent
unsettling unrest, strikes and demonstrations around the country had the entire region
vigilantly watch the course of events in Iran.
Concerned with the anti-regime cries and rallies in Iran, King Khalid sent Prince Sultan
ibn Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation, to pay a 3-day official visit
to Iran. In an audience with Mohammad Reza Shah on April 11, 1978 Prince Sultan
conveyed to the Shah the greetings of his brother King Khalid and the Crown Prince Fahd.
During this audience, which was attended by Iranian War Minister, General Reza Azimi
and Saudi Ambassador in Tehran Shaikh Ibrahim Bakr, the two sides reviewed bilateral
relations and explored ways to strengthen mutual cooperation in various fields.618
On the very same day, the newspaper al-Madinah published an article titled “We and
Iran Are One Nation,” which termed the relations between the two states “fraternal” and
bonded by “spiritual ties.” The article praised the cooperation between Riyadh and Tehran,
underscored the significant role that the two countries played in the region and the world
at large, and emphasized the determination of the two countries to continue their close
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coordination and consultation in variety of security-related issues.619 The official visit to
Iran by Prince Sultan and al-Madinah’s quick coverage of it are signs that Saudis were
anxiously tracing the turn of events in Iran, and in hindsight, the unraveling of a kingdom.
Eight days later, on April 19, Sheikh Hisham Nazir, the Saudi Planning Minister, left
Riyadh for Tehran. According to Riyadh SNA, Nazir was carrying an important message
form King Khalid for the Shah of Iran. The nature of the message has not been documented
to this day. This visit, which occurred only few days after Prince Sultan’s visit to Iran, did
not last more than a day but one can speculate that it was encouraged by the Saudis’
consternation over upheavals in Iran.620
Meanwhile, in Najaf, the leader of the movement, Ayatollah Khomeini had no
hesitation in rendering his harsh critique of the Shah and the incumbent regime in Iran.
This critique, one can argue, further exacerbated Saudis’ anxiety over the Iranian uprising
since there were alarming resemblances between the Iranian and Saudi polities. In an
interview with Le Monde on May 6, 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini asserted:
In all my proclamations to the Iranian people over the past 15 years, I have
always called strongly for the economic and social development in my
country. But the Shah, implementing the imperialists’ policy, strives to keep
Iran in a backward state. His regime is dictatorial [and has no respect for]
individual freedoms …, real elections, the press and parties. In violation of
the constitution, deputies are imposed on people by the Shah. Political and
religious associations are prohibited, and independence of the courts and
cultural freedom no longer exists. The Shah has assumed all there powers.
He has established a single party system and …has made it compulsory to
join it.621
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Putting aside negligible specificities, this critique of the regime in Iran was as applicable
to Saudi Arabia as it was to Iran. Watching how a strong a regime backed by the United
States was shaken by recurrent riots, strikes and rallies was unsettling to a regime that had
its own host of domestic threats and vulnerabilities.
Another special meeting between the Iranian-Saudi officials took place on May 10,
1978. In this meeting Crown Prince Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz received Manuchehr Zelli, the
undersecretary of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, who handed him a message from the Shah
of Iran. The meeting was attended by the Saudi undersecretary for political affairs in the
foreign ministry and the Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia. After the meeting, Saudis
maintained that the message was about common matters of interest, falling within the
framework of the Iranian-Saudi consultations in the interest of the two countries and
peoples.622 The text of the message is still unknown.
On August 24, 1978, Saudi officials publicly, for the first time, expressed their
concern about the turbulence on the Iranian streets. In an interview, Prince Sultan ibn
Abdul Aziz, the Minister of Defense and Aviation, stressed the importance of stability in
Iran. Concerned with the rise in the gravity of the matter, Prince Sultan warned “that any
fundamental disturbance in the situation will upset the security balance in the whole
region.”623 In another interview with on the same day, Prince Sultan accused communism
and international left of fomenting the riots in Iran. He reiterated his concern that “any
basic disruption [in Iran] is bound to affect the security situation in the entire area.”624
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On Nov. 20, 1978, Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal states that Iran
was of great importance to the region and the world and “any problem in Iran [would
naturally] provoke anxiety.” Prince Saud hoped that the situation in Iran would calm down
so that it would resume its important role in the region. He emphasized that Saudi Arabia
encouraged the Shah to remain in Iran and continue with his reign. He maintained that the
achievements of Mohammad Reza were an example for any state aspiring development.625
In an interview with a London-based Arabic newspaper on December 22, 1978,
Ayatollah Khomeini addressed the nature of Sunni-Shiite divide and the prospect of
relations between an Islamic republic in Iran and the royalist regimes in the Persian Gulf
region. Ayatollah Khomeini in response to a question regarding the nexus of incidents in
Iran and Sunni-Shiite differences said, “I have addressed an appeal to our Sunni brothers
thanking them for their struggle against the shah. The Sunnis are out brothers and will
remain so.” He also replied to a question regarding the nature of relations with the Arab
countries littoral to the Persian Gulf after the establishment of the Islamic republic
asserting, “the Islamic republic in Iran will continue to deal with all countries that respect
the independence and freedom of the Iranian people on the basis of the mutual respect
provided that contact and dealing with these states does not jeopardize and violate the
Islamic laws and values, to which the Iranian Islamic republic will strongly adhere.”626 In
an interview with Radio Luxemburg on January 11, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini echoed the
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same principle, stating that the Islamic republic would maintain friendly relations with all
those nations who desire such ties.627
On January 6, 1979, Crown Prince Fahd made interesting commentary on the
Iranian upheavals, demonstrating an uneasy vacillation whether to fully support the
incumbent regime in Iran or prepare for an overhaul. In a statement to Saudi paper alJazirah, Crown Prince Fahd expressed the Saudi Kingdom’s support for the regime of Shah
in Iran on the ground that it was based on legal legitimacy. He said that Saudi Arabia
supports any legal regime in Iran, but also affirmed that the regime of Shah was legal and
had the support of its Saudi counterpart. He continued that the situation in Iran was
detrimental to the stability of the region.628
On January 16, 1979, the days that Shah fled Iran, Saudi paper Okaz expressed
concerns over the growth of communist activities under the leadership of Tudeh Party with
an aim to win supporters amidst popular unrest in Iran. The author of the piece discounts
the complexity of the pre-revolutionary alliance among disparate forces. The disparaging
language of this editorial in accounting for how that alliance came to be is notable. Okaz
wrote:
The communist party which has returned from exile, imagines that, through
absolute or partial power, it can bring about ideological and philosophical
changes in the country’s domestic and foreign policies through new
commitments reflecting strategic ties influencing current Middle East
events. The other extremist side is not aware of this fact. Therefore, this
side, which includes Shiite religious leaders, has deliberately declared that
the political color of the future state, after the Shah’s temporary or
permanent departure, will be purely Islamic and not subject to influence by
any other internal and external forces so as to curb the role of the communist
party, with which it was allied during the struggle and with which it is now
in conflict during the struggle for power. However, the communist party is
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now countering this religious trend, which the popular masses support
because of their deep Islamic beliefs through misleading actions and by
exploiting the ignorance of the majority of the masses. This ignorance is the
result of incorrect educational and cultural policies, lacking in foresight,
which were pursued prior to these incidents. Such policies have enabled the
communists to raise false slogans that they have tried to ascribe to religious
beliefs, such as justice and equality, thus succeeding in winning support
among the broad base, which believes in Islam.629

After Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after years in exile, Riyadh in a
commentary expressed concern about the future course of events in Iran; however, the tone
and language used in this commentary reflected a departure Okaz’s coverage of Iran, and
Saudis’ gradual move to embrace the political overhaul in Iran. This commentary reads:
[Iran,] this great Islamic county has witnessed, particularly in the past few
days, developments whose impact on the various aspects of life there cannot
be underestimated. The question which poses itself most persistently now
is [if] the return of …Ayatollah Khomeini to his country means that calm
and tranquility will return to Iran or the trouble will be intensified. The
answer to this question is …extremely difficult, for only the Iranian people
themselves can create calm and restore tranquility to Iran. Iranian people
are capable of overcoming these troubles and difficulties and of saving their
country from the tribulations of division and anarchy. The Arab and Islamic
nation prays with hope to God to protect Iran and save it from all ill, for any
challenge to any Islamic country is a challenge to the entire Islamic
nation.630

On February 4, Riyadh, clearly in reaction to recent developments in the region,
commented on the composition of Saudi foreign policy in a vague language open to
interpretation. This declaration was indicative of an anxiety that Saudi officials felt as of
massive change one of the most stable countries in the region was going through. Riyadh
declared in this commentary:
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Once again, we recall and important question imposed by events: What
governs Saudi foreign policy and decide its directions? We repeat the
questions while comprehending with great satisfaction that our language is
understandable at the Arab, Islamic and international levels. We do not
speak with a faint voice; we do not deal with events with ambiguity. Many
new developments in the Middle East have confirmed that all that the
kingdom has warned against has happened and that what it is warning
against requires a quick review of all our calculations in order to prevent it
from happening.631

Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal in an interview granted to the Kuwaiti
paper, KUNA on February 5, clarified on the ambiguous Saudi position in the February 4
commentary. Prince Saud al-Faisal asserted that as long as the events in Iran remained of
an internal nature, Saudi Arabia would have no position, but it opposed any changes that
were likely to attract foreign interference.632 On the same day, the Saudi Council of
Ministers met with the Crown Prince Fahd ibn-Abdul Aziz. In this meeting, Prince Fahd
pointed out that the Saudi policy of supporting the Arab right and noninterference in the
internal affairs of other states has not changed due to the latest development in the region.633
In another events on February 5, Prince Saud al-Faisal had an extensive interview
with the special correspondent of al-Siyasah on the developments in Iran. Saud al-Faisal
expressed that Saudi Arabia had nothing against the developments in Iran as they were
reflective of the demands of the Iranian populace, but he asserted that Saudi Arabia
opposed any change that disrupted the balance of power in the region. However, the impact
of developments in Iran was by no means contained within its bounds. In fact, what the
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Saudi officials feared as of the direct or inspirational influence of the Iranian Islamic
revolution was a legitimate threat to the Saudi rule and not far from reality.
The paradigmatic shift in the foreign policy of post-revolutionary Iran was a
rejection to the regional status-quo and a challenge to the legitimacy of the monarchic
regimes in power. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, monarchic and secular forms of
governance were incompatible with Islamic injunctions. He had declared in the 1970s
that monarchy is “one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary
manifestations.”634 Drawing upon Shiite imageries and symbols,635 Ayatollah Khomeini
had called upon religious leaders of all traditions to fight monarchic systems. Saudi
Arabia was host to various opposition fronts with which Ayatollah Khomeini’s call could
resonate. On February 14, Al-Safir, published in Beirut, inquired into the recent unrest
behind the “border curtain of the Kingdom of oil and silence” suggesting that something
menacing was brewing and it was logical to think that events in Iran had played a role in
kindling that.636
Saudi Arabia was about to experience another round of Islamist resurgence in the
likes of 1920s Ikhwan revolt, but this time motivated and inspired by the success of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran. This challenge unlike what Abdul Aziz had handled
successfully emerged in an environment filled with anxiety and doubt. The collapse of a
monarchy in the region in face of revolutionary passions led by a religious leader brought
to the fore Saudi’s fear of its own religious fundamentalists. In addition, the fall of a
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monarchy amidst the United States hesitancy to prop up the regime of a much closer ally
left the House of Saud with questions as to what the United States would do to support
the Saudi Kingdom in face of threats posed by religious fundamentalists.637
The inspiring success of the Iranian Revolution coupled with “American impotence
in face of Islamic vengeance”638 further corroborated by the Iranian students storming into
the American embassy in Tehran and taking hostage American diplomats emboldened
Juhaiman al-Utaibi and Abdollah al-Qahtani to seize the Grand Mosque of Mecca with
the support of two hundred to three hundred men. Clearly inspired by the charges hurled
Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, Juhaiman denounced the legitimacy of the rule by the House
of Saud on the charge that monarchies are alien to Islam in front of thousands of worshipers
that were beseeched in site. Saudi officials emerged from this crisis triumphant and
eventually purged the vault of the Grand Mosque from “corrupt gang of renegades,” in the
words of Amir Nayif ibn Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Interior Minister.639 However, the House
of Saud could not ignore the fact that even though Juhaiman and his followers were some
Wahhabi zealots but their movement was inspired by the paradigm of the Islamic
Revolution which was admired among religious students in Mecca in 1979.
There is no evidence confirming that Saudi Shiites played any role in Mecca
uprising despite speculations to that effect. The Saudi Shiites, however, were not immune
to the message of the Islamic Revolution from across the Arabian Peninsula. This message
resonated well with their long-standing grievances against the House of Saud. The Islamic
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Republic of Iran had assumed ‘an eternal mission for emancipation of the “oppressed”
around the world.’640 This self-bestowed universal mission was predicated on the unique
interpretation of Ayatollah Khomeini of the Shiite political theory.641 Central to Ayatollah
Khomeini’s political worldview was the Manichean imagery of constant struggle of the
“oppressed” against the “oppressors”.642 Joining the leftist Zeitgeist of the time from a
theological angle, Ayatollah Khomeini had assigned the Islamic Republic of Iran, a moral
duty to act as the agent of bringing about the triumph of the oppressed against the
oppressors.643 In December, while observing Ashura, the Shiite day of mourning that
commemorates the death of Imam Hussein, the residents of Qatif took to the streets with
such fervor that the National Guardsmen had to engage them with panic resulting in
violence and bloodshed. In February riots broke out once again with Shiite demonstrators
in Qatif pouring out their wrath against the tyranny of Najdi Wahhabi majority. The
National Guard, once again, met demonstrators with brute force.644
Ayatollah Khomeini’s emphasis on poor masses and his call for social justice and
political participation remained threatening to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain in
which Shiites were more socio-economically disadvantaged than their co-religionists in
Qatar, the UAE or Oman. However, in response to the disturbances stirred by provocative
Iranian post-revolutionary foreign policy, Saudi Arabia managed to calm mass discontent
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by improving the living conditions in Hasa province while keeping a watchful eye on the
Shia community. In November 1980, King Khalid visited Hasa, spoke to Shia leaders and
heard their grievances. This further improved the atmosphere in the Eastern Province.
These developments stopped any further uprisings, in particular as the Saudi Shia had no
institutional links with the clerics in Iran.
The anti-monarchic narrative central to Ayatollah Khomeini’s political theory was
antithetical to the ruling elites in the Arab monarchies of the region. Ayatollah Khomeini
castigated the Al-Saud’s “frivolous and shameless way of life,” which, according to him,
reflected no adherence to Islamic morality.645 The clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia,
however, was not limited to Ayatollah Khomeini’s reproach of the Al-Saud’s hedonism.
Saudi Arabia represented a conservative, status-quo-oriented, pro-Western hereditary
monarchic system which made the symbiosis with the revolutionary, idealistic, antiimperialist and anti-monarchical Iran extremely difficult.646

Concluding Remarks
Despite the relatively stable period between 1969 and 1978 in which Iran and Saudi
Arabia could align their policies and tacitly cooperate on many levels, that cooperation did
not spawn a radical change in the historical patterns of amity/enmity between the two states
as Saudi Arabia and Iran never surmounted their mutually stigmatizing differences deeply
embedded in their political cultures. In other words, while the facade of interactions
between the two states in this decade alludes to cooperation, the convergence of policies
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between the two countries did not occur as the result of a genuine transformation in
historical perceptions. The reason is to be sought in an exacerbated Arab-Persian divide
which was pushed to the back of geopolitical considerations, yet limiting the extent of an
Iranian-Saudi integration.
The insistence of Shah on an exclusionary and chauvinistic ‘Iranianist’ state
identity, in the likes of his father’s, was perceived as “belligerent” by the Arab states in the
region. Iranian nationalism in this period appeared as an expansionist and hegemonic
ideology threatening its geographical, ethnic and cultural neighbors.647 Mohammad Reza
Shah, following the path of his father, nurtured the notion of Iranianism by linking his rule
to ancient, pre-Islamic Persian empires.648 The Iranian self that Shah was promoting in this
period was embedded in the romanticized idea of Aryan superiority over Arab-Semitic
other.649 Such self-identification was anathema to genuinely communitarian relations
among the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region.650
In this ideational context where racially coded Iranian supremacy over the ArabSemitic people was emphasized as the basis for essentializing the Iranian self, Arabs had
begun to develop their own vitriolic discourse towards Iranians. Drawing upon the
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metanarrative of “Arab nationalism”651 developed by Sati Khaldun Al-Husri,652 Arabs
invoked a political strategy that excluded Iran from the arena of inter-Arab politics by
advocating the myth of perennial antagonism between Arabs and Persians. Accordingly,
the Arabs, in their definition of self and advocacy of Arab volkgeist externalized Iranians
as others. According to this view, the Arab nation was a cultural entity held together by a
common language and shared common folklore, a nation that is to be protected from its
chief nemesis, the Persians. In his survey of the image of Iranians in Arab school textbooks,
Talal Atrissi demonstrates that Iranians are mostly introduced as “racist” Persians who
constantly “conspire against the Arab nation, its unity and its language, as well as the
Islamic Arab civilization.” Atrissi confirms that Persians are largely portrayed as evil
invaders constantly conspiring against the Arab nation, and causing sectarian conflict and
unrest in the Arab world. Nevertheless, there are variations of this portrayal in various Arab
societies, and as Atrissi documents, this portrayal, for example, is much softer in Saudi
textbooks than their Iraqi counterparts.653 This ideational divide effectively stymied the
prospect of transforming the communitarian norms and aligned policies into a functioning
security community architecture. In other words, Iranian-Saudi relations from 1962
through 1979, by and large, moved in a canal as a synthesis of common threats with
cooperative norms catalyzed by the Nixon Doctrine provided a ground where the two states
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could manage to overcome some of their historical grievances against one another, yet that
effort was capped by ideational differences fundamentally dividing the two states along
cultural fault-lines.
With the 1979 Islamic revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
regional stability of the 1970s — determined by the Saudi-Iranian equilibrium —
collapsed which led to a long period of bloodshed and hostility in the region. The 1970s
cooperative norms which were consonant with the global norms of ‘appropriate behavior’
had ameliorated the contentious effect of diverging interests and exclusionary narratives
of state identity. The Islamic Revolution was essentially anathema to that order. The role
that Iranian revolutionaries had defined for the Islamic Republic of Iran was a blunt
rejection of the role assigned to the state under Nixon’s Twin-Pillar doctrine.654 The crux
of the new role was the notion of “neither East, nor West,” which called for a radical nonalignment policy and detachment from the Cold War rationale.655 Despite the forbidding
exigencies of the Cold War, this ambitious approach turned Iran from the guardian of the
status-quo under the patronage of the United States to a revisionist state.656
The paradigmatic shift that the Islamic revolution introduced to the region
overhauled the essence and character of regional interaction in the Middle East. The postrevolutionary Iran was intent to unilaterally determine the outcome of regional politics
within the forbidding context of the Cold War. The natural corollary to such self-
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attributed revolutionary state identity was an effort to export the revolution by the “true
and unique Islamic state.”657 Accordingly, Iranian revolutionary/ideological turn exposed
the receptive sub-state political constituencies in other polities in the region, specifically
Shiites. The revolutionary message that the marginalized Shiite communities in the
region received from Iran served as an impetus for their struggle against their suppressive
states.658 This means that Iran’s interaction with the Persian Gulf states and the wider
Muslim world, in negation of the orthodox nation-state principles of the Westphalian
system, became one of interaction with the states in the composite sense of the word as
opposed to its unitary sense.
Soon, the media outlets of the time, religious sermons and seminars, pamphlets of
propaganda material, as well as Iranian embassies became the means to propagate the
Iranian revolutionary message. In Arabic language, programs broadcasted from major
hubs,659 the Iranian government attacked the United States, criticized the collusion
between the Arab states and the US, and denouncing the region’s Arab governments’
harsh treatment of opposition groups. Through frameworks such as the Association of
Militant Clerics and the Revolutionary Guards, the Congress of Friday Imams and Prayer
Leaders, and the Revolutionary Islamic International, Islamic Republic of Iran
coordinated a network of activist clerics, Shiite and Sunni alike, to help import the
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Iranian Revolution into their respective countries.660 Also, the Foreign Ministry and
Iran’s representatives abroad were assigned to “voice Iran’s views to the world” and
“convey the message of the Islamic revolution.”661 Ali Shams Ardakani, Iran’s
Ambassador to Kuwait, confirmed in 1982 that “The Islamic revolution will reproduce
itself in places [plagued by] oppression and social injustice… [therefore] it would be
stupid to believe that revolutionary ideas stop at state boundaries.662
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See Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Modern Islam (New York: Linden Press, 1985), 27;
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In this research, an attempt was made to identify dynamics of Iranian-Saudi
relations, trace patterns of amity/enmity in these relations, and examine the operation of
some variables commonly referred to as chief/contributing factors in these relations.
Below, a brief account of the elements that proved to be enduring factors in
shaping/influencing Iranian-Saudi relations are provided. Here, the emphasis will be on
major themes that capture the essence of Iranian-Saudi relations in decades of their
coexistence. Accordingly, minor incidents and encounters have been excluded.
Iran and Saudi Arabia as an entity in the formation had their first encounter in the
1920s, when Reza Khan began securing Iran's interior, responding to several revolts that
erupted against his new government and suppressing the federal rulers of Qajarid Iran. In
November 1924, Reza Khan launched a campaign to subdue Sheikh Khazal’s rebellion in
Khuzestan. Abdul Aziz perceived Reza Khan’s campaign to subdue Sheikh Khazal in
November, 1924 threatening. This encounter had the Saudis suspect Reza Khan’s
expansionist drive, closely monitor Persia’s next move, and follow further regional
developments with insecurity. In other words, geopolitical considerations informed
Iranian-Saudi relations from the outset. The measures that Abdul Aziz employed in
response to Reza Shah’s growing power and rising star with the British attest to the role
and significance of geopolitics in Iranian-Saudi relations. To be more precise, Abdul Aziz
— concerned with Persia’s expansionist drive into the Arabian Peninsula — concluded
the 1927 Treaty of Jeddah with Britain in order to preempt the materialization of such a
scenario. In another move, Abdul Aziz — having witnessed Britain’s failure to protect its
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Arab ally — unilaterally appeased Iran in 1929 Treaty of Friendship. These events
provide an empirical case for mutual construction of security perceptions, practices and
policies between the two states. In other words, the sequence of events according to the
available data reflect an incontrovertible case of security interconnectedness. Also, the
Iranian-Saudi relations in this period reflect a notable level of agency that both Iran and
Saudi Arabia exercised despite British hegemonic power in the region
In the 1930s, an ethno-racial rift as an enduring component was introduced to the
Iranian-Saudi relations. This period of Iranian-Saudi relations was puzzling as Persia
pursued a policy of avoiding any engagement with infantile Saudi Arabia. In order to
give presence to Saudi entity in the region and reaffirm their assumed identity, Saudis
desired to engage Iran but much to their disappointment, Persia did not reciprocate that
desire, making a curious case of “disregard” in foreign policy. The notion that Saudis
sought affirmation for their identities [a matter of ontological security] in an engagement
with Persia provides yet another case of security interconnectedness. Two factors of
geopolitics and geo-culture explain the course of (non)events in this decade.
Geopolitically, Persia’s primary concern rested with the threats posed by Russia and
Britain. To be more precise, there was neither any real or perceived threat posed by the
neighboring Arab states that would amount to that level of gravity, nor these states could
be part of any solution to Persia’s affliction with Russo-British interventionist policies.
However, an ideational/geo-cultural element contributed to such an outcome in
conjunction with the abovementioned geopolitical considerations. This element had to do
with the gradually dominating narrative of Iranian nationalism predicated on a
romanticized notion of glorious pre-Islamic Persia which was essentially anti-Arab. This
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racist/racialist notion informed Reza Shah’s European-style modernization and the
pursuit of the Persian fate in relation with Europeans and not “racially sub-par Arabs.”
The (re)construction of Iran’s classical past as an epoch in which the nation existed in its
homogeneous and untarnished form was the foundation of the nationalist discourse that
emerged out of a complex interplay between mobilized myths and legends representing
pre-Islamic Iranian culture and an appropriation of racialist Aryanism. This essentially
anti-Arab discourse defined Reza Shah’s foreign policy toward Arab states, specifically
Saudi Arabia. The relevance of Persian-Arab divide for the states’ preferences, policies
and practices which endured as a subtext to the Iranian-Saudi relations for the subsequent
decades had its origin in this period.
In the 1940s, the role and relevance of great power politics as yet another
enduring factor in shaping the Iranian-Saudi relations became apparent. The exigencies of
the new era made it both functionally and normatively mandatory for the states to
subscribe to the ethos of either the Western or Eastern bloc. Without any vacillation, both
Iran and Saudi Arabia submitted to the patronage of the United States. Therefore,
clientelism in a variety of degrees and sense became a common feature in both Iranian
and Saudi foreign policies in this period. Nevertheless, the two states exhibited two
distinct modes of clientelism despite the sameness of their patron. For Saudis, clientelism
was a desirable mode, a status to aspire for, and a condition that was a host of political
and economic benefits. Saudi Kings, except for a short period of policy disarray during
King Saud’s reign, enthusiastically desired continued American involvement in the
region which could mean more American aid and contribution to the development and
stability of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, such a presence and active involvement of the
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United States in the region, Saudi Kings were convinced, was a protective measure for
the House of Saud in face of a large swath of domestic threats to their rule. The material
and ideational compromises that Saudi Arabia have historically made to carve themselves
a secure space in American strategic thinking, thus ensuring the continued support of the
United States demonstrates the gravity of this matter for Riyadh. On the other hand, a
clientelist status has never been Iran’s status of choice, a glorious state of being, and
conducive to permanent security and prosperity. Iran never strived for a clientelist status
rather it viewed it as a fallback position, a point of departure, and a point from which to
resurge. From the earliest days following the of the WWII, Iran was placed in the
Northern Tier, therefore deserving an important place in the American strategic thinking.
In fact, Iran was passively dragged into the new world order, as opposed to Saudi Arabia
that actively strived to attain a parallel role and position. There is not enough evidence to
argue that such a rift caused serious tensions in Saudi-Iranian relations before the Islamic
Revolution; however, this variable played a significant role in defining the nature of
Iranian-Saudi relations after 1979. There is no evidence suggesting any strong case of
Iranian-Saudi security interconnectedness in this period as the real security concerns in
both Tehran and Riyadh rested in (re)positioning their respective states in the post-WWII
world order. During this period, Iran and Saudi Arabia both converged and diverged
policies on a number of issues; however, the realities of the new era overshadowed these
policy practices and neither gained momentum enough to influence patterns of amity and
enmity. In fact, Iranian-Saudi encounters in this period, regardless of nature and outcome,
were diluted, sporadic and episodic.
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The 1950s introduced the importance and relevance of two themes/layers of
analysis for the Iranian-Saudi relations. First, both Iran and Saudi Arabia proved to be
highly sensitive to major political events in adjacent regions and their spill-over effect on
the Persian Gulf. This is yet another enduring element that has defined/impacted the
nature of Iranian-Saudi relations in certain historical junctures. Second, the role and
impact of domestically generated vulnerabilities — caused by the maladies of statesociety relations — in constraining foreign policy options and thereby defining foreign
policy choices came to the fore. The Iranian-Saudi relations in the 1950s were impacted,
more than anything, by Nasserism and the Israeli question. The case was made in the
analysis of this period that the Iranian government perceived the Egyptian growing
influence in the region primarily through pure Cold War geopolitical considerations. In
the 1950s, Iran was primarily concerned with the Soviet Union and the Soviet-supported
leftist Iranian opposition groups. In fact, Shah did not perceive Nasserist pan-Arabism as
a threat on its own right, but he was concerned that this ideology could function as a
vehicle for the expansion of the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf region. On the other
hand, the instability ingrained in the foundation of the Saudi polity (as discussed in
chapter two) imposed certain choices and policies on the Saudis when dealing with the
predicament of Nasserim became the order of the day. Unlike Iran and its pure
geopolitical considerations with regard to Nasserism, Saudi Arabia had more reasons to
feel apprehensive of Nasser’s eastward move and ideological narrative. Nasser’s suprastate identity of pan-Arabism was an existential challenge to Saudi Arabia’s idea of the
state. Exposure to Nasser’s pan-Arabism as a strong supra-state source of identity placed
Saudi rulers in a precarious situation. The pan-Arab ideals normatively pressured Arab
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states to adhere to ideals that were anathema to the state’s sovereign status and
independent foreign policy-making, an imposition that could shake the foundation of the
infantile Saudi state. With such predispositions, Iranian pure geopolitical response to the
challenge as witnessed in de facto recognition of Israel and close cooperation with this
state in a variety of areas stood in contradistinction with Saudi’s ambivalent response to
this scenario. This divergence of policies went beyond straining Iranian-Saudi relations.
Indeed, Riyadh — in line with the rest of the Arab world — turned anxious as to what
Tehran’s real intentions behind such a preference/policy were, an anxiety that was only
reinforced when Iran joined the 1955 Baghdad Pact and decided to remain on the
sidelines of the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. After a decade of dormancy, the 1950s witnessed
a resurgence in Iranian-Saudi mutual construction of security perceptions and policies.
In the 1960s, Iran and Saudi Arabia experienced relatively amicable relations in
spite of a variety of factors which could potentially distance the two states. Among the
factors, one can note Iran’s adamancy in maintaining ties with Israel, Iranian-Arab
territorial disputes in anticipation of the British withdrawal from the region and a power
vacuum created thereof, Iran’s demonstrable regional assertiveness and its rapid military
build-up, and contention over the sovereignty of Bahrain. Two factors convinced Iran and
Saudi Arabia that pursuing cautious political ties, in spite of disagreements and
differences, was vital to their interests. First, the threat of Nasser and his Pan-Arab
ideology to the Persian Gulf region persisted into the 1960s; however, unlike the 1950s,
this threat proved to be of positive impact on Iranian-Saudi relations thank to King
Faisal’s introduction of prudence to Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy after almost a decade
of disarray under King Saud’s aegis. The second factor that kicked in the second half of
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the decade, was cooperative norms propagated by the Johnson administration’s Persian
Gulf policy in anticipation of the British withdrawal from the region. Despite ebbs and
flows, Iran and Saudi Arabia sought to establish closer ties in order to coordinate their oil
policies within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), curb
Nasser’s moves in the region, and collaborate to maintain the regional peace and security.
This partnership was of immense strategic importance for Mohammad Reza Shah to the
point that he allegedly maintained that neither could theological differences undermine
the Iranian-Saudi partnership nor Iranian-espoused Shiism was meant to overshadow the
Saudi role in the Islamic world. This positive invocation of foundational theological
differences constitutes the first and only instance where this notion was brought to the
forefront of foreign policy rhetoric between the two states. Shiite-Sunni schism is
commonly cited as one of the most important factor explaining the Iranian-Saudi difficult
relations. In contrast to this suggestion, there is no evidence from the years covered in
this study that corroborates that essentialist notion. Interestingly, the theological divide
was never utilized in any securitizing language by either Iran or Saudi Arabia even in the
heat of their most divisive tensions. In addition to that, the Shah of Iran had alluded that it
does not intend to politicize the religious divide by any means. When in a symbolic visit
to Saudi Arabia on June 3, 1968, Mohammad Reza Shah referred to King Faisal “Amir
al-Muminin,” he was clearly hinting Saudi Arabia that Shiite-Sunni divide did not need to
be a determining factor in their interstate relations. In this period, mutual understanding
between King Faisal and Mohammad Reza Shah about their common interests and their
respective constraints helped them emerge from difficult times of the decade and
overcome setbacks, join forces in launching regional initiatives such as Organization of
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the Islamic Conference, and set the stage for continued constructive political relations
during the 1970s. At the outset of the first Islamic Summit, King Faisal and Mohammad
Reza Shah entered together and received a standing ovation from an audience that
included kings and presidents of the Islamic world. This positive image captures the
essence of the Iranian-Saudi relations in this 1960s.
Iranian-Saudi relations continued with its remarkable growth into the 1970s due
to the consolidating effect of the cooperative norms that the 1969 Nixon Doctrine set
forth. During the latter half of the 1960s, Iran and Saudi Arabia learned how to cooperate
in certain areas without letting their disagreements and rivalry negatively impact their
relations. The Nixon Doctrine further solidified these relations. Nixon’s Doctrine was
slightly different from Johnson’s Persian Gulf policy as it offered a greater role to Iran
rather than Saudi Arabia. According to the documents, between 1969 and 1972,
Mohammad Reza Shah aggressively lobbied Nixon to allow Iran fill the void left by the
British withdrawal in the region. Accordingly, Nixon administration promoted Iran, and
to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, as guardians of regional security and as bulwarks against
Soviet expansionism. This policy involved the provision of military armaments to these
two key allies with the aim of achieving regional security. In spite of disparate American
support for Iran, Tehran and Riyadh could align their policies and tacitly cooperate on
many levels. Nevertheless, that cooperation did not spawn a radical change in the
historical patterns of amity/enmity between the two states as Saudi Arabia and Iran never
surmounted their mutually stigmatizing differences deeply embedded in their political
cultures. In other words, while the facade of interactions between the two states in this
decade alludes to cooperation, the convergence of policies between the two countries did
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not occur as the result of a genuine transformation in historical perceptions. The reason
was the exacerbated Arab-Persian divide which was pushed to the back of geopolitical
considerations, yet limiting the extent of an Iranian-Saudi integration. This ideational
divide effectively stymied the prospect of transforming the communitarian norms of the
decade into a functioning security community architecture. In other words, Iranian-Saudi
relations overcame historical grievances, yet its further expansion was capped by
ideational differences fundamentally dividing the two states along cultural fault-lines.
The cut-off point for this research was set at 1979 for greater intellectual
consistency; nevertheless, the identified dynamics for the Iranian-Saudi Relations
continued to define the nature of these relations in the decades to follow. The rift between
Iran and Saudi Arabia came to complete rupture after other fault-lines were introduced to
their relations after the revolutionary overhaul in the Iranian foreign policy. A snapshot of
how these dynamics operated after 1979 is provided below.
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